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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this case study was to evaluate the flood recovery process for the
Minot Public School District after the devastating Souris River Flood of 2011, and to
provide a definitive study of the recovery of a school district after a natural disaster. This
study identified the school  community’s  processes involved with financial, emotional,
and social aspects of recovery, and identified key players in the recovery process.
The research consisted of nine focus groups; three groups of teachers, three
groups of parents, and three groups of community members. Formal interviews were
also conducted with community leaders and subject matter experts identified by focus
group data. Questions for formal interviews were developed, in part, with input provided
during focus group discussions.
The study utilized a qualitative approach to identify (a) the factors of recovery;
(b) the key players in the recovery process; and (c) an evaluation of the success of
recovery as a whole, as noted by individuals directly affected by the flood. Eight themes
developed during analysis of this research: (a) the pre-flood and evacuation period was a
traumatic experience and was the first crisis faced by Minot residents directly affected by
the flood; (b) the assessment and recovery period was a traumatic experience and was the
second crisis faced by Minot residents who were directly affected by the flood; (c) the
FEMA Individual Assistance program, while expeditious in nature, received mixed
reviews by Minot residents who were directly affected by the flood; (d) the FEMA Public
xv

Assistance program was a contentious process subject to intervention by political leaders
before consensus could be reached and recovery could begin; (e) crisis management is a
collaborative process involving federal, state, and local government, as well as volunteer
services from charitable organizations; (f) long-term effects of a natural disaster span far
beyond the physical recovery of homes, businesses, and school buildings. The Minot
Public School District community was drastically changed as a result of the Souris River
Flood of 2011; (g) effective communication has been lacking during all phases of crisis
and recovery, and has created a layer of confusion and mistrust throughout the Souris
River Valley; and (h) the Souris River Flood of 2011 negatively affected survivors;
negative effects have included social, emotional, and financial hardships. The study
indicated that pre-flood social, emotional and economic stability, combined with the
ability to self-advocate and self-perform during reconstruction were key components in
the recovery process.
For the purpose of this study, key stakeholders included: teachers, parents,
students, school administrators, school board members, community members, community
leaders, and government officials.

(KEY WORDS: Minot, North Dakota, Natural Disaster, School, FEMA)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Souris River has flooded on numerous occasions since the inception of
Minot, North Dakota, in the late 1800s (ND Department of Emergency Services, 2011).
The flood of 2011 surpassed all previous records and officially marked the seventh such
occasion since 1881 that flood waters inundated the Souris Valley (Obenchain, 2011, p.
B1). On many other occasions, the river was dangerously close to flooding the valley,
but flood mitigation efforts were successful, and the city was spared from extensive
damage.
In the years of 1904, 1916, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1969, and 2011, the Souris River
swamped a large part of residential Minot, North Dakota, interfering with public services
and requiring large-scale evacuation (Appendix A). Minot Public Schools received
damage to several buildings during these years. The most notable was the damage
sustained to Erik Ramstad Middle School in 1969, when the building was flooded with
38 inches of water that remained in the structure for 38 days (Minot Public School
District, 1969).
Like other communities located along a major river, Minot has monitored the
Souris River system closely. For many years, the National Weather Service (NWS) in
collaboration with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has provided a
flood forecast for the region each year. The origins of the Souris River Flood of 2011
1

began in December of 2010. In a flood forecast, the Saskatchewan Watershed Authority
announced that:
Above-normal precipitation during this past summer and fall has left much
of the eastern portion of Saskatchewan saturated. Rivers and creeks are
flowing at rates well above normal for this time of year and some streams,
which are normally dry in the fall, are flowing. It is anticipated that these
flows will continue throughout the winter. (Saskatchewan Watershed
Authority, 2010, p. 14)
Heavy winter snowfall, coupled with wide spread spring rains, heightened
concerns of flooding and many flood forecasts were reported. On May 28, 2011, the
Minot  Daily  News  reported  “the  entire  Souris  River  reservoir  system  remains  near  
capacity and vulnerable to significant  rainfall”  (Obenchain, 2011, p. B1). In an effort to
describe  the  city’s  current  flood  protection  of  levies,  Roland Hamborg, Regional
Direction  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers  reported,  “It’s  an  extraordinary  event  that  is  getting  
beyond the flood they [the levies] were  designed  for”  (Obenchain, 2011, p. B1).
Heavy rains over the Memorial Day weekend of 2011 and full reservoirs along
the Souris River presented a certainty of flooding to residents along the river basin. On
May 31, 2011, Colonel Michael Price of the United States Army Corps of Engineers
stated,  “There  will  be  flooding  in  the  city  of  Minot”  (Obenchain, 2011, p. B1). On June
1, 2011, Minot Mayor Curt Zimbleman ordered the evacuation of 10,000 residents who
resided in the Souris River Valley (ND Department of Emergency Services, 2011).
On May 30, 2011, Minot Public School Superintendent David Looysen ordered
the evacuation of all school buildings in the evacuation zone (Vollmer, 2011). The
2

district removed a large portion of the contents of Erik Ramstad Middle School, Perkett
Elementary, Sunnyside Elementary, McKinley Elementary, Central Campus PLUS, the
Adult Learning Center, and Head Start from school buildings. In order to maximize the
time available, utility crews moved first-floor inventory to the second floor at Longfellow
Elementary, Roosevelt Elementary, and Lincoln Elementary. A seven-foot earthen levy
was built around Erik Ramstad Middle School and a five-foot earthen levy was built
around Lincoln Elementary. Sewer lines were capped and manhole covers were welded
and secured with several tons of sandbags. This work continued for nearly a week
(Vollmer, 2011).
On June 6, 2011, Mayor Zimbleman allowed several residents to return to their
homes (City of Minot, 2012). By June 10, 2011, it appeared the river had been contained
with no flooding in the valley. The United States Army Corps of Engineers ordered the
removal of the earthen levy at Lincoln Elementary. The district did not move items back
into school buildings at this time (Vollmer, 2011).
However, a major rain event in Saskatchewan on June 18, 2011, forced city
officials to order another evacuation. Flood projections were now expected to pass the
1969 flood by at least 7 feet. At a press conference on Monday, June 20, 2011, Mayor
Curt  Zimbleman  stated,  “It’s  hard  to  realize,  but  we  are  going  to  become  a  lake”  
(Obenchain, 2011, p. B1). The message at this press conference was consistent with the
statement made by the mayor; flooding in the Souris River Valley was imminent.
Minot Public Schools responded by securing local construction companies to
expand the earthen levy at Erik Ramstad Middle School to 14 feet. On Tuesday, June 21,
2012, Minot’s  Public Works Director, Alan Walter, ordered that school structures in the
3

inundation zone were to be considered as crucial infrastructure (Vollmer, 2011). This
allowed the district to be assisted by the USACE and the North Dakota National Guard,
who built a 3 foot Hesko barrier system around Longfellow Elementary and worked with
local contractors to secure Sunnyside Elementary (Vollmer, 2011).
Attempts to bring clay to the Lincoln Elementary site proved futile. Poor bridge
conditions and other access issues forced the district to leave the structure unprotected.
Construction crews were secured to protect Perkett Elementary, but clay was unavailable
(Vollmer, 2011). On June 21, 2011, incoming Minot Public School District
Superintendent, Mark Vollmer, ordered construction crews to excavate the playground
area around Perkett Elementary in order to build a levy to protect the school. Crews
worked throughout the night, completing the project shortly before noon on June 22,
2011 (Vollmer, 2011).
The river exceeded its limits and poured over its banks at 12:57:20 PM on June
22, 2011 (City of Minot, 2012). The Souris Valley was inundated with water for 30 days.
The Minot Public School System owned nine buildings that received heavy damage as a
result of the flood. The total financial loss to the district has surpassed $76,000,000.
Need for the Study
The Minot Public School District received extensive damage as a result of the
Souris River Flood of 2011. Although other school districts have experienced extensive
loss as the result of a natural disaster, limited research has been conducted to identify
issues of loss and recovery for public schools.
The Souris River Flood of 2011, like many other natural disasters, caused extreme
damage to district infrastructure and upset lives. The magnitude of this event was noted
4

by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and has been recognized as the
third largest temporary housing relocation in FEMA history (Hintz, 2013). All in all,
4,152 structures, 522 business, and 7 parks located in the city of Minot were damaged in
this event. Minot Public School District #1 owned nine buildings affected by the Souris
River Flood of 2011.
Recovery from a catastrophic event is daunting. While infrastructure loss is
concrete and relatively easy to determine, emotional recovery is difficult to assess.
Limited research has been conducted to identify the full scope and breadth of recovery.
In general terms, the question begs to be asked: What does recovery look like, and
furthermore, what constitutes a complete recovery from any type of natural disaster?
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study was to evaluate what constitutes full recovery from a
natural disaster. The researcher examined victim perceptions of the Souris River Flood
of 2011, and has attempted to address all facets of recovery.
Research questions included:
1.

What social, emotional, and economic processes are associated with school
community recovery from a natural disaster?

2.

What  demonstrates  that  a  school  community’s  recovery  is  complete?

3.

Who are key players in a recovery process of a school community?
Delimitations of the Study

The study had the following delimitations:
1.

The case study involves the Minot Public School District and community.
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2.

Some participants may be strongly affected by the Souris River Flood of
2011 and may be unwilling to share their experiences or unable to express
their feelings.

3.

The number of interviews, surveys, and focus groups were limited, and
represented a purposeful sample of flood victims.
Assumptions of the Study

The assumptions in this study included:
1.

Participants were affected, in some way, by the Souris River Flood of 2011.

2.

Participants that participated in interviews, surveys, and focus groups
responded honestly to questions.

3.

Participants served as a purposeful sample of individuals affected by the
Souris River Flood of 2011.
Definition of Terms and Acronyms

The following terms were used in this study. The definition of terms is intended
to provide clarity and specificity regarding use of terminology in this study. Terms
included:
(CFS) Cubic Feet per Second: Cubic feet per second (CFS) is a common
measurement for measuring the flow of water in channels. The USACE and the NWS
closely monitor cubic feet of water flowing per second at the Minot Broadway Bridge
and the 4NW Bridge, as well as several locations upstream and downstream of the city of
Minot (Obenchain, 2011, p. B1).
(FEMA) Federal Emergency Management Agency: The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is an agency of the United States Department of
6

Homeland Security, initially created by Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978
and implemented by two Executive Orders on April 1, 1979. The primary purpose of
FEMA is to coordinate responses to a disaster that has occurred in the United States and
that overwhelms resources of local and state authorities. The governor of a state in which
a disaster occurs must declare a state of emergency and formally submit a request to the
President of the United States that FEMA and the federal government respond to the
disaster (FEMA, 2007a).
International Souris River Board: The International Souris River Board is made
up of residents of the United States and Canada who reside along the Souris River. The
board meets on a regular basis to discuss river management in both nations (International
Souris River Board of the International Joint Commission, 2009).
Minot Public School District: A school district located in north central North
Dakota, which hosts an inventory of 19 school buildings serving approximately 7,500
students and 1,400 employees (Vollmer, 2011).
(NDDES) North Dakota Department of Emergency Services: The North Dakota
Department of Emergency Services (NDDES) was founded by the 59th Legislative
Assembly of the State of North Dakota. This agency has worked directly with FEMA,
and serves as a state liaison for FEMA and other disaster-based federal and private
organizations (ND Department of Emergency Services, 2011).
North Dakota Game and Fish Department: The North Dakota Game and Fish
Department, founded in 1909, is  a  state  agency  designed  to  manage  the  state’s  natural  
resources. The North Dakota Game and Fish Department maintains control of the Lake
Darling Dam along the Souris River Valley (Wilson, 2005).
7

(NWS) National Weather Service: “The National Weather Service (NWS), once
known as the Weather Bureau, is one of the six scientific agencies that make up the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the United States
government”  (“National  Weather  Service,”  2014,  para.  4). The NWS closely monitors
weather conditions along the Souris River Valley during potential flood events (National
Weather Service, n.d.).
(HMGP) Hazard Mitigation: The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
provides grants to states and local governments to implement long-term hazard mitigation
measures after a major disaster declaration. The purpose of the HMGP is to reduce the
loss of life and property due to natural disasters and to enable mitigation measures to be
implemented during immediate recovery from a disaster. The HMGP is authorized under
Section 404 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(FEMA, 2011).
(PTSD) Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Post Traumatic Street Disorder (PTSD)
is a severe anxiety disorder that can develop after exposure to an event that results in
psychological trauma. This event may involve the threat of death to oneself or to
someone else, or to one's own or someone else's physical, sexual, or psychological
integrity, overwhelming the individual's ability to cope. As an effect of psychological
trauma, PTSD is less frequent and more enduring than the more commonly seen acute
stress response. Diagnostic symptoms for PTSD include re-experiencing the original
trauma(s) through flashbacks or nightmares, avoidance of stimuli associated with the
trauma, and increased arousal—such as difficulty falling or staying asleep, anger, and
hyper-vigilance. Formal diagnostic criteria (both DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10) require that
8

the symptoms last more than one month and cause significant impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning (Breslau & Alvarado, 2007).
Stafford Act: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (Stafford Act) is a United States federal law designed to bring an orderly and
systematic means of federal natural disaster assistance to state and local governments to
help them carry out their responsibilities in aiding citizens. This act established the
Presidential Disaster Declaration system, which triggers federal financial and resource
assistance to eligible states and local authorities through FEMA. Through the Stafford
Act, FEMA is the designated coordinating agency during federally declared disasters
(FEMA, 2007b).
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority: The Saskatchewan Watershed Authority
leads management of Saskatchewan’s  water  resources  to  ensure  safe  drinking  water  
resources and reliable water supplies for economic, environment, and social benefits for
the people of Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan Watershed Authority manages the
Rafferty, Alameda, and Boundary Dams that provide flood control for the Souris Valley
(Saskatchewan Watershed Authority, 2010).
(USACE) United States Army Corps of Engineers: The United States Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE) is a U.S. federal agency under the Department of Defense
and a major army command made up of around 37,000 civilian and military personnel.
USACE is involved in a wide range of public works throughout the world. The Corps of
Engineers provides outdoor recreation facilities that are open to the public, and provides
24% of U.S. hydropower capacity (US Army Corps of Engineers, n.d.a, n.d.b).
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Researcher's Background
The researcher has been a professional educator since 1990, having worked as a
teacher and administrator in several North Dakota School districts. The researcher served
as a high school principal for 9 years at Minot High School – Magic City Campus before
starting his position as Superintendent of Minot Public School District #1 on July 1,
2011.
After being hired as Superintendent of Minot Public School District #1, the
researcher worked closely with outgoing superintendent, Dr. David Looysen. The
researcher was involved in mitigation efforts before the flooding in 2011 and before his
official start date as superintendent. Since the flood, the researcher has worked closely
with local, state, and federal officials during the flood event and in subsequent recovery
efforts.
Organization of the Study
This dissertation study is organized into six chapters. Chapter I includes an
introduction, need for the study, experience of the researcher, purpose of the study,
delimitations of the study, assumptions of the study, and definitions of terms and
acronyms. Chapter II provides a literature review. Chapter III includes a description of
the methodology utilized in the study, including the collection and analysis of data.
Chapter IV includes a presentation of the findings of the study. Chapter V includes the
summation of research and central phenomena of the study. Chapter VI includes a
summary and conclusions from the study, as well as recommendations for action.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), responds to several
natural disasters each year. The agency also works closely with affected communities to
rebuild and recover community infrastructure. Natural disasters vary in devastation and
intensity. These variances have direct effects on the level of federal response. The
literature review for this dissertation emphasized:
the definition of natural disaster,
the economic effects of disaster,
the sociological effects of disaster,
the role of the federal government in the recovery process, and
the importance of hazard mitigation as a component of recovery.
The definition of disaster is examined in the first section of this literature review.
This section describes how disaster recovery is not limited to the reconstruction of
buildings and structures; the process must include sociological aspects of recovery as
well. The financial loss associated with disaster cannot be ignored and is examined in a
separate section of this literature review.
The next section of the literature review addresses the sociological effects of
disaster and begins with an overview of psychological studies linked to disaster
11

survivors. Current literature in regard to the diagnosis and treatment of survivors is
examined.
Federal involvement plays an important role in the recovery process and is
examined in the next section of the literature review. Hazard mitigation implementation
is a requirement set forth by the federal government as a critical component in a disaster
recovery process. Hazard mitigation requirements and procedures are explored in the
final section of the literature review. A conclusion is provided at the end of this chapter.
What is a Disaster?
Disaster is defined as “An occurrence causing widespread destruction and
distress; a catastrophe” (“Disaster,”  2007,  p.  402). The consideration of any event as
catastrophic requires close evaluation based on sound theory and methodology (Bunge,
1998). This evaluation must consider more than a study of property loss. The evaluation
process must include a study of sociological impact, including emotional loss,
redistribution of wealth in the community, and the specific effects on socio-economic,
race, and gender groups within the community (Quarantelli, 2005).
The challenge of defining a natural disaster is exacerbated by a plethora of
research and study. Lowell Carr (1932) was the first researcher to study disasters through
a lens of cultural change. This concept of studying disaster together with cultural change
was embraced by Kroll-Smith and Gunter (1998), who suggested the definition of
disaster should be designed, in part, by those who experience it. Others (Britton, 1986;
Buckle, 2005; Shaluf, Ahmadum, and Mustapha, 2003) believed the definition of disaster
is best left to federal agencies mandated to respond to disasters.
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The United States government, through the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (2007), refers to a disaster as either an emergency or a major
disaster. According to the Stafford Act, a major disaster is:
Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water,
winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide,
mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or
explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the
President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. (FEMA,
2007b, p. 2)
This definition addresses economic and sociological impacts, including loss and
suffering.
Collateral damage is not only measured in dollars. The emotional toll brought
forth by a major disaster is significant and cannot be ignored. These emotional concerns
can manifest through issues of mental illness and suicidality (Alexander, 2004; Carver &
Scheier, 1994; Drescher & Foy, 2010; Kessler et al., 2008; Madrid & Grant, 2008; Shear,
Frank, Houck, & Reynolds, 2005), marital problems (Davis & Ender, 1999),
manifestation of complicated grief and bereavement (Drescher & Foy, 2010; Fullerton,
Ursano, Kao, & Bharitya, 1999; Njarian et al., 2001; and Weissbecker, 2009). Children
are also prone to severe anxiety, and stifling of normal development may occur in
children after a major disaster (Bradley, 2007). These issues resonate throughout a
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community and can have a negative effect on public organizations and social structures.
Schools are not exempt from the adverse effects of a major disaster (Schwab, 2010).
Research has shown that disaster cannot be limited to the description of a
particular event. A recovery process is an extension of an actual disaster (Drescher &
Foy, 2010; Fullerton et al., 1999; Najarian, Goenjian, Pelcovitz, Mandel, & Najarian,
2001). Recovery is affected by a variety of factors, including long-term recovery that is
“recognized  across  social  time  as  a  radical  change”  (Rosenthal,  1998,  p.  226).    This  
recovery  may  include  changes  in  community  demographics  and  create  “disruptions  in  
cultural  expectations” (Horlick-Jones, 1995, p. 311).
Previous disaster research concluded that institutions cannot always safeguard
against the perils of natural disasters (Smith, 2011). This uncertainty can create a sense
of social vulnerability within a community (Oliver-Smith, 1998) and can foster a social
aura  that  leaves  a  community  “analytically  frozen  at  one  point  in  time”  (Quarantelli,  
2005, p. 340). Sociological ideology must be considered in a recovery process. Smith
(2011) noted that residents may become frustrated when they realize rules and procedures
change after a disaster. This frustration can lead to anger, spite, and a sense of
helplessness (Carver & Scheier, 1994).
Disaster is not easy to define. While all disasters share certain common
dimensions, the long-term effect or response may be very different (Quarantelli, 1998).
Political subdivisions tend to first concentrate on economic issues of a disaster, leaving
social issues to medical personnel within a community (Quarantelli, 1988). Alexander
(2004) noted that disaster research is not limited to specific study, and therefore,  “none  of  
us  should  presume  to  have  all  the  answers”  (p.  97).    Disaster and subsequent recovery are
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best handled by communities who work collaboratively in order to seek acceptable
solutions to complex issues (U. S. Department of Education, 2006; Zevenbergen,
Veerbeek, Gersonies, & Van Herk, 2008).
So, how can we best define the meaning of a natural disaster? The answer rests in
a heuristic approach to understanding disaster and the cumulative effect a disaster has on
a stricken community (Becker, 1976; Godschalk, Rose, Mittler, Porter, & Taylor West,
2009; Lindell & Prater, 2003; Olshansky & Johnson, 2010). A community that has
experienced a natural disaster must initiate and participate in rational discussions in
regard to the event, study ramifications brought forth by the disaster, and work
collaboratively to develop a recovery plan.
What is Recovery?
In the aftermath of a natural disaster, community agencies are left to develop
short-term and long-term plans for recovery. While some might think that recovery is
easy to define, research shows that disaster survivors may have very different ideas as to
what recovery should look like (Baird, 2010). Anderson (2008) found the definition of
recovery is dependent on the view of the evaluator, stating that for some, recovery is a
return to pre-disaster conditions. For others, it is defined as community revitalization that
involves hazard mitigation and risk reduction. Most researchers believe that true
recovery is reached when the community is returned to a condition that is as good as, or
better than, before (Baird, 2010).
FEMA (2009) provided recommendations for political subdivisions intending to
develop emergency plans in a report called Developing and Maintaining State,
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Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans. Recommendations
included:
the development, coordination, and execution of service- and siterestoration plans;
the reconstitution of government operations and services;
individual, private-sector, nongovernmental, and public assistance
programs to provide housing and to promote restoration;
long-term care and treatment of affected persons;
additional measures for social, political, environmental, and
economic restoration;
evaluation of the incident to identify lessons learned;
postincident reporting; and
development of initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.
(p. 6)
While FEMA recognizes the need to address social and political restoration, this issue is
not at the forefront of recovery discussions. Therefore, leaders of recovery efforts must
recognize that recovery is a complicated process that involves economic, social, and
emotional aspects for individuals and governmental sub-divisions.
Waugh (2000) found that recovery is divided into short-term recovery and longterm recovery. Short-term recovery involves an emergency period immediately
following a disaster, which entails the restoration of power, critical infrastructure, health
and safety treatment, and clearance of debris (Department of Homeland Security, 2003;
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Lindell, Prater, & Perry, 2006). Long-term recovery involves a long-range plan for
developing a community that is resilient from future disasters (FEMA, 2002; FEMA,
2007a; FEMA, 2011; Godschalk et al., 2009; United States Government Accountability
Office, 2007).
While recovery is essentially a local issue (Jennison, 2008; Olshansky & Johnson,
2010; Pielke, 1999), the role of the federal government in recovery remains a paramount
consideration. Federal involvement can be seen in short-term and long-term recovery
efforts alike (Burby, 2006). The role of the federal government in regard to recovery and
hazard mitigation will be addressed later in this chapter.
Recovery can vary by individual, family, business, or community (Lindell &
Prater, 2003). This individual sense of recovery may be affected by a variety of issues
such as:
financial status before the disaster,
property loss due to the disaster, and
the effects of hazard mitigation on personal property and loss of financial
resources (Peacock & Girard, 1997).
Recovery is difficult to define, and therefore, recovery time is also difficult to assess.
Kates and Pijawka (1977) suggested that normal recovery from a disaster will take
between 2 and 8 years.
Economic Effects of Natural Disaster
A natural disaster can create extensive disruption to victims. This disruption is
witnessed as citizens await financial compensation, infrastructure repair, and
determinations in regard to long-range planning (Olshansky & Chang, 2009). Physical
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recovery can affect the lives of citizens for years, while the social-emotional toll created
by an event can last for decades and slow a recovery process (Johannesson, Lundin,
Fröjd, Hultman, & Michel, 2011).
Mileti (1999) discovered a drastic increase in the number of natural disasters
occurring in the second half of the 20th century compared to the first half of the century.
Since 1999, we have seen devastating earthquakes in Turkey, Taiwan, India, Iran, and
Kashmir, that have resulted in a cumulative death toll that exceeds 126,000 (Olshansky &
Chang, 2009) and a tsunami in 2004 that claimed the lives of over 283,000 people in 10
countries (U. S. Geological Survey, 2004).
Hurricane Katrina hit the United States mainland in August of 2005 and remains
the most devastating disaster that has occurred in the history of the United States,
resulting in the displacement of 770,000 people in the southeastern quadrant of the
country (Townsend, 2006). Researchers believe that global warming and rising sea levels
will prompt even more horrific storms and disasters in upcoming years (Olshansky &
Chang, 2009).
The effect of disaster extends beyond actual crisis and emergency response.
Long-term results of a natural disaster may take years to correct. In New Orleans,
recovery was inconsistent and uneven among precincts (Olshansky, Johnson, & Topping,
2006). French, Lee, and Anderson (2010) concurred with this finding, noting negative
impact was more serious in poorer and smaller communities. Gunderson (2010)
discovered  “the  speed,  severity  and  complexity  of  natural disasters continually challenge
the  ability  to  generate  an  appropriate  response”  (p.  1).    Therefore,  some  individuals  are  
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not as prepared as others, or may not be able to prepare to deal with the devastation of a
natural disaster.
Resilience is key to overcoming negative effects of a natural disaster. Resilience
is a process of creating community leadership structures to assist in recovery from a
current disaster and to mitigate the danger of future disasters (Burby, 2006). According
to Vale and Campanella (cited in Berke & Campanella, 2006), resiliency is defined as:
The ability to survive future natural disasters with minimum loss of life
and property, as well as the ability to create a greater sense of place among
residents; a stronger, more diverse economy; and a more economically
integrated and diverse population. (p. 193)
Post-disaster recovery is similar in many ways to post-war recovery (van Horen, 2002;
Yarwood, 1999). Whether as a result of war or disaster, recovery efforts force a
community to improve and revitalize infrastructure, as well as provide for long-range
planning for future expansion (Blanco & Alberti, 2009). Resiliency is an important
component of recovery from a natural disaster.
Very little research has been conducted in the field of natural disasters. Several
researchers have provided qualitative studies in regard to the immediate effects of
specific disasters, including family and household recovery (Bolin & Stanford, 1998;
Mileti, 1999; Quarantelli, 1999) and business loss (Alesch, Arendt, & Holly, 2009;
Chang & Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2002). While these
studies are somewhat incomplete, they show a common thread; homeowners and business
owners with the least number of assets and resources struggle the most until federal
assistance arrives (Olshansky & Chang, 2009).
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Despite efforts to provide quantitative and qualitative research in regard to
economic recovery after a natural disaster, no consensus has been reached on defining
what economic recovery is, or what it should look like (Olshansky & Chang, 2009).
Comerio (1998) found that recovery means more than providing temporary housing
during a post-disaster period. Other researchers have concluded that recovery involves
extensive planning, from responses to an initial emergency, to long-term planning to
develop appropriate infrastructure to supporting a recovering community (Gordon,
Richardson, & Davis, 1998; Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhammer, 2000). Community
infrastructure, such as utilities and transportation systems, plays a vital role in immediate
and long-range recovery. The infrastructure components, while independent of each
other, can fail and lead to additional failures of related systems (McDaniels et al., 2007).
School districts are not exempt from this concept (United States Government
Accountability Office, 2007).
Economic effects of a natural disaster can be devastating. The extent of damage
can depend on a variety of circumstances such as:
1.

the location of the disaster, i.e., rural or urban;

2.

the duration of the disaster period; and

3.

pre-planning and hazard mitigation programs (Blanco & Alberti, 2009).

The failure to plan accordingly can result in social vulnerability within a community
(Kreps & Drabek, 1996). Quarantelli (1988) found that a key component in disaster
preparedness rests with the ability to recognize the difference between a disaster and a
minor emergency. Many researchers (Jennison, 2008; Kick, Fraser, Fulkerson,
McKinney, & DeVries, 2011; Meyer, Henry, Wright, & Palmer, 2010; Quarantelli, 1988)
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concur that the ability to plan and provide an appropriate response to a natural disaster is
a key component in limiting economic loss. Financial loss, while undoubtedly
devastating, is only one negative aspect of a natural disaster. Social and emotional
upheaval may also be present among victims (Madrid & Grant, 2008; Norris et al., 2002;
Weissbecker, 2009).
Sociological Effects of Natural Disaster
Economic loss is a major component of a natural disaster. Economic loss can also
exacerbate social and emotional problems (Jones, Immel, Moore, & Hadder, 2008;
Kristensen, Weisaeth, & Heir, 2009; Weissbecker, 2009; Whaley, 2009). Left untreated,
these emotional problems can manifest over a period of time and may result in serious
mental conditions such as Complicated Grief (CG), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), and other psychological problems (Drescher & Foy, 2010; Fullerton et al., 1999;
North et al., 2008; Regehr & Sussman, 2004).
Many people who experience a natural disaster are traumatized (Whaley, 2009).
While federal, state, and local organizations are quick to provide temporary shelter and
food following a disaster, little attention is paid to mental health issues (Jones et al.,
2008). These issues can be aggravated by previous tendencies toward depression and
mental illness (Drescher & Foy, 2010; Whaley, 2009). Without appropriate treatment,
mental health issues can worsen and result in marital problems, extreme depression, and
suicidal ideation (Fullerton et al., 1999; Kessler et al., 2008; Shear, 2006).
Researchers have gathered very little longitudinal data in regard to the long-term
psychological effects of a natural disaster (Kristensen et al., 2009). This data may be
lacking for a variety of reasons. Madrid and Grant (2008) found that federal and local
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relief  policies  “tend  to  underemphasize  mental  health  preparedness  and  interventions  
relative  to  physical  health”  (p.  90).    In  many  instances,  victims  may  not seek counseling
due to financial constraints or unavailability of trained psychiatric professionals
immediately following the disaster (North et al., 2008).
Grief is one symptom often noted in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Parkes
(1996) found that while grief is considered to be a process rather than a mental disorder,
extensive or Complicated Grief can manifest to the status of mental illness. Parkes stated:
The assertion that, because grief will be experienced by most of us sooner
or later, it cannot be said to be an illness is not valid. If a bruise or broken
arm, the consequence of physical injury is in the realm of pathology, why
not grief, the consequence of psychological trauma. (p. 5)
Regehr and Sussman (2004) helped define the difference between normal grief and
Complicated Grief, expressing that normal grief does not interfere with social, emotional,
and physical functioning for extended periods of time. Complicated Grief may mirror
symptoms of depression and may require psychiatric assistance (Fullerton et al., 1999;
Jones et al., 2008; Kessler et al., 2008; Najarian et al., 2001).
Availability of mental healthcare providers is often compromised after a natural
disaster. Jones et al. (2008) found that in disaster-ravished areas, mental health
professionals are often overworked and may experience extreme emotional burnout.
Madrid and Schacher (2006) stated that over-worked trauma counselors may suffer from
vicarious traumatization, an extension of a victim’s  trauma  that  is  felt  by  the  therapist.    
This manifestation can cause the therapist to develop feelings of depression and
helplessness (Culver, McKinney, & Paradise, 2011; Hunter, 2012).
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In many instances, victim depression may manifest through psychosomatic pain
and functional impairment (Kristensen et al., 2009). These ailments may be treated by a
general practitioner, who may provide treatment for physical symptoms rather than the
emotional root of the problem (Maguen, Neria, Conoscenti, & Litz, 2009; Neria et al.,
2008). Inappropriate treatment may result in a variety of complications, including
additional mental health issues, such as Prolonged Grief Disorder (PGD). PGD has been
reported in 14-76% of populations affected by natural disasters (Ghaffari-Nejad, AhmadiMousavi, Gandomkar, & Reihani-Kermani, 2007; Johannesson et al., 2011; Kristensen et
al., 2009; Neria et al., 2008; Shear et al., 2005).
In the wake of a natural disaster, it is evident that recovery is not equal. Victims
of low socio-economic status tend to suffer the most in the midst of a natural disaster
(Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Kessler et al., 2008; Madrid & Grant, 2008). Alterman (2005)
noted this inequity in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, stating that many povertystricken victims did not have the financial or emotional means to escape the disaster.
Furthermore, the city government did little to provide an appropriate level of assistance.
Bolin (1993) noted that immediate housing shortages and temporary housing
arrangements in disaster-stricken areas can create stress in as little as one month
following a disaster.
Research has shown that certain individuals or neighborhoods are vulnerable to
the effects of a natural disaster (Cutter, 2003; Kasperson, Kasperson, & Dow, 2001;
Wisner & Walker, 2005). This phenomenon is known as hazard vulnerability (Wisner,
Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). Vulnerability researchers contest that existing social
and economic structures have a meaningful effect on what was once referred to as a
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natural disaster (Cannon, 1994; Maskrey, 1994). Quarantelli (1990) said, “There can
never be a natural disaster; at most there is a conjuncture of certain physical happenings
and  certain  social  happenings”  (p.  18).    Wisner  et  al.  (2004)  further  defined  vulnerability  
as  “The characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their
capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover  from  the  impact  of  a  natural  disaster”  
(p. 11). The understanding of vulnerability in relationship to the handling of the disaster
and subsequent recovery efforts is a key component of disaster recovery research (Madrid
& Grant, 2008; Thomas & Holzer, 2006).
Vulnerability plays a huge role in how communities rally and react to a natural
disaster (Alterman, 2005; North et al., 2008). Lindell and Prater (2003) found that
economically depressed areas affected by a natural disaster reacted ineffectively to the
disaster and often were the slowest areas within a community to recover. Thomas and
Holzer (2006) found these areas were the last to receive emergency assistance as well.
Whaley (2009) and Kessler et al. (2008) noted that mental illness among the victims of
disaster was more prevalent in low-income areas and was often left untreated.
Much research has centered on the role of race and gender in social vulnerability.
Bolin (1982) noted that extensive damage is often noted in areas where minority groups
reside. Wilson (2005) argued that a racial divide exists in the process of disaster
recovery, causing long-lasting social and political ramifications for minority populations.
Research shows that gender is also related to social vulnerability. Enarson and
Fordham (2001) found disaster vulnerability is not directly related to low socio-economic
status, although poverty does play a role in the recovery process. While affluent females
may be more resilient to the effects of a natural disaster, they remain vulnerable to
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disaster-related issues such as emergency evacuation, loss of physical property, and the
stress of recovery (Enarson & Fordham, 2001; Fothergill, 2004; Hoffman, 1998). This
effect is compounded with females of low socio-economic status who have more
restraints and fewer options for recovery (Bradshaw, 2001; Enarson & Fordham, 2001).
Fordham and Ketteridge (1998) noted that poor women struggle with recovery issues
primarily because they have often been living in a state of crisis before a disaster hits.
Children are especially vulnerable in the midst of a natural disaster. Bradley
(2007) found that children affected by a natural disaster are prone to a variety of anxietyinduced trauma, which left untreated, could result in long-term mental illness. This
trauma can result in a variety of psychiatric problems, criminal behavior, and drug use
(van der Kolk & McFarlane, 1996). Successful parenting strategies play a crucial role in
the treatment of children who are vulnerable after a natural disaster (Bradley, 2007).
Research shows that children respond differently than adults to social and
emotional issues surrounding a natural disaster (Bradley, 2007; Pfefferbaum, Houston,
North, & Regens, 2008). Lewis and Junyk (1997) noted that children have limited
abilities to regulate emotional responses, and therefore, may be unable to express their
feelings and concerns in an appropriate manner. Current research shows the ability of a
child to deal with social and emotional impacts of a natural disaster are related to:
the ability of the child to cope with issues present before the disaster,
the extent of the disaster, and
the ability of the child and his/her family to maintain general safety
throughout the disaster and subsequent recovery (Garbarino, 2001; Pynoos
et al., 1987; Rutter, 2000).
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Treatment of mental illness is a crucial component of a recovery process
(Bradley, 2007; Madrid & Grant, 2008; Weissbecker, 2009; Whaley, 2009). While
treatment options may vary by diagnosis, current research shows a disconnect between
the diagnosis of normal grief and psychological illnesses such as severe anxiety, clinical
depression, and PTSD (Feske, 2008; Jones et al., 2008, Zappert & Westrup, 2008).
Madrid and Grant (2008) found that victims of Hurricane Katrina found solace in
returning to a normal routine as quickly as possible. Ginzburg (2008) noted that
individuals who survive a natural disaster should be referred to as survivors rather than
victims, thus creating a positive aura and affirmative self-perception. Alegria et al.,
(2008) found that survivors of a natural disaster can benefit from telling their story
without interruption. So, how can mental health professionals determine the difference
between general grief and complicated mental illness?
Research shows that survivors who were diagnosed with depression before a
natural disaster were at a higher risk for poor mental functioning following the event
(Fullerton et al., 1999; Kessler et al., 2008; & Kim, Plumb, Gredig, Rankin, & Taylor,
2008). Ginzburg (2008) noted that many clinicians rush to judge and misdiagnose
normal depression as other disorders. This misdiagnosis may be directly related to the
lack of qualified mental health professionals who are forced to relocate as a result of a
disaster (Thomas & Holzer, 2006). Although research shows that most disaster-induced
mental illness resolves within 2 years following an event (Kessler et al., 2008), early
intervention and appropriate treatment are often necessary (Drescher & Foy, 2010;
Kessler et al., 2008; Kristensen et al., 2009; Madrid & Grant, 2008; Najarian et al., 2001;
Whaley, 2009).
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Recovery from a natural disaster involves more than economic, social, and
emotional factors – a community must also concentrate efforts on rebuilding
infrastructure as part of the recovery process (FEMA, 2011). While city planners work
with a variety of state agencies and volunteer organizations, the role of the federal
government is paramount to recovery and long-range planning in the United States.
Federal Involvement in a Recovery Process
The role of government is very clear in the wake of a natural disaster. Federal
assistance is provided by FEMA, a division of the Department of Homeland Security
(FEMA, 2007a; FEMA, 2007b). This assistance is provided to communities and private
nonprofit organizations under the Public Assistance (PA) program (United States
Department of Homeland Security, 2007).
FEMA operates under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §5121-5207, or the Stafford Act (FEMA, 2007b).
FEMA’s Public Assistance program provides funding to assist communities recovering
from a natural disaster. Once the president of the United States has declared an
emergency in a given location, FEMA is instructed to mobilize to that community (or
communities) and spearhead an immediate recovery process (United States Department
of Homeland Security, 2007).
FEMA does not control all aspects of a flood recovery. FEMA operates under the
notion that local decision-making is a key component of a successful recovery initiative
(Kick et al., 2011). That said, it is important to note that FEMA, in compliance with the
Stafford Act, is required to follow specific provisions of the law. Failure of any local
government sub-division to comply with provisions of the Stafford Act may result in loss
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of some, or all, federal assistance (Westley, Murphy, & Anderson, 2008). Under
provisions of the Stafford Act, the federal government pays 75% of recovery costs, which
is matched by a 25% local cost share (Rubin & Barbee, 1985; United States Department
of Homeland Security, 2007).
Federal assistance is provided through a variety of venues. Immediate, short-term
solutions are spearheaded by a FEMA Emergency Response Team, while long-term
planning is led by a Federal Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team, or HMT (Rubin &
Barbee, 1985). Hazard mitigation will be addressed later in this chapter.
FEMA provides assistance to individuals and public entities. Individual
assistance is based on financial guidelines, including availability of federal funds
specifically apportioned for disaster relief (United States Department of Homeland
Security, 2007). Public assistance is available to public buildings and certain non-profit
organizations, such as public schools (Davis & Richard, 2005). Private or parochial
schools are excluded from assistance under the Stafford Act (Zehr, 2005).
When damage is caused by repetitive disasters such as flooding of low-lying
areas, hazard mitigation is often a requirement of federal public assistance under the
Stafford Act (Baird, 2010; Burby, 2006; Kick et al., 2011). This may include options for
rebuilding that eliminate flooding danger and provide a least-cost alternative to
rebuilding at a previous location (United States Department of Homeland Security,
2007).
The interaction of federal, state, and local agencies can cause a sense of
competition among various entities and may lead to confusion in regard to individual
roles, priorities, and post-disaster mitigation (Burby, 2006; Pielke, 1999; Wright & Rossi,
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1981). This confusion can create anger when federal regulations lead to limited options
(Gill, 2007; Westley et al., 2008). Platt (1999) noted that while the federal government is
expected to pay the majority of costs linked to a recovery, local government sub-divisions
are angered by federal requirements that alter long-term recovery plans.
The role of federal involvement in recovery planning took on new meaning after
Hurricane Katrina swept New Orleans in 2005. Burby (2006) found attempts to make the
most hazardous areas of New Orleans safe for building added to damage caused by the
hurricane. Grunwald and Glasser (2005) discovered that New Orleans city officials
rejected plans to enhance their levee system to avoid paying the local cost share of
federal projects. This lack of local concern prompted federal officials to place long-term
planning requirements on affected government sub-divisions (Godschalk et al., 2009).
The effectiveness of FEMA has long been debated. The role of FEMA in each
natural disaster is closely scrutinized in the court of public opinion and provides an
opportunity for change and improvement (Roberts, 2006). When Hurricane Hugo
destroyed  much  of  South  Carolina  in  1989,  United  States  Senator  Ernest  “Fritz”  Hollings  
referred  to  FEMA  as  “the  sorriest  bunch  of  bureaucratic  jackasses  I’ve  ever  known”  
(cited in Roberts, 2006, p. 19). Examples of this nature have been cited after every
natural disaster to date; Hurricane Sandy in 2012 was no exception (Johnson, 2012). The
idea that FEMA may be inefficient at best and ineffective at worst is based on the
assumption that individuals experience the most suffering in the aftermath of a natural
disaster, while government officials provide little support to limit individual vulnerability
(Burby, 2006). Regardless of intent, recent disasters have shown that it is difficult for
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government officials to respond in a manner that meets public approval (Pennings &
Grossman, 2008).
Federal involvement in recovery is not limited to financial assistance. Under the
provisions of the Stafford Act, FEMA provides a long-range community response service
known as Emergency Support Function #14, or ESF #14 (FEMA, 2003). ESF #14
employees work with groups in a community to assess that  community’s reality and help
plan to avoid future disaster (FEMA, 2011). Information is gathered through a variety of
community meetings and interviews to assist a community in long-range planning
initiations. The United States Government Accountability Office (2007) found while
several aspects of ESF #14 are acceptable, the organization lacks clarity and specificity in
federal reporting and finalization of community reports.
Federal involvement in disaster recovery remains a controversial discussion. The
question is not related to the need for assistance, but rather the level of support that is
provided. Hazard mitigation, which may affect federal financial assistance, can create an
even larger concern.
Hazard Mitigation
When it comes to the study of leadership, dealing with crisis effectively is the
most extreme test of a successful leader (Kapucu, 2008). Each year, civic leaders are
faced with tough decisions in regard to short-term and long-term disaster recovery.
Rubin and Barbee (1985) found that in regard to these decisions, local involvement is
key. Collaborative decision-making can result in a successful long-term recovery plan
and create a sense of post-event viability within a community (Alesch, 2005; Jennison,
2008; Topping, Hayashi, Siembieda, & Boswell, 2010).
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Hazard mitigation is a key component of long-term disaster recovery (Berke,
Song, & Stevens, 2009). Hazard mitigation involves complex interaction, research,
scrutiny, and planning (Kapucu, 2008; Rubin & Barbee, 1985). In theory, mitigation
programs limit repetitive damage, save money, and provide a safer living environment
(Berke et al., 2009; FEMA, 2007a; FEMA, 2007b; FEMA, 2008; Jennison, 2008; Kick et
al., 2011).
Recovery from natural disaster is a very expensive venture. Hurricane Katrina
remains the most costly natural disaster in the history of the United States with a total
recovery cost of 200 billion dollars (Congleton, 2006; Wolk, 2005). The Red River
Flood  of  1997,  commonly  referred  to  as  North  Dakota’s  flood of the century, totaled one
billion dollars in total damages (Pielke, 1999). The Souris River Flood of 2011 is
expected to exceed the one billion dollar mark (Zeman, 2012). While financial loss
experienced by a natural disaster is devastating, the remedy of hazard mitigation is not an
easy pill to swallow.
In reference to natural disasters, flooding appears to be the most burdensome
disaster and claims the most lives (Brody, Zahran, Highfield, Grover, & Vedlitz, 2008;
Mileti, 1999). Since the 1990s, FEMA has focused their mitigation efforts on repetitive,
non-catastrophic flooding (Kick et al., 2011). This effort involves the mitigation of
circumstances that may prevent future damage from repetitive flooding. While costbenefit studies have shown that homes and businesses should not be constructed on lowlying ground, collective behavior and human decision-making can make mitigation
decisions very difficult (Kunreuther, 2006). Financial rationality is a crucial part of the
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hazard mitigation process, although decision-making in the aftermath of a flood disaster
is not always a straightforward process (Viscusi, 2009).
A 20th century model of rapid community growth led to growth and
overpopulation of areas prone to flooding (Burby, 2006). Newer construction models are
based on avoiding building in danger areas, with sprawling parks and green space in lowlying areas (National Research Council, 2006). This phenomenon has created a natural
hazard mitigation model in rapidly growing cities (Kick et al., 2011). Older communities
were often built near natural water sources. As these cities have expanded, homes
located near water sources may serve as low-income areas (Burby, 2006). Research has
shown that low-incomes areas have the most difficult time recovering after a natural
disaster (Bradshaw, 2001; Enarson & Fordham, 2001).
Hazard mitigation efforts tend to affect those who live in areas prone to repetitive
damage. While a logical assessment of mitigation may make fiscal sense, psychosocial
needs of residents must also be considered (Manzo & Perkins, 2006). Blunt and Dowling
(2006) found that a home is more than a material object; it provides a sense of security
and fills an emotional need. This understanding has also been noted by Brown and
Perkins (1992); Chawla (1992); Brown, Perkins, and Brown (2003); and Manzo and
Perkins (2006).
The federal government plays a crucial role in hazard mitigation planning. In
earlier intervention periods, for example the years 1917 to 1965, the government focused
on structural flood control; and from 1966 to 1992, flood insurance regulations (Kick et
al., 2011). Over the years, each phase of federal disaster response has provided a unique
methodology in dealing with disaster and subsequent recovery.
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The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 established the National Flood
Insurance Program (United States Government Accountability Office, 2007). The
program was created to provide affordable flood insurance to residents as an alternative
to direct assistance after repetitive flooding (Congressional Digest, 2012a, 2012b;
Richards, 2008). The National Flood Insurance Act was amended in 1973 by the Flood
[Disaster] Protection Act. Since the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, homeowners
with a federal home mortgage, who reside in an area prone to flooding, have been
required to purchase flood insurance (Congressional Digest, 2012a).
Mitigation work and successfully limiting flooding in low-lying areas tends to
create a sense of complacency. A survey of Grand Forks homeowners concluded that
while 95% knew what flood insurance was, 79.6% concluded that flood insurance was
not necessary (National Lenders Insurance Council, 1997). Gordon et al. (1998) found
that this paradigm is common in flood-prone communities and is based on the assumption
that natural disasters will not affect a community twice in a given amount of time.
Before the flood of 2011, supposedly successful flood mitigation efforts in the city of
Minot caused the federal government to lift a requirement that residents in flood prone
areas purchase flood insurance (Sulzberger, 2011a). Protective efforts in place were
considered adequate, and then the Souris River inundated the city of Minot in late June of
2011 (Barrett & Nicas, 2011; Sulzberger, 2011b; Zeman, 2012).
In 2000, the United States Congress passed the Disaster Mitigation Act to amend
the Stafford Act (Schwab, 2010). This amendment requires state and local governments
to provide long-range mitigation plans in order to prevent repetitive, non-catastrophic
flooding (Schwab, 2010; Topping et al., 2010). While local entities remain in charge of
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this process, federal compliance is required in order to secure public assistance funds
from FEMA (FEMA, 2007a).
Hazard mitigation is based on the concept of financial practicality – homes and
businesses do not flood when they are moved from high-risk areas (Jennison, 2008;
Olshansky, 2006; Topping et al., 2010). In 2005, FEMA reported that every dollar spent
on hazard mitigation efforts provides four dollars of benefit (Woodworth, 2006). In the
fiscal arena, sound hazard mitigation policy makes sense (U. S. Department of Education,
2006). However, the discussion of sound fiscal practice may be ill received by property
owners, thus creating a rift between local government and residents (Donner, 2008, Kick
et al., 2011).
The role of the federal government in hazard mitigation is a sensitive topic.
FEMA has the ability to provide a variety of federal experts such as engineers,
environmental scientists, and social workers to assist in a recovery process (Brennan,
Cantrell, Spranger, & Kumaran, 2006). However, local residents tend to view the role of
expert as controlling, ineffective, and insensitive (Burby, 2006; Gill, 2007; Pennings &
Grossman, 2008; Platt, 1999; Westley et al., 2008). Brinkley (2006) found that FEMA
operates most efficiently when positive relationships are formed with local officials early
in the recovery process.
Can hazard mitigation be viewed as a successful method for eliminating repetitive
claims for help from natural disasters? While evidence appears to lead one to assume
that yes, hazard mitigation is a successful method for eliminating repetitive claims, more
research is needed (Murphy, 2007). Kick et al. (2011) found that because hazard
mitigation is a relatively new concept, it has presented a ripe opportunity for further
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evaluation. While hard data is not present to affirm the importance of the role of hazard
mitigation in disaster recovery, conventional wisdom implies that hazard mitigation can
limit vulnerability and increase community resilience (Jennison, 2008; Kick et al., 2011;
U. S. Department of Education, 2006).
Conclusion
Chapter II provided a review of literature of natural disaster recovery. The review
was aimed at creating a better understanding of natural disasters and what constitutes
recovery from a natural disaster. Specifically, Chapter II examined the economic, social,
and emotional effects of a natural disaster; federal involvement in the recovery process;
and the role of hazard mitigation in long-range planning. The literature review indicated
that recovery is difficult to define, and therefore, difficult to obtain. The review also
found that while the role of the federal government is necessary, it is not easily accepted.
Recovery is difficult, and collaboration is a vital element of sustainable recovery.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
One cannot dispute the immediate effects of a natural disaster. In the midst of a
natural disaster, the news media swarms to create and promote special interest stories.
Broadcasters share heart-wrenching stories of those who have lost their homes, family
members, or friends. Eventually, the media moves on to another crisis, leaving the
victims in the midst of the rebuilding process.
No human life was lost as a direct result of the Souris River Flood of 2011.
However, many valley residents experienced emotional distress. The valley residents
were evacuated on two separate occasions during the summer of 2011, and watched
damage totals increase during the 30-day inundation period. In late July, residents
returned to the valley to get a first-hand glimpse of the damage caused by the water. The
damage was extensive.
Minot Public School District #1 experienced extreme financial loss as a result of
the Souris River Flood of 2011. Financial loss was relatively easy to determine as
damage estimates were tallied and buildings were either repaired or rebuilt. The
emotional and social loss to the district and its patrons has not been as easy to determine.
The Minot community and school district found that the social and emotional effects of
this event went far beyond any detailed financial damage estimate.
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While one may not question the fact that emotional loss is evident as the result of
a natural disaster, the researcher found very little information and research on the topic.
Specifically, no definitive research had been conducted to explore what constitutes full
recovery of a school community following a natural disaster. The purpose of this
research is to seek answers to research questions listed below.
Research Questions
The purpose of this study was to evaluate what constitutes full recovery of a
school community following a natural disaster. The study examined perceptions of
victims and public leaders in regard to the Souris River Flood of 2011 and subsequent
recovery efforts up to the time of this research.
Focus group sessions and individual interviews were conducted to answer the
following research questions:
1.

What social, emotional, and economic processes are associated with school
community recovery from a natural disaster?

2.

What  demonstrates  that  a  school  community’s  recovery  is  complete?

3.

Who are the key players in the recovery process of a school community?
Introduction

The Souris River Flood of 2011 had a dramatic effect on many Minot residents.
While all citizens were very aware of the flood and the subsequent damage, not all
citizens were affected equally. In total, 4,152 structures and 522 businesses were heavily
damaged (City of Minot, 2012). Many other businesses were forced to close during the
flood, and owners of these businesses have experienced financial losses as well. Some
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families lost their homes and sources of income; some only lost their homes; while others
lost homes, businesses, and schools.
The story of the Souris River Flood of 2011 cannot be told by financial facts and
figures alone. The researcher felt struggles and recovery efforts could best be
documented through a series of focus groups and interviews. In order to ascertain the
zeitgeist of the Minot community after the flood and the collective response of the
community to the Souris River Flood of 2011, the researcher implemented a qualitative
approach. In simple terms, the researcher acknowledged there was a story to be told in
Minot, North Dakota; a story that could be told by the powerful voices of the Minot
Public School District #1 family and other area residents most affected by the Souris
River Flood of 2011.
Qualitative Methods
The research population included patrons of Minot Public School District #1 who
were affected, in some way, by the Souris River Flood of 2011. The researcher used a
series of focus groups and interviews to evaluate the effects of the flood on citizens of
Minot, North Dakota.
Participant selection for focus groups was based on recommendations from
citizens, school leaders, and community leaders to create a purposeful sampling that
provided an  “information-rich”  environment  for  understanding (Patton, 2002, p. 169).
Focus groups were conducted with parents, teachers, and community members
(community members who had no direct link to the school system). Each focus group
was homogenous, and contained no more than nine participants. The researcher
conducted a total of nine homogenous focus group sessions, three in each category listed
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above. Focus group participants were given a pseudonym, and their names listed as a
participant in the study. All participants were required to sign a “consent to participate”
form (Appendix B).
Qualitative research centers on the notion of who we are and who are the people
to be studied (Hatch, 2002). Hatch also noted the delicacy of vulnerable populations and
was concerned that imbalance of power may cause risk to participants. The researcher is
currently serving as Superintendent of Minot Public School District #1. The researcher
recognizes the level of authority attached to the position of superintendent and,
furthermore, understands that being directly involved in focus groups may hamper
responses of participants who know and recognize the researcher. Therefore, strict
instructions were provided at the beginning of each session, ensuring participants that
participation was voluntary, and that direct quotes would not be attached to a
participant’s name, or to any description that may identify the participant.
Participants in focus groups were asked a series of non-leading questions
(Appendix C) as a basis for discussion. In order to create a thick description of first-hand
accounts, the researcher followed up with more specific, close-ended questions. The
researcher allowed all participants an opportunity to freely express their stories and
opinions while ensuring the major talking points were covered during each session.
Participants were informed the length of each session would be around 90 minutes.
Information gathered by focus groups was transcribed and coded. This process is
clearly defined in the data analysis section of Chapter III. A list of perceived leaders and
significant helpers in the flood recovery process were identified as part of this data
analysis.
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The researcher also conducted formal interviews with state and local leaders who
were directly related to flood recovery efforts. Interviewees were given the option to
participate in the study and were also required to sign a consent to participate form
identical to the form focus group participants were asked to sign (Appendix B). Like
focus groups, interviews were recorded, transcribed, and coded.
Collection of Data & Data Analysis
Minot Public School District #1 supported this research study. The researcher
received a letter of support from the Minot Public School Board President (Appendix D)
to utilize school district data for purposes of this study.
The researcher also gathered data from state and federal agencies, such as the
North Dakota Department of Emergency Services, FEMA, the United States Army Corps
of Engineers, and the Small Business Association. Some data were gleaned through
published reports, and appropriate references were documented. For unpublished data,
specifically school district data, the researcher secured an appropriate letter of permission
from the President of the school board. This letter of permission can be found in
Appendix D.
All focus group participants were provided a reasonable assurance of anonymity.
Also, individuals who participated in the formal interview process were referred to in a
manner that would not unveil their position or identity. All focus group sessions and
formal interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed verbatim.
Varied backgrounds and interests bring unique perspectives to research. Creswell
(2013)  found  that  researchers  have  a  “personal  history  that  situates  them  as  inquirers”  (p.  
51). The researcher, serving as Superintendent of Minot Public School District #1 during
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the flood recovery period, has a keen interest in the findings of this research.
Furthermore, the absence of similar research created an unprecedented opportunity for
this study.
Focus groups were completed during the first phase of the research period.
Observation and interview data from each focus group was transcribed, coded, and
analyzed. The results of focus groups were used to identify key players in the recovery
process. The data gleaned from focus groups assisted the researcher in development of
questions for formal interviews conducted with key players. Formal interviews were
considered a second phase of the research period.
While Phase 1 and Phase 2 differed in specificity and content, the researcher
believes that methodological congruence (Morse & Richards, 2002) showed
interconnectivity between focus groups and interview data. The procedures used to
gather data in focus groups and interviews followed the same protocol.
Participants were afforded the opportunity to provide additional comments during
the focus groups and interviews. The transcript of each session was transferred to a
HyperResearch software program for coding.
Using a grounded theory approach, all codes were categorized; a process of
linking like codes together (Ary, Jacobs, Razavieh, & Sorensen, 2005). The process of
open coding and categorizing was used to create detailed descriptions of each participant.
Axial coding was used to develop categories. The researcher began to examine common
threads or potential themes in the data. Selective coding was used to glean data points to
create a theory. A grounded theory diagram was completed, illustrating commonalities
noted in focus group data. This diagram can be found in Chapter V.
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Verification
The emotional nature of loss and bereavement is astounding. Bereavement is
considered to be one of the most painful experiences of life (Shear et al., 2005). The
researcher recognized the emotional nature of a natural disaster and, specifically,
understood the emotional nature of loss and bereavement as seen by many flood victims.
This emotion may be exacerbated by the presentation of rumor and innuendo as fact. In
order to ensure that all data presented in the study was valid, the researcher provided
separate assurances of validity.
Two analytical strategies were used to test internal validity of data. The first test
included a triangulation of personal report data, legal reference data, and interview data.
The second test involved member checking through a review of interview transcripts.
The researcher concentrated on reporting perceptions of participants, and data
were gathered from surveys, governmental agencies, and public records. Data that could
not be triangulated or verified through member checking were not included in the
findings of the study.
In times of mishap, rumors abound. This was noted during the 2001 Foot and
Mouth Crisis in the United Kingdom. According to researchers at Dominican University,
rumors and gossip began to flourish. Farmers and ranchers were isolated and received
information third and fourth hand; often this information was not based on fact (Hagar,
2009). This created a level of panic throughout the nation.
The researcher recognized that rumors and innuendo are often present during a
crisis and recovery process. In order to preserve the opinions and voices of survey
participants, unverified information, rumor, or innuendo were documented as unverified
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beliefs. While this information may not play a direct role in the recovery process, the
researcher recognized the pandemonium caused by unsubstantiated rumor and the
correlating effect on the emotional well being of victims. The awareness of volatility of
inaccurate information presented in the midst of this natural disaster may assist leaders in
dealing with crises prompted by future natural disasters.
Researcher Background and Subjectivity
The researcher has worked for Minot School District #1 since July 1, 2002. The
researcher has worked as a high school assistant principal, principal, and district
superintendent. During this time, the researcher has developed many relationships within
the community and, specifically, among the patrons of Minot Public School District #1.
Qualitative research is aimed at enriching our understanding of human experience
(Elliot, Fischer & Rennie, 1999). Terre Blanche and Kelly, (1999), found that qualitative
data analysis is designed to glean social, emotional, and historical meaning from data that
is gathered. The patrons of Minot Public School District #1 have a story to tell. As the
leader of this organization, the researcher felt an obligation to bring this story to a level of
common understanding among school district constituents.
As a veteran of Minot Public School District #1, the researcher had ample
opportunity to promote real and accessible dialogue through a qualitative research
framework. This qualitative research study allowed the researcher to be involved in
transcription, coding, and categorization of data collected from focus groups and
interviews, but avoided any potential concerns of coercion.
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Ethical Considerations
Qualitative data should provide an in-depth description of a specific phenomenon
(Creswell, 2009). The Souris River Flood of 2011 is a specific event that has forever
shaped the lives of the Minot Public School District community. The researcher
recognized the sensitive and emotional nature of this disaster and, furthermore,
recognized the emotional effects that may be present during focus groups and interviews.
Participants who experienced emotional difficulty were allowed to opt out of the focus
group or interview at any time. Data that might identify an individual or family was not
used in this study.
Participation in this study was voluntary and no compensation was provided.
Thank you notes were sent to each participant. Each focus group transcription was
shared with a participant to verify accuracy of the transcripts. Findings were made
available to all participants if requested.
Conclusion
The methodology used to conduct this study was described in Chapter III.
Chapter IV will report the data gathered from the study, and Chapter V will include the
central phenomena of the study, as well as an analysis of the relationship of the study to
the literature review found in Chapter II. The researcher will provide a conclusion and
recommendations based on the results of the study in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER IV
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to determine what constitutes a full
recovery of a school community from a natural disaster. This qualitative study examined
the perceptions of residents affected by the Souris River Flood of 2011. This study has
the potential to assist school communities who are suffering the effects of a natural
disaster, and can also support and enhance response plans of governmental agencies and
non-profit organizations that typically respond to disasters.
The researcher chose a qualitative approach to gather and examine the
experiences and perceptions of residents affected by a flood in Minot in the year 2011.
Denzin and Lincoln (2011) found that varied backgrounds bring a unique perspective to
research. It is noted that not every resident of the Souris River Valley was affected in the
same fashion, and therefore, residents affected by the flood had different perspectives on
damage and subsequent recovery efforts. Simply put, the citizens of Minot, North
Dakota, had a unique story to tell; a story that could not simply be relayed by survey data
or financial facts.
The information provided by focus group participants and interviewees was
timely, relevant, and crucial in understanding the social, emotional, and financial effects
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of this natural disaster, as well as determining what constitutes recovery from such an
event.
Selection of Participants
Volunteers for the study were sought by contacting school and community
organizations, as well as placing posters throughout the community (Appendix E). The
response was surprising. Over three thousand individuals were either nominated or
volunteered for participation. Each name was placed on a list entitled, Community
Participation List. Names on this list were compared with school district records to
determine which potential participants had students currently enrolled at Minot Public
Schools. Those potential participants were then placed on a separate list, entitled Parent
Participation List. Teachers and staff members were removed from the Community
Participation List and the Parent Participation List to form a third list entitled, School
Employee Participation List. In order to glean a representative sample from the large
number of potential participants, the principal researcher used a random number
generator to ensure participants provided a unique and unbiased sampling of opinions and
experiences.
Observations Made During Focus Group Sessions
Whaley (2009) found stress of a natural disaster may exacerbate social and
emotional problems. The researcher noted that participation in a flood recovery focus
group sometimes aroused negative feelings and connotations. In order to ensure an
adequate number of focus group participants, additional participants were invited to each
focus group session. The researcher noted several interesting phenomena: (a) the
participation rate exceeded expectations, that is, very few individuals failed to attend their
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scheduled focus group session; (b) while focus groups were scheduled for 90 minute
periods, participants continued visiting for up to 70 minutes after the close of a session;
(c) while several participants exhibited various emotions during focus group sessions, all
participants completed their sessions; and (d) participants appeared anxious to talk about
their experiences, and to share their stories with individuals who had similar experiences.
Charles, a retired teacher commented,  “Thanks  for  inviting  me.    I  feel  a  kinship  with  the  
folks  around  the  table.    It  might  have  not  all  been  the  same,  but  we  are  similar.”    George,  
a  laborer  and  Minot  resident  affirmed  this  belief,  stating,  “This  is  actually  pretty  
therapeutic . . . sitting  with  people  who  experienced  the  same  thing  you  did.    It  doesn’t  
happen  often  where  people  sit  in  the  same  room  that  were  in  the  same  situation.”
The structure of a focus group can create an environment ripe for fabrication and
pretentiousness. Statements used in this chapter were selected as examples indicative of
lived experiences of residents affected by a flood as a whole. Statements that
exemplified outlying experiences or fringe behaviors were not selected for this chapter.
Interpretation of Data
This qualitative study model involved a series of nine focus groups and ten
individual interviews. The information gleaned through this process was extensive. All
interviews and focus group meetings were recorded, and the principal researcher
transcribed each recording verbatim. The transcription process yielded over 700 pages of
documents. A participant from each focus group was asked to review the transcript for
accuracy.
In order to bring out the dimensions of the data, the principal researcher
developed a list of 153 codes. All codes and descriptive examples were verified by Dr.
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Pauline Stonehouse before open coding was conducted (Appendix F). The transcripts
were coded twice to ensure accurate interpretation. In total, 2,743 passages were labeled
and coded during the open coding process. The codes were categorized, and eight
thematic findings were noted.
Thematic Findings
This chapter presents themes that emerged from compilation of data gathered in
focus groups and interviews, as well as documents that were gathered as part of this
study. In order to better understand data gathered in the research process and to capture
the zeitgeist of the Minot community at the time of this study (a couple years after the
flood), the researcher used a grounded theory model. This model included an iterative
process that allowed the researcher to gather and review data in stages in order to develop
a series of themes revealed during the research process. Through a thorough review of
data, eight specific, recurrent themes emerged. These themes are presented as follows.
1.

The pre-flood and evacuation period was a traumatic experience and was the
first crisis faced by Minot residents directly affected by the flood.

2.

The assessment and recovery period was a traumatic experience and was the
second crisis faced by Minot residents who were directly affected by the
flood.

3.

The FEMA Individual Assistance program, while expeditious in nature,
received mixed reviews by Minot residents who were directly affected by
the flood.
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4.

The FEMA Public Assistance program was a contentious process subject to
intervention by political leaders before consensus could be reached and
recovery could begin.

5.

Crisis management is a collaborative process involving federal, state, and
local government, as well as volunteer services from charitable
organizations.

6.

Long-term effects of a natural disaster span far beyond the physical recovery
of homes, businesses, and school buildings. The Minot Public School
District community was drastically changed as a result of the Souris River
Flood of 2011.

7.

Effective communication has been lacking during all phases of crisis and
recovery, and has created a layer of confusion and mistrust throughout the
Souris River Valley.

8.

The Souris River Flood of 2011 negatively affected survivors; negative
effects have included social, emotional, and financial hardships.
Theme #1

The pre-flood and evacuation period was a traumatic experience and
was the first crisis faced by Minot residents directly affected by the flood.
Residents were concerned that flooding was possible in the Souris River Valley
long before water left the river banks on June 22, 2011. In December, 2010, the
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority expressed concern that rivers and creeks normally
dry in early fall were still flowing at the time of freeze up. This prompted the Canadian
government to release water into the Souris river system throughout winter months
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(Saskatchewan Watershed Authority, 2010). A rapid snow melt in March, coupled with
snow and rain events throughout the Spring of 2011, caused increased flows through the
city of Minot (see Appendix A).
Heavy rains at the headwaters of the Souris River during Memorial Day weekend,
2011, created panic among Minot residents. On May 30, 2011, Minot Mayor Curt
Zimbleman ordered the evacuation of 10,000 residents along the Souris River Valley.
The Minot Public School District conducted a mass evacuation of school structures in the
flood plain region. An earthen dike was placed around Lincoln Elementary and Ramstad
Middle School. The Army Corps of Engineers removed the dike around Lincoln School
following the first evacuation.
On June 6, 2011, Mayor Zimbleman canceled the evacuation and allowed
residents to return to their homes. The Army Corp of Engineers, the Saskatchewan
Watershed Authority, the North Dakota Game and Fish Department, and the city of
Minot continued to monitor river levels. At the time, the situation appeared stable. But
then, a final evacuation was ordered on Monday, June 20, 2011, when Mayor Zimbleman
stated,  “It’s  hard  to  realize,  but  we  are  going  to  become  a  lake”  (Obenchain,  2011,  p. B1).
Statements made by participants in this study describe the stress and panic surrounding
Minot’s  final evacuation, and paints a picture of a most traumatic phase of the crisis.
Pre-Flood Fight, First Evacuation, and Life Between Evacuations
On June 6, 2011, the flood scare appeared to be over. Residents were allowed to
return home, despite reports the river level remained high. Many residents gathered their
belongings that were removed during the first evacuation and moved home, while others
remained cautious and did not move. Carl, a local electrician, decided to paint the
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basement  and  clean  carpets,  stating,  “I  thought  it  was  a  good  time  to  do  it.”    Janeen,  a  
daycare provider, cleaned her entire house.
On June 20, 2011, news of additional water coming and more potential flooding
created  a  whole  new  level  of  panic.    The  Mayor’s  office  stated the flood forecast was
much more severe than previously expected. An initial report predicted residents would
have a period of 3 days to evacuate. Subsequent reporting of additional water releases
from Canadian dams reduced predictions to half that time. Burt, an electrical inspector
reflected on this period, stating,
We  lost  a  lot  of  things  that  we  couldn’t  get  out; and I know that if I had
been there, I would have worked, but the timelines they gave us. . . . They
gave us three days on the final, and then all the sudden it was down to a
day and a half . . . so  the  time  was  cut  short,  so  you  couldn’t  get  
everything out.
Residents of the valley were dependent on volunteer labor to provide assistance in
evacuation.
Despite reports that flooding was imminent, many residents were in a state of
denial. Clarice, a social worker, followed up with neighbors during the evacuation
period, and found an elderly neighbor who refused to evacuate. According to Clarice,
“[I] literally  had  to  go  in  and  talk  her  into  getting  out,  because  she  didn’t  want  to  leave. . .
She had evacuated in 1969, and  nothing  happened.”    Alton,  a  retired  city  worker,  recalled  
this phenomena in the Souris River Valley, especially on West Central Avenue, where
people  “thought  there  was  no  way  this  was  going  to  happen.    But,  as  I  drove  through  that  
area right after the water went down, and there were a lot of houses that had everything
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they owned out on the curb.”    Citizens  who  were  well connected depended on volunteers
to assist in a rapid evacuation during the final hours before the flood.
Volunteers During Evacuation
Volunteer assistance was a crucial component of  Minot’s  evacuations.
Individuals who were connected to others in the community had more success in
evacuation and, in general, were able to remove most of their belongings from their
home. Pete, a school teacher and scout leader stated that:
[I had] a lot of friends through scouts and family that brought a trailer
down, and we were lucky enough to get most of the important stuff out or
at  least  up  to  the  second  floor,  so  it  didn’t  get  affected . . . just the
outcropping of friends and family that helped us out along the way.
Cindy, a home daycare provider, noted the valley was  full  of  “roving  bands  of  people  .  .  .  
just  around  to  pick  up  stuff.”
Some residents did not fare so well. Many workers in the public sector struggled
with role responsibility during this period. Jeri, a 911 dispatch operator, stated that 19
Minot police  officers  were  flooded,  “Were  driving  around  town  telling  people  to  get  out  
of their houses, and wishing they could be home to get stuff out of their houses.”    
Vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and economically disadvantaged individuals,
struggled to find assistance during the final evacuation period.
Charles, a retired school administrator, recalled that he and his wife had accepted
that they would not be able to save any items in their home, but they were amazed when a
group from their church  came  and  “backed  into  the  driveway  with  a  flatbed . . . and
things starting going on out of the house.”    This  was reported again and again by several
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elderly study participants. Margaret, a retired secretary, recalled waiting to meet with a
FEMA agent,  and  “there  was  an  elderly  gentleman  waiting, too.    He  didn’t  get  anything  
out  of  his  house.    His  kids  all  live  out  of  state,  and  he  didn’t  know  who  to  call. . . . He
lost  everything.”    Jackie,  a  para-professional noted, “Us  younger  folks  had  friends  and
co-workers, but I think it had to have been tougher for the elderly . . . you just pack your
suitcase and go.”
Public entities were not exempt from the stress of evacuation. The Minot Public
School District went to great lengths to remove essential materials from district buildings
in the inundation zone. Sam, a district custodian, noted that in many instances, the
choices  of  what  to  remove  were  less  than  prudent,  stating  that  “in  many  cases,  it  was  
nickels for dollars. . . . We would carry out boxes of paper, and walk right past expensive
musical  instruments.”    Ring  dikes  around  Ramstad  and  Perkett  limited  the  ability  of  
district personnel to remove items from those schools in the final hours of the evacuation
period.
Limited evacuation was noted among other vulnerable populations as well.
Richard, a retired park district board member, noted that for many, the reality of flooding
was an issue. He stated:
When we got back to our house, we were busy working, so we never
really thought much about it until one day. In general, we noticed that
nobody was there, and a couple of weeks later, we went over, and
everything was still in that house, including their clothes. They must have
gotten very little out. We heard later they had ended up getting a divorce.
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Stress in families and relationships were not uncommon. Pastor Pete, a local
minister,  noted,  “When the hero stage wore off, the strain on relationships was huge. My
observation was that if you had any strain prior to, it was exemplified by the disaster. I
would think you have this disaster to fight, that it might pull people together, but for
many it was the exact opposite – those  problems  intensified.”    Shock  and  stress  was  a  
major issue during the evacuation period.
Stress and Shock Associated With Evacuation
The first reaction reported by participants during focus groups and interviews was
shock associated with the reality of evacuation and flooding. Despite a 3 month preflood fight and prior evacuation, many residents reported experiencing signs of shock
during the second evacuation process and subsequent flood. Sam, a school district
custodian, recalls the evening before the flood, when he went to assist a friend in
evacuating during the second evacuation, stating,
We were just given the order to evacuate again, and I ended up at one of
my  daughter’s  friend’s  house.    I  distinctly  remember  the  dad  walking  
around, drinking gin and tonics, basically laughing at us, because we were
moving his stuff . . . finally at about 8:30, it was starting to get dark, and
then it hit him. He panicked as he was watching the trucks and pickups. . .
It was just like something you would see in the movies.
The shock was evident as citizens scurried during the final hours of the evacuation. Rico,
a former TV journalist, recalled the actions of city council members who were affected
by the flood. “Their expressions were just blank . . . you could almost see a little wash of
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horror  over  their  faces.”    The  shock  quickly  set  into  a  very  stressful  period  of  transitional  
living and a 30 day wait to assess damage from the flood waters.
Transitional Living
In the days following the evacuation, flood-affected residents were forced to find
transitional homes. The Red Cross set up two shelters, one on each side of the Souris
River  Valley.    According  to  Hunter,  a  Red  Cross  employee,  “Less than 300 of the
estimated 14,000 evacuated citizens accessed the shelter system in Minot.” The
remaining residents found transitional living sites, many with citizens of Minot who lived
outside the flood zone. This experience received mixed reviews by participants in this
study.
While some found the experience of living with other families rewarding, many
others noted extreme struggles with communal living. For many, this experience created
a stressful environment that had negative effects on marriage and family. Jeri, a 911
dispatch operator, opened her home to her in-laws, and noted, “It’s  terrible  to  say,  but  it  
was a long time with the in-laws. My husband said, ‘it  won’t  be  that  bad,’ and I said,
‘they’re  your  parents,  and  you  lived  with  them  your  whole  life.’”    Sally,  an  appliance  
salesman, described her living experience:
In Carpio . . . we stayed there until September. . . . We  couldn’t  stay  in  the  
house, so we put our daughter in the house, and she laid on a mattress in
the living room, and my nephew slept on the floor. So, we slept outside in
a little makeshift camper until September. It got to the point, on different
occasions, I woke up with ants crawling all over me.
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Some participants reported extreme issues with transitional living that resulted in
counseling for family members. Tiffany, a special needs teacher, took in a co-worker and
her daughter during the evacuation and early recovery period, both whom she claims
bullied her daughter. She said, “It did happen, and my daughter is still in counseling . . .
and we kicked  them  out  in  September.”
Flood-affected residents with pets also noted stressful conditions. Many hosts
were unwilling to take in pets, and in some instances, those who did were unhappy with
the special attention that was required by the animals. Leila, a delivery driver, stated that
“We  moved  to  our  daughter’s  place  with  our  three  dogs  – It  didn’t  go  so  well,” adding,
“My dogs are like 15 years old, and you can’t  teach  an  old  dog  new  tricks.”    Mark,  a  
secondary math teacher who experienced the Grand Forks Flood of 1997, pondered what
to do with his cat, stating,
We  didn’t  think  at  first  that  it  was  going  to  take  that  long,  so  we  thought  
about just leaving him upstairs, but then we figured we better grab him. I
told my wife, “It’s going to be longer than you think . . . from my
experiences in Grand Forks. . . . It  won’t  be  a  couple  of  days,  it  will  be  
weeks,  and  I  don’t  want  to  find  a  dead  cat  upstairs.”
In many instances, the options for transitional living were limited for pet owners.
While participants expressed sincere gratitude to those who offered shelter during
the transitional period, many experienced a sense of guilt during this time. Georgiana, an
elementary school teacher, noted:
We were with good friends, so we had a basement all to ourselves. But, I
always felt that we needed to do something for them. We needed to cook.
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. . . We needed to clean . . . or do laundry. It felt bad using their things. I
felt like I needed to walk on tip toes . . . not that they made us feel bad, but
you do feel bad. You just feel like you  can’t  do  what  you  want  to.
Alyssa, a stay-at-home military wife, felt the need to show her appreciation. She
explained:
I am a couponer, so that is one way I showed gratitude to the family that
we were living with. . . . I would buy the stuff I could get for free or
cheap . . . because she wouldn't accept any money, and I knew her water
bill had to be going up, and the food bill we took care of because we could
go to the commissary on base, but I felt like we couldn't do enough to
thank her . . . thank you from saving us from sleeping in our cars.
The shock and stress of evacuation, coupled with struggles of transitional living during
the evacuation and flood was the basis of the first crisis noted by flooded residents.
Shelby, an elementary school teacher summed up the stress related to the evacuation and
transitional living period:
As we were leaving our home, and we were driving away from our house
in  my  husband’s  little  truck,  I  looked  at  him  and  thought  .  .  .  I  love  this  
man,  and  I  am  so  glad  that  he  is  here  to  go  through  this  with  me.    I  didn’t  
always like him, but I knew, at this point, that I loved him. Then, we
drove to my sister-in-law’s  tiny  little  house,  and  we  couldn’t  have  sex  for  
8 months.
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Summation of Findings of Theme #1
The pre-flood fight and subsequent evacuation periods were difficult for residents
of the Souris River Valley. Residents who were well connected were able to evacuate
their homes, and in some cases, lost very little personal property, while vulnerable
populations did not have the connections and networks to evacuate from their homes.
Transitional living during the flood and early stages of recovery was a difficult
experience for many. While many residents affected by the flood appreciated the support
of friends, they also experienced guilt in regard to accepting assistance from others.
Theme #2
The assessment and recovery period was a traumatic experience and was the second
crisis faced by Minot residents who were directly affected by the flood.
The period of time that water from the Souris River inundated the valley, while
stressful, paled in comparison to the shock noted by residents as flood damage was
assessed. Many anxious residents attempted to sneak into flood stricken areas before the
ban was lifted in the hopes of providing early assessment of damage. Nick, a local
journalist stated:
I think it was a Sunday morning when I was able to sneak into my
neighborhood, which was one of the last areas to lose enough water to get
into, and I had these big old clod-hopper boots on, and in the house was 3
or 4 inches of mud. There were smoke alarms going off in the
neighborhood, and it was the only sound. . . . It was just dead.
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Jody, a retail manager, noted a similar experience. She reported:
We did the same thing. We snuck in with Hilex jugs and spray. My
husband is a reloader, and we had a lot of stuff in our basement when we
left. We threw the first few jugs of Hilex down, and we heard popping,
and got the heck out of there . . . didn’t  know what that was mixing with.
Shock of damage created a very stressful situation for residents of the Souris
River Valley once the evacuation ban was lifted. While residents of the valley knew their
homes were flooded, many held on to a hope that the damage was not as devastating as
forecast. The initial re-entry  proved  otherwise.    Art,  a  railroad  worker  said,  “Oh,  when  
we  went  in,  we  didn’t  even  speak.    We  went  to  the  back  door  and  unlocked  it . . . why we
locked  it  before  the  flood,  I’ll  never  know . . . we had  no  idea.”    Alyssa,  a  stay-at-home
military wife, recalled her first trip into her flood ravaged home.
My husband actually bought those face masks with the filters on the side,
and he was like, trust me, you’re going to need this. It was the end of July
when we finally went in, and I remember trying to take the mask off to
wipe  the  tears  away,  and  he  wouldn’t  let  me.”
The shock associated with flood damage created a very stressful situation for
many valley residents. Milton, a local mental health provider, commented on how
damage from the flood reminded  him  of  “some  inner  city,  like  Detroit . . . just nothing in
some  of  those  homes”  adding, “We drove around neighborhoods, and it was stunning. In
one neighborhood, we had nine houses that were off their foundations, and that’s  when  it  
really  hit  me.”
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Damage Assessment and Rebuilding
Homeowners were eligible for assistance from FEMA. While the amount of
money provided by FEMA was helpful, it did not cover costs associated with rebuilding.
Other forms of federal assistance were available, and will be discussed later in this
chapter. The responsibility to rebuild fell on the backs of homeowners and landlords.
The ability to assess damage, plan for rebuilding, and seek assistance was directly
related to an individual’s  ability  to  self-advocate. Many citizens had connections in the
community before the flood and those connections provided a great source of assistance
in  planning  and  preparation,  such  as  Elaine,  an  elementary  teacher,  who  said  “I  need  to  be
proactive and get things quickly done, so even when the waters were very high, I had
somebody that I knew could clean my house, and I was calling contractors and trying to
get  them  all  lined  up.”    Others  were  dependent  on  out-of-state contractors who responded
to the crisis, while vulnerable populations, with little or no resources were left in the
lurch.
Many residents were forced to delay decision making due to uncertainty of flood
protection plans. Richard, a retired park district board member, said:
We spent a lot of time wondering, and you know . . . until we were
actually  able  to  get  in  and  see  what  was  really  going  on,  we  really  didn’t  
have any idea, and we look at and wondered . . . what are they going to do,
and what can we afford to do?
Richard was not alone in his concern. Lelia, a delivery driver, stated:
It  took  us  so  long  to  dig  in,  and  we  didn’t  get  to  work  on  our  home  right  
away,  because  we  didn’t  know  what  the  plan  was  for  that  diversion  
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project, so we just ended up waiting. We waited until November of that
year, until the city decided they were not going to do anything with the
Ramstad Loop, then we fixed our home. We were kind of behind
schedule and then had to make a last minute decision if we were going to
fix up our house.
Not all delayed decision making was due to financial constraints or undetermined flood
protection plans. Pete, a laborer, noted that he and his wife struggled with the decision
making process stating:
We  knew  we  wanted  to  stay  there,  but  we  didn’t  know  which  path  we
should take. . . . It was just hard finding people to commit to doing the
work.    We  knew  we  couldn’t  do  it  ourselves.    We  both  work,  and  we  are  
both too busy, and  we  don’t  have  the  skills,  so  we  finally  decided  that  we  
would tear down and put [up] a modular home. That took a long time.
Many citizens, especially vulnerable populations, struggled with the planning and
implementation of a recovery plan. Many were dependent on assistance from faith based
organizations and charitable organizations. Lori, a single mother and special needs
teacher, recalled:
It was just me, so . . . I  don’t  have  a  husband,  so  it  was  just  my  son  and  
me. My dad was at the end of his days, so  he  couldn’t  help.    I  just  let my
house sit until I could find somebody.
According to Pastor Pat, it was not uncommon to see houses just sitting,  because  “they  
were all in the same spot – they  didn’t  know  where  the  resources  were.”
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A Flurry of Contractors
The city of Minot was inundated with out-of-state contractors immediately after
residents were told they could return to the valley. These contractor firms provided a
plethora of services to residents affected by the flood, often at outrageous prices. Sam, a
retired laborer, recalls his experience with price gouging.
I had somebody come from Northern States Power, just so I could get a
breaker  box  set  up,  and  I  didn’t  even  get  the  bill  for  like  3  months,  and  I  
couldn’t  believe  it  .  .  .  it  was  over  $600.00.    He  was  there  for  about  a  half  
hour, left, and came back for another half hour, and bang, I got a bill for
$600.00.
Jordan, an elementary school teacher, had a similar experience, stating,
The only guy I can complain about is the guy who did my taping,
texturing, and painting, who was excellent, but he screwed us out of
money. He was too expensive, but at the time, I wanted it done. . . . I was
at  the  point  that  I  wasn’t  doing  any  more  work.
Price gouging among local contractors was also noted. Not all residents were happy with
the work that was completed.
Many contractors provided shoddy workmanship. Sally, an appliance
saleswoman, found that while her out-of-state contractors were nice to work with, they
did not provide quality work.
Ten thousand dollars later, I have to put money into my house because my
pipes freeze. They put them against the outside wall, and they freeze; and
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now, I have to tear out my kitchen cupboards, and replace it, and I have to
tear up my flooring because it is separating. . . . It’s  really  frustrating.
Concerns with fly-by-night contractors extended beyond price gouging, and
sometimes into fraudulent practice. The level of damage was beyond what local
contractors could handle, and the need to bring in outside assistance was evident,
although not always positive.
In some instances, flooded residents, especially those who were vulnerable in
some way, fell prey to fraudulent acts. Lori, a single mother and special needs instructor,
stated, “I  hired  a  friend  of  over  30  years,  and  he  was  nothing  but  trouble.    He  walked  
away with about $23,000 of unfinished work.”    Despite  attempts  of  city  and  state  
government  to  hold  contractors  accountable,  Deb,  a  city  official,  stated  that  “Sometimes,
they would rename their company and continue working, and put a new sticker on their
truck.”    The  level  of  damage  was  beyond  what local contractors could handle, and the
need to bring in outside assistance was evident, although not always positive. The grim
reality of flooding, the shock and assessment of damage, and the stress of planning and
rebuilding created an extremely traumatic experience for citizens of the Souris River
Valley.
Summation of Findings of Theme #2
While the flood period was undoubtedly traumatic for valley dwellers, shock
associated with damage caused by inundation of river water was astounding. Many
residents were able to gather a network of friends, who volunteered and assisted with
cleanup and repair. Residents who did not have many connections or were unable to find
helpers were forced to hire others to do the work. The flood brought a plethora of
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workers into the community, many of whom were guilty of price gouging and shoddy
workmanship. At-risk populations appeared to be the most at risk of fraudulent practices
set forth by contractors and service workers.
Theme #3
The FEMA Individual Assistance program, while expeditious in nature, received
mixed reviews by Minot residents who were directly affected by the flood.
By early July, a team of FEMA constituents visited the city of Minot, North
Dakota, to set up a base camp in preparation for flood recovery services. The first team
was assigned to work with homeowners and renters who were directly affected by the
flood. The process began quickly, and contact was made with residents affected by the
flood even before water had receded from the valley.
Initial Contact With FEMA
FEMA arrived in Minot well before individuals were able to evaluate damages to
their homes. Since valley dwellers were no longer at their residences, and were
unavailable for an intake interview, FEMA workers met residents affected by the flood in
various locations around town. Mary, an elementary school teacher, remembered:
It was kind of scary. We got a phone call saying . . . meet a guy in the
parking  lot  of  the  Dreamland  Motel  .  .  .  and  I  was  like  .  .  .  I’m  not  doing  a  
drug deal here people, and then you pull up and ask, are you FEMA?
Many residents expressed concern about this initial contact. FEMA caseworkers also
seemed confused by this lack of trust. Jordan, an elementary school teacher, noted that a
FEMA caseworker told him:
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Everyone here wants to do it themselves, and they second guess those who
are here to help from FEMA; but, I'll go someplace else, and there is a line
of people two miles long, because they know that I have money, and I'm
gonna give them money . . . so, this is weird for me.
Despite all, most Minot residents affected by flooding were uncomfortable with the initial
FEMA contact, but grateful to receive this first level of assistance. The initial intake
meeting was followed up by an on-site visit to ascertain damage to property.
Damage Assessment and FEMA
The initial damage assessment completed by FEMA was very important. FEMA
provided up to $30,200.00 in grant money per household to assist flood victims,
depending upon amount of damage to each property. While FEMA capped the amount of
payment a household could receive, this initial FEMA assessment of damage each house
received was used by other governmental agencies that offered low interest construction
loans to flooded residents. Ken, a retired railroad worker, was pleased with his
assessment and could easily borrow funds he needed to repair his home, where George, a
laborer,  was  disappointed,  stating  his  assessment  was  “low, and  limited  to  $54,000.00.”
Many flooded residents expressed discontent in regard to grant payments considering
them low in comparison to what other households affected by other natural disasters in
recent years have received.
Arlen, a school district employee, discussed a concern regarding equity in
funding. “I think there is a lot of mistrust and distrust after some other disasters in the
country, and I think there was a lot of abuse of FEMA, and I think it’s a different FEMA
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after Katrina. . . . I've heard that from many people.” Art, a railroad worker agreed
stating:
We heard a lot about how much money people got in Grand Forks, or after
Hurricane Katrina . . . some people say up to $160,000, but there was
some discrepancy in how the money was divided up. . . . I mean . . . who
determined who had lost X amount of money, and who had what amount
of damage. . . . I don't get it . . . don't understand it . . . but, um . . . it was
$30,000 that got us moving on the flood repair.
Some also questioned the equity of funding at a local level. Lucy, an elementary
teacher, discussed her frustration with damage assessment and subsequent funding by
stating:
Most people got the flat $30,000 . . . $30,200 or whatever it was . . . and
some people lived in a $15,000 trailer and got that, or someone lived in a
$259,000 home, and they got $30,200. If they would have said, you
know, this is what your house is worth, and this is what you get . . . period
. . . because money was tight and everything was jacked up, and the
hardest part was just coming up with the funds.
Barb, a school secretary and owner of a modular home, expressed frustration over her
inability to seek other low-interest loan opportunities because she did not own the land
her home sat on. “I  didn’t  qualify  for  FEMA  money,  or  SBA  money,  or  any  money  from  
the  state.”
According to Redekop (2011), of almost 4,200 homes, 471 homeowners in the
Souris River Valley had flood insurance. Charles, a retired school employee, noted that
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flood  insurance  “was  helpful,  but  you  had  to  jump  through  a  lot  of  hoops  with  flood  
insurance,  too.”    Roger,  a  school  district  administrator  had  flood  insurance,  but  had  many  
struggles following his initial damage assessment. He received a $30,200 payment from
FEMA. Concerned about how his insurance might affect this FEMA payment, he called
FEMA to discuss this with an agent. He was told that because damage to his house was
so extensive, he would receive this FEMA money in addition to his flood insurance
reimbursement. Still concerned, Roger placed the FEMA money in a savings account for
safekeeping. Later, Roger described his anger when,  “I  got  a  letter  from  FEMA,  stating  
that they did an audit, and that I accepted money that I was not entitled to, and there was
a  possibility  of  prosecution,  saying  that  I  lied  in  order  to  get  this  money.”    Roger  returned  
the money immediately. Like most other FEMA interactions, the attitude and
compassion shown by a FEMA case manager appeared to make a difference in whether
or not a resident had a good experience or a bad one with FEMA.
FEMA Housing
A portion of the FEMA rehabilitation program included installation of temporary
housing facilities. The Souris River Flood of 2011 resulted in the third largest
mobilization of temporary housing in the history of FEMA. FEMA trailers came in 2bedroom and 3-bedroom models, and were assigned on the basis of household
population. When possible, a FEMA trailer was parked on a property  owner’s  lot  and  
tied in to existing water and sewer at that location. Lelia, a delivery driver, noted, “When
those  FEMA  trailers  came  in,  they  were  kind  of  the  heroes  of  the  day.”
Many flooded residents appreciated the move to a FEMA trailer, as most had been
living in transitional housing since the flood crisis began, especially those who could
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locate the trailer on their own property. Cheryl, a retired housewife, remarked,  “Our  
FEMA trailer was like our little castle. . . . It was right next to the house, and it worked
out very  well  for  us.”    On  certain  occasions,  the  lot  size  or  shape  would  prohibit  
placement of the trailer at the home site. When this occurred, FEMA assigned residents
to one of four FEMA parks in and around the city of Minot. Burt, an electrical inspector,
stated, “It really  wasn’t  too  bad,  but  there  were  some  people  who  didn’t  take  care  of  their  
property,  and  a  lot  of  people  that  moved  out  there  figured  it  was  a  place  to  have  parties.”    
The FEMA Housing Program, like other FEMA programs, was assessed on the
relationship between FEMA workers and flood-stricken residents.
The Role of the FEMA Worker
Residents affected by floodwaters had differing opinions about FEMA workers.
Janice, a para-educator, became frustrated when a FEMA worker told her that it was
impossible to place a FEMA trailer on their property. When she questioned his decision,
he  stated,  “You’re  a  woman,  you  just  don’t  know  anything.”    The  same  worker  shoved  
Janice’s  neighbor,  and  exclaimed,  “Are you trying to tell me what to do?”    Gertrude,  a  
retired homemaker, was told by a FEMA worker that it was impossible to place a trailer
on her property, and she would have to relocate to a FEMA housing site. She spoke with
a FEMA official who did allow her to place a trailer on her property, but was met with
resistance when the same worker showed up to install the trailer. Gertrude expressed her
frustration.
It  felt  like  you  were  homeless,  and  you  didn’t  have  any  grounding,  and  
then he brought the trailer . . . this guy . . . I think he worked for the SS
Army  or  something.    He  said,  “Now,  don’t  forget,  all  of  this  is  the  
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property of the United States Government, and if its damaged you will be
liable  for  it” . . . and I thought . . . how stupid do these people think we
are?
Others noted that many FEMA workers were very dedicated and worked hard to
ensure flood victims were safe and secure in FEMA housing. One particular worker,
Chico,  was  mentioned  in  several  different  focus  groups.    Chico  was  known  as  the  “go  to  
guy”  by  many  area  residents. He readily provided his cell phone number and was always
available when problems would arise. When Elaine, an elementary school teacher,
locked her keys in the trailer, Chico got her in. When Betty, a retired secretary, needed
an ADA (American with Disabilities Act) accessible bathroom for her elderly husband,
Chico assisted her in following the chain of command to see it would happen. When
compliance  was  met,  Chico  told  her,  “You  good  woman  – you stick up for your husband
and got him what he needed.” Betty  exclaimed,  “That’s  the  kind  of  guy  he  was.”    Chico  
made a positive impact on those he served.
The Experience of FEMA Living
Other residents whose homes were damaged by flooding noted that, in some
instances, FEMA housing created additional stress. The immediacy of the housing crisis,
coupled with the slow pace of production, meant that many larger families were placed in
two separate trailers rather than one 3-bedroom model. Liz, a speech pathologist stated:
We got our FEMA trailers – two of them, because I have a son and two
daughters, so my husband was in one trailer with my son, and I was in the
other with my two girls. It was do-able; we just did what we had to do.
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Anne, a daycare provider, also had two FEMA trailers on her property. She described her
experience. “My  husband  and  I  stayed  in  one  with  our  two  daughters,  and  my  dad  and  
our  son  stayed  in  the  other.    They  basically  slept  and  bathed  in  that  one.”    Not  all  of  the  
experiences in the FEMA trailers were negative. Rose, an elementary school teacher and
the mother of two teenagers, stated:
We tried to make the best of it, but we learned to live closer as a family in
the FEMA trailer with no cable television and only one television channel
. . . two teenagers with no cable and no internet. . . . I  laugh  now.”
Summation of Findings of Theme #3
The FEMA Individual Assistance program received mixed reviews from Minot
residents affected by flooding. While the expeditious response of FEMA was appreciated
by many flood victims, many questioned the equity of funding in comparison to other
natural disasters. The crisis brought many contractors to town. Some of these
contractors appeared to take advantage of residents affected by flooding by raising prices
or committing fraudulent acts. The poor, the elderly, and single mothers appeared
especially vulnerable to corrupt practices. FEMA workers were on front lines of the
FEMA movement. The actions of FEMA workers played a major role in the
implementation of the Individual Assistance program, and shaped residents’ views of
FEMA as an organization.
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Theme #4
The FEMA Public Assistance program was a contentious process subject to intervention
by political leaders before consensus could be reached and recovery could begin.
Things were rocky with FEMA’s Public Assistance program from the start. In
mid-July, 2011, FEMA’s front man, Willie Nunn, announced that FEMA had teams on
the ground working with schools and parks to facilitate the recovery process. According
to Wayne, a school district administrator, though, in mid-July of 2011, FEMA Public
Assistance had yet to provide a team to assist with flood recovery, despite the school
district’s  attempt  to  make  direct  contact.    Similar  problems were noted by park district
officials as well. Randy, a park district administrator explained:
We had issues right from the start in getting someone from FEMA to
come meet with us, and for that team to get assigned, I had to scream and
holler. It was about 6 weeks after they, a team assigned, that we got to
meet with someone.
Unfortunately, things did not go much better when FEMA put boots on the ground in
Minot, North Dakota. Richard, a retired park district board member, remembered being
informed by Grand Forks park district employees that a consultant was needed to help the
organization work with FEMA. Richard recalled:
We were told not to worry about it, because FEMA [had] a built-in pay
structure to cover the cost of a consultant, so they even realize[d] that the
structure must be flawed, and it is difficult to work through it on the
FEMA Public Assistance side.
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Initial FEMA Contact: A Need for Consultative Services
Minot Public School District administrators determined early on that a consultant
would be needed to work through FEMA paperwork and bureaucratic red tape. Wayne, a
district administrator, indicated the district hired a construction management team to
assist the district in setting up portable classrooms to educate over 1400 displaced
students.    Wayne  stated,  “If  it  wasn’t  for  our  construction  management  team,  we  would  
not have gotten 64 portable classrooms set up in less than 40 days.”    The  team  assisted  
the district throughout the recovery and rebuilding phase.
Minot Park District personnel hired a consulting firm that provided assurances to
garner every eligible dollar from FEMA Public Assistance. Randy, a park district
administrator admitted the firm he hired did not always provide the assistance necessary
to promote recovery. For example:
We kept the consulting firm on for 1 year, and we had an option of
renewing their contract for another year. I was told by a FEMA official, in
so  many  terms  .  .  .  I  guess  in  uncertain  terms  .  .  .  that  if  we  didn’t  renew
our contract that things would get better, and I already had enough.
Randy  added,  “I’m  not  sure,  in  the  end  that  hiring  a  consultant  was  bad  .  .  .  maybe,  if  we  
hired  the  right  one,  I  think  it  would  have  been  a  different  story.”
FEMA Public Assistance and the Stafford Act
FEMA Public Assistance is a government run program created by the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 2007. This act is a United
States federal law designed to bring an orderly and systematic means of federal natural
disaster assistance to state and local governments to help them in carrying out their
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responsibilities to aid citizens. This act established the Presidential Disaster Declaration
system, which triggers federal financial and resource assistance to eligible states and
local authorities through FEMA.
Flood stricken public agencies have not always agreed with  FEMA’s  strict  
interpretation of the Stafford Act. School district and park district administrators both
felt that FEMA workers did not provide necessary guidance for local public entities to
make appropriate decisions. When a local decision was not to FEMA’s  liking, threats of
limited funding were offered. Wayne, a school district administrator, expressed his view
of  FEMA’s  interpretation  of the Stafford Act:
I would say they were anything but clear. There was a point where it was
almost  threatening  .  .  .  that  if  you  didn’t  do  specific  things,  you  could  
jeopardize your entire funding. We drug our feet on cleaning some
buildings, and we looked at it from a common sense perspective. We
asked . . . did it make sense to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars, if
not millions, to clean two of the buildings that we knew had over 50%
damage, and were eligible for replacement? And when they [FEMA]
finally went to the buildings, they admitted that yes, they were in need of
replacement. We basically got threatened by FEMA, and told that we
were jeopardizing funding.
Wayne admitted frustration with this train of thought as he reflected on the words of one
FEMA  representative  who  said,  “Sometimes,  common  sense  doesn’t  fit  into  the  
equation.”
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Many were frustrated with an apparent lack of common sense and bureaucratic
red tape that surrounded FEMA’s  Public Assistance program. Duncan, a local engineer,
noted:
My perception was that they wanted to tighten up the belt following the
Katrina disaster and some of the fraudulent things that were reported
coming out of that; and in doing so, they became so restrictive, that
instead of making these programs work for the people, they were making
the people work for the programs.
Alton, a state employee, admitted, “I  was  not  impressed,  and  that  part  of  the  problem  
was, as I recalled, is that you had changing opinions, changing decisions, and changing
personnel.”    Seymour,  who  was  also  involved  with  the  Grand  Forks  Flood  of  1997  
remembered  a  different  FEMA,  where  Grand  Forks  had  “One  federal  coordinating  office  
who  basically  handled  it  all  the  way  through.”    This  was  not  the  case  in  Minot, North
Dakota, in 2011. In general, a situation of mistrust had developed. It appeared as if local
agencies did not trust FEMA to provide the support needed to rebuild their community,
and FEMA appeared to distrust public entities, and continued to judge their intentions as
negative and undermining.
The city of Minot was not spared from frustrating relationships with FEMA.
Seymour, a state employee, was frustrated that FEMA officials refused to allow the city
to open existing mobile home parks for placement of FEMA trailers.
If they would have come in on Day 2 and removed all the damaged mobile
homes  so  we  could  move  trailers  in,  we  wouldn’t  have  needed  all  those  
FEMA camps. We had the mobile home parks set up, and they f*****
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around with that for 2 or 3 months, and that was just a total FUBAR
situation, and just the worst example of total incompetence in FEMA that I
have ever seen.
FEMA also delayed funding for critical infrastructure repairs necessary after the flood.
Alton, a retired city employee, expressed  frustration  with  the  slow  pace  of  FEMA’s  
response  to  recovery,  noting  there,  “ . . . was a number of issues that could have been
handled  that  they  deemed  weren’t  an  emergency  any  long[er], so you had to go through
their process to get  things  done.” Alton added:
One that sticks out in my mind was the guardrail along the river on 4th
Avenue North. There was a guardrail that was tore out and pushed out
when we installed the dike along there, and it was a dangerous situation,
because if anyone lost control of their car, they could have easily went
over that wall into the river and been killed. I wanted that railing up right
after  the  dike  was  removed,  but  was  told  that  I  couldn’t  do  that  without  
going through the FEMA process.
City, park, and school district administrators often felt they were caught in a sea of red
tape.
Intervention by Political Officials
Each public agency had its own battle with FEMA Public Assistance employees.
The primary issue faced by Minot Public School District administrators focused on the
relocation of Erik Ramstad Middle School, which flooded in 1969 and again in 2011.
District administration felt it was foolish to rebuild the school at its existing location. In
August,  2011,  North  Dakota’s  congressional  delegation  visited the Ramstad Middle
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School. According to Wayne, a school district administrator, a FEMA official “accused  
the  district  of  political  grandstanding.”    The  slow  process  of  recovery  raised  concern  
among the congressional delegation, and Senator John Hoeven asked FEMA to take
another look at the Ramstad relocation request. Wayne added:
I know for a fact that there was an email that was circulated through
FEMA and possibly NDDES, talking about the Ramstad project. It said
that they had already made their determination that Ramstad was not
eligible for relocation to a different site, which, from a taxpayer
perspective  .  .  .    it  didn’t  make  a  lot  of  sense  to  invest  40  million  into  a  
building that had been flooded twice in 42 years. But, since Senator
Hoeven had intervened, they would come to Minot, have the meeting, and
then send the letter.
The email caused great concern among the congressional delegation, and prompted a
face-to-face meeting in Washington, DC, between Minot City, School District, and Park
District officials and FEMA Director Craig Fugate. The working relationship improved
after this intervention.
Hazard Mitigation – Like for Like, and Least Cost Alternatives
The Stafford Act requires FEMA officials to follow specific protocols in regard to
reconstruction or repair of flooded structures owned by qualifying municipal
organizations. During  Minot’s  2011  flood,  federal funding was essentially tied to
assurances that public entities had taken proper steps to mitigate any future damage.
Such action might include moving essential mechanical items, such as furnaces to an
elevation higher than the flood crest, or building on a site with a higher elevation. Public
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entities were also required to replace or repair damaged elements to a similar condition,
or in other words, to meet a “like for like” repair of the previous structure. The park
district struggled with hazard mitigation and like for like rulings from FEMA for a
variety of reasons. First, hazard mitigation costs often exceeded the cost of repair to a
structure. The park district also noted that like for like comparisons were not always a
prudent  decision.    Randy,  a  park  district  administrator,  noted  “we  even  fought  with  them  
to upgrade electrical to current code – we pushed that and they finally  agreed.”
FEMA also sought least cost alternatives to repair and replace affected structures.
Under this program, FEMA would encourage public entities to consider least cost
alternatives whenever possible. Wayne, a school district administrator, admitted that. He
said:
Sometimes, we would try to use that for our benefit, saying . . . yes, we
understand that like for like is that way, but if we do it this way, it will
cost less . . . and they would consider it.
City, park, and school officials all agreed that intervention by political leaders was
necessary to break down barriers and jumpstart the public sector recovery process.
Summation of Findings of Theme #4
The relationship between FEMA Public Assistance employees and administrators
of public entities in the city of Minot was contentious from the start. Early on, FEMA
stated they were on the ground helping local agencies recover, but this statement was
contested by local officials. Local entities felt disconnected from FEMA officials, and a
certain level of distrust was evident throughout the process. Consultants were hired by
local agencies to help mediate differences between FEMA officials and city
77

administrators, and some consultants were more successful than others. Problems
continued  until  North  Dakota’s  congressional  delegation  intervened.    A  meeting  in  
Washington, DC, with FEMA Director Craig Fugate was a turning point. This meeting
paved the way for recovery to begin.
Theme #5
Crisis Management and Recovery is a collaborative process, involving federal, state, and
local government, as well as volunteer services from charitable organizations.
The flood crisis began long before water left the banks of the Souris River on
June 22, 2011. The city of Minot opened an Emergency Operations Center at the First
District Health Building in late March. This site served as the Emergency Operation
Center for Ward County from March – August, 2011.
Meetings were scheduled to discuss water levels, releases from Canadian dams,
and rainfall totals in the Souris River Basin. As the potential for flooding increased, so
did the frequency of the meetings. On June 20, 2011, Mayor Curt Zimbleman ordered
the forced evacuation of 14,000 Minot residents, and ordered the Emergency Operations
Center be open 24 hours a day during the pre-flood fight and flood period.
Hunter,  a  Red  Cross  employee,  noted  that  “A  disaster  is  basically  chaos,  and  if  
you can control that  chaos,  you  can  basically  control  any  situation.”    Chaos  was  evident  
during the week of June 20, 2011. According to Alton, a retired city employee, the city
of Minot scrambled to build a secondary dike along Broadway to protect north/south
access through the valley. The school district worked with local contractors to extend the
earthen levy around Erik Ramstad Middle School, and built a make-shift dike around
Perkett Elementary. Meanwhile, residents of the Souris River Valley scrambled to move
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the last of their belongings from their homes. Connected residents had friends assisting
in evacuation, with trucks and trailers readily available to assist. The same was not noted
among the elderly, the poor, or women who did not have connections in the community.
Megan, a para-professional who was alone in Minot, recalled her last pre-flood hours in
the valley:
It was just I and the three kids, so we didn't have a vehicle. We had a van
sitting in the driveway for a year and a half, and it had been one of those
discussions, husband and I thought, get it out of here, we don't need it.
Anyway, my husband talked the boys how to put the car battery in, and
then it started up (crying).
With less than 72 hours before water was expected to top the existing levy system, the
city and charitable organizations did not have time to mobilize and provide assistance to
struggling residents; the process of evacuation was left up to individual residents.
Assistance from Federal and State Governments
Financial assistance was provided to individual homeowners through various state
and federal programs. First, homeowners were eligible for grant money from the FEMA
Individual Assistance program. The $30,200 provided under this grant program, in most
instances, did not come close to covering the costs associated with recovery.
The Small Business Administration (SBA) also provided low interest loans, with
a sliding scale to determine interest rates. Eligibility for a loan was based on an initial
FEMA assessment. Interest rates were determined by an applicant’s  credit  rating.    
Reviews of the administration of SBA loans were mixed. Richard, a retired park district
member, stated that his experience improved when he was assigned a second case
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manager, the first being ineffective. Others had a much different view of the SBA loan
process.    Tiffany,  a  special  needs  teacher,  described  the  process  as  “nightmarish”  stating,  
“You had to prove everything 45 times, and then I had to prove that I spent this and that .
. . they were very unpleasant.”    Betty,  a  retired  secretary, expressed her frustration with
the SBA Loan process, stating, “We changed the whole house to make it handicapped
accessible . . . which SBA gave us a little problem at first, because they said we couldn't
change the floor plan – they wanted us to redo it just as it was before.” Many
participants expressed frustration over the bureaucratic red tape that was associated with
the acceptance of this loan.
Other Funding Sources
The North Dakota state legislature came to the assistance of Minot residents by
providing 1% Bank of North Dakota loans to flood victims, with a cap of $10,000 per
loan, and also provided sales tax rebates for items purchased to repair flooded property.
Many residents stated the application process for a state loan was easy. However,
miscommunication between state and federal agencies created problems for some
residents who accepted a low interest loan from the state. Nick, a local media specialist,
stated:
That's a screwed up mess there, and my son got caught in that. All the
sudden, they told him that you qualify, but the money goes to SBA and
State Representative Scott Louser, who was instrumental in getting that
passed through the legislature, was incensed by that, and said it was the
goal for it to be easy money for people to get their hands on.
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Inter-agency battles at the local, state, and federal level often caused additional stress for
flooded residents. In general, the state and federal response addressed a portion of the
financial needs of flooded residents, but did not address social or emotional needs. Those
needs were often addressed by charitable organizations and faith-based groups.
Charitable Organizations Take the Lead
In the early days of flood inundation, charitable organizations arrived on the scene
to provide assistance. The Red Cross was quick to mobilize and open two evacuation
centers, one north of the valley and one south of the valley. Within days, other
organizations arrived to provide assistance. The assistance provided by these
organizations became more evident as residents returned to the valley in order to assess
damage.
It appeared that in some instances, lack of coordination caused confusion in
regard to roles and responsibilities of various organizations. According to Seymour, a
state employee appointed to assist flood recovery efforts, the city did not have a
communications coordinator to disseminate information and take the lead in coordinating
volunteer efforts. An offer was made by the governor’s  office  to  appoint  a  
communication specialist, but the offer was rejected by the city.
This confusion was evident as the city began to re-enter the flood stricken valley
to assess damage and begin clean up. Hunter, a Red Cross employee, stated the role of
the  Red  Cross  was  to  provide  assistance  during  a  disaster,  but  the  agency  “depends  on  
other agencies for the  long  term  needs  of  the  people.”    Hunter  also  stated  that  
communication  between  charitable  organizations  was  also  an  issue,  stating,  “I  think that
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part  of  the  problem  was,  we  didn’t  understand  what  everyone  else  was doing during the
disaster.”
Mike, an employee of the Salvation Army, noted that in his opinion, part of the
struggle rested with differences in the missions of each organization. He explained,  “I  
have seen the Salvation Army over here working while others are in front of the camera .
. . there is  a  contrast.”    Richard,  a  retired  park  district  board  member,  agreed  with  Mike.
He said:
My dad was an old World War II vet; and  he  always  said,  “If you wanted
a  cup  of  hot  coffee  close  to  the  front,  you  didn’t  get  it  from  the  Red  Cross,  
you got it from the Salvation Army, and I thought about that during our
recovery. They were the ones coming around the street.
Richard was not the only one who appreciated services provided by the Salvation
Army. Barry, a retired contractor, remarked,  “It  was  great when you would hear them
coming. . . . It  was  almost  like  the  ice  cream  truck.”    Raymond,  a  retired  firefighter,  
agreed the Salvation Army played a huge role during initial stages of flood recovery. To
Mike  and  Richard’s  remarks,  he  added:
When I would hear that truck coming through . . . you knew you would get
a sandwich and a cup of coffee. We would be up to our ankles in mud,
and we would hear the truck . . . and it was so nice to go out and get a
sandwich, or coffee, or water, and sometimes hot meals. I remember
getting pork chops, mashed potatoes, and gravy one night, and thinking it
was the best meal I had eaten in a long time.
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The Salvation Army did provide small grants to a handful of flooded residents
who were in severe need of assistance; but in general, their primary service was
providing meals throughout the valley. The Salvation Army paradox gained popularity
throughout the valley in the weeks and months following the flood. The service that was
provided was relatively simple – a thin sandwich on white bread, a bottle of water, or
maybe a cup of coffee – but this act of kindness was so appreciated by flooded residents.
Ryan, a physical therapist whose home  and  business  was  damaged,  said,  “To have
somebody hand you a sandwich and bottle of water  .  .  .  that  was  such  a  morale  booster.”
Faith Based Volunteer Assistance
Many faith-based organizations also came to Minot to assist flooded residents.
The faith-based groups targeted at-risk populations and provided services when and
where possible. Sally, an appliance saleswoman, was able to contact a Mennonite group
to assist her elderly mother in the repair of her home. She stated:
My mom had her home done by the Mennonites, and they did such a
wonderful job. I went to the house when they were working, and those
people . . . they came from every direction, even from Canada, and at least
60% of them were women, and they were in their dresses, and they were
sheet rocking and nailing. They would stay for two weeks, and another
group would come . . . they were a most blessed group.
Richard, a retired park board member, noticed the popularity of faith based groups, and
commented:
My son came over every day to help; and  one  day,  he  told  me,  “I’ve  taken  
a survey on the street. We have a Jewish group here . . . Mennonites here .
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. . Baptists, Catholics, and Lutherans . . . and I think there was another
one. There were six different denominations working on just our Central
Avenue – all volunteering their time.
The primary issue was not attracting volunteer labor; the issue was coordinating efforts of
volunteers to ensure those who most needed help – those who were most vulnerable,
were able to get the assistance they needed to recover.
The Inspiration of Hope Village
Pastor Pat recalled the day that he received a phone call from an out-of-state
Lutheran church. The group was excited to come and assist the residents of Minot. They
changed their plans when no interim housing was available within a 45-mile radius of
Minot. Pastor Pat, along with several members of the local ecumenical association
realized that volunteer labor, while appreciated, was most beneficial when targeted to
specific individuals who were in desperate need of assistance. The idea for Hope Village
was born . . . an organization that became an umbrella for nine different organizations
and their affiliate state organizations.
Pastor Pat recalled early on in the crisis that  volunteer  help  wasn’t  always  placed  
where it was most needed, noting that:
Right after the flood, I was involved with immediate conversations of
what we could do to begin putting things back together. As that was
developing, it was obvious that nobody was addressing the issue of where
volunteers might stay, and not only that, but who will manage volunteers,
who will set up jobs, and who will organize this. There are people who
are a tremendous resource in the Christian church throughout the United
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States to help in time of need. All of this was happening, week after week,
and nobody was addressing it at all.
The Hope Village concept was based on capitalizing on the strengths of several faithbased organizations. Minot’s  ecumenical  organization  recognized  that  each  church  
response group had specific core strengths. For example, the Methodist church had the
best case-management system, but the Lutheran response team was the most efficient in
construction management and planning. Hope Village was opened in April, 2012, after
10 months of planning and preparing.
The concept of Hope Village was relatively simple; it was designed to serve as a
one-stop shop for flooded residents who were desperately in need of assistance. Pastor
Pat recognized the greatest strength of the Hope Village concept was the case
management approach to flood recovery. He stated:
We had access to all of the FEMA case management records, so we could
take that financial information, the resources they could provide, and we
could  track  those  with  each  family.    So,  let’s  say  Bob  and  Susie,  in  order  
to get them back into their house, needed $62,000. They have $30,000
from FEMA, they have $2,000 of savings to spend, and they can access
$10,000  from  the  Bank  of  North  Dakota.    That  wasn’t  enough  money,  so  
the case managers would look into other resources and put together a
package. Everyone went through the same case management system, and
that was helpful.
Pastor  Pat  added  that  there  was  “very  little  duplication  of  services,  so  we  maximized  
every dollar that came in,”  and “Our  goal  was  to  victimize  the  victims  less.” The Hope
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Village project proved effective in providing a collaborative link between nine faithbased organizations, and utilized a common case management system to ensure
assistance was provided to the most vulnerable residents.
Summation of Findings of Theme #5
Federal and state assistance most often offered a financial remedy to homeowners
who were negatively impacted by the Souris River Flood of 2011. Social and emotional
needs of victims were often met by charitable and faith-based organizations. A lack of
direct communication from the city often resulted in role confusion and turf wars
between different organizations. Many faith-based organizations came to Minot to
provide assistance, but a lack of organization and structure prevented the assistance
getting to those who most needed it. The Hope Village concept was developed to get
help to where it was most needed. The Hope Village team pooled resources and provided
assistance to many individuals who did not possess skills or financial resources necessary
to rebuild and recover.
Theme #6
Long-term effects of a natural disaster span far beyond the physical recovery of homes,
businesses, and school buildings. The Minot Public School District community was
drastically changed as a result of the Souris River Flood of 2011.
Before the devastating Souris River Flood of 2011, valley residents measured
river flooding in comparison to a flood that occurred in 1969 (see Appendix A). The
1969 flood, followed by high water levels in 1974, 1975, and 1979 prompted city, state,
and federal officials to develop a plan to manage water flows in the Souris River Basin,
especially in heavily populated areas. According to Alton, a retired city official, this
flood work was directed by the Army Corps of Engineers, under the direction of their
86

lead Minot manager, James Ruyak. Through these years, a comprehensive flood plan
was initiated. This plan included the development of an enhanced levy system through
the city of Minot to handle up to 5,500 cubic feet per second of water, as well as the
purchase of water storage space behind three Canadian dams. The Lake Darling Dam
located north of Minot also provided flood protection for the city of Minot, and was a
tool used by the Army Corps of Engineers to manage the river system throughout the
year.
In 1995, a flood protection system was in place that provided flood protection for
the city of Minot to a level that surpassed 1969 levels. This protection prompted FEMA
to remove the  Souris  River  Valley  in  Minot  from  a  “flood plain status.” Residents were
no longer required to purchase FEMA Flood Insurance when seeking a mortgage.
According to Alton, a retired city employee, less than 400 homeowners in the Souris
River Valley carried flood insurance in 2011.
The Cause of Flooding
Within a relatively short period of time, residents of the Souris River valley lost
their sense of safety and protection. The 2011 flooding of Minot created an environment
ripe for speculation as to the cause of the flooding, as well as claims of mismanagement
of the river system. Many residents felt the flood was essentially a man-made event, and
was the direct result of poor management throughout the Souris River Basin. Other
residents  scoffed  at  the  government’s  claim  that  a  7 inch rainstorm at the headwaters of
the Souris River in Canada resulted in the massive flood that inundated Minot.
Raymond, a retired firefighter, questioned those who blamed extensive snowpack and
spring rainfall.
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It flooded worse than it ever had in Minot, even with all the dams put in
place to protect us. I think it has a lot to do with management – managing
the flow and trying to determine how much water is in the system, and
knowing how much the system can handle.
Once evacuation was complete, and the water had toppled the existing levy
system, residents had time to reflect on causes of the flood. This discussion led to many
negative theories in regard to river management, and in some instances, very pointed
claims against the Canadian government, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service. For many, anger became the catalyst that prompted
residents to find an individual or entity to blame. Isla, an elementary school teacher, said,
“I  was  mad  for  a  long  time,  but  it  really  doesn’t  matter. When I heard my kids repeat
some  of  my  statements,  I  said  .  .  .  enough  of  that.”
The City Response
The situation in late June went from bad to worse. Alton, a former city employee,
recalled the pandemonium that began on June 20, 2011.
We had beat the flood three or four times, and we had gotten the word that
the river was going to 11,000 cfs, and in about 3 days, we were ready to
do that. . . . The next day, we got the call that it was going to 15,000 cfs,
and I said . . . that’s  it  – we  can’t  do that in 3 days – we are going to have
to dike as much of the infrastructure as we can and save Broadway. The
next day, we got the prediction for 20,000 cfs, and then the next day, it
went to 24,000 cfs. Six hours later, it went to 30,000 cfs.
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The situation was dire, and the city was forced to make crucial decisions to save city
infrastructure within a very short period of time. In the aftermath of hasty decision
making, there were bound to be winners and losers.
Many residents questioned the wisdom of constructing a secondary dike to protect
Broadway. The dike also protected homes in northeast Minot from extensive flood
damage. Alton, a retired city employee, stated the secondary dike saved over 600 homes,
the nursing home, and two schools, but others had negative opinions about the dike, and
some assumed water levels in west Minot were higher as a result. Liz, a speech
pathologist  admitted,  “I do think that the main dykes probably did flood a lot of people’s  
homes.”
Residents along the northern inundation zone were also frustrated by a dike that
was built along University Avenue to protect Minot State University. This structure was
built  by  Minot  State  University,  and  was  not  part  of  the  city’s  protection  plan.   The
university did receive ground water damage, but buildings north of the inundation zone
were protected from flooding. Tiffany, a special needs teacher and single mother
admitted,  “It drove me crazy . . . to see them watering the green grass 2 days after the
dyke went down. I thought . . . well really, is it that important that you are watering your
grass? I still drive by, and I get angry.”
Post-flood planning and ideas for future flood protection also created a level of
concern throughout the valley. Immediately following the flood, the city contracted with
a local engineering firm to design an enhanced flood protection system through Minot.
Discussions of where to build flood protection structures resulted in some delayed
recovery for flood victims, such as Lelia. She said, “We ended up waiting. We waited
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until November of that year, until they decided they were not going to do anything with
the  Ramstad  Loop.”    Suzanne,  a  city  employee, was also in a holding pattern due to the
potential flood protection project. She noted:
We looked at the maps, and our house was in a buy-out area, and then it
wasn’t,  and  then  it  was  .  .  .  and  I  can’t  go  back  there  .  .  .  to  build  our  
house, and then they come back in 2 years and want to buy our house, or
maybe in 10 years. What if they run out of money, or change their minds?
Suzanne also expressed concern that, as a city employee, she was treated differently after
co-workers realized she was in a potential buy-out zone. “I  was  being  excluded  from  
meetings,  not  because  I  was  a  potential  risk,  but  in  some  ways,  I  probably  was.”    This  
uncertainty of flood protection and future buy-outs created a high level of concern for
many residents, and some residents whose homes were damaged by the flood felt the city
had done little to reassure citizens about future flood protection in the valley.
Many participants expressed concern that neighborhoods have changed drastically
since the flood. Milton, a Red Cross worker, noted that most of his neighbors did not
return after the flood. Their homes are now rental properties. The problem of ad hoc
rental districts was exacerbated by oil exploration in western North Dakota, and a drastic
increase in population in the Minot area. Charles, a retired school administrator, noted
that not all loss was financial. He explained:
You asked me what the most special thing that we lost . . . and I forgot to
mention it . . . it was our neighbors . . . our next door neighbors moved to
West Fargo. We did everything together . . . we would barbeque together,
sat on the deck together . . . and had coffee in the summertime. They were
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dear, dear friends, and they are struggling in West Fargo, because they are
not here – where their friends are . . . and so, they aren't making friends
where they are.
Clarice, a social worker, agreed that the loss of the neighborhood was devastating:
It changed our neighborhood all together . . . and when I was down there
one day, and all the sudden, two cop cars pull up, and they are . . . both ran
into the house, and it’s like 11:30 in the morning. My daughter tells me it
happens often, and that there is a sex offender that lives there.
The City Response to Recovery
Many participants expressed concern in regard to the slow progress made by the
city of Minot. Patrice, an elementary school teacher and flood victim, noted:
The city hasn't moved fast enough, and we still don't know . . . we just
went to the latest meeting, because we are slated to be bought out, but we
are on Phase 4 - Year 2018 . . . so it will be many years before they get all
these stages done,  so  we  could  all  flood  again.”
This thought was reaffirmed  by  Raymond,  a  retired  firefighter,  who  said  he  has  heard  “a  
lot of discussion about recovery and flood diversion projects . . . but not a lot happening
. . . and we still have a lot of people sitting in the valley without a lot  of  direction.”    The  
frustration noted by valley residents extends far beyond enhanced flood protection.
Micah, a small equipment operator, summed up the general sentiment of many valley
residents stating,
Minot has done nothing to prevent this from happening again; Minot and
the government. . . . If we end up with a bad winter . . . the only thing
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they have done is taken dikes down. . . . They haven't done nothing else,
and they can't make a decision about anything. . . . I am very unhappy
about it.
Many dismayed residents discussed the delayed process of clean up and repair in
the valley during the post-flood period – most notably, the repair of traffic signals on
busy streets. Duncan, a local engineer, stated:
Again, we are going through this long, drawn out federal process so we
can get money to fix traffic signals. The damage was extensive, don't get
me wrong, but we are talking about a pretty easy fix – traffic signals could
have been up and running [in] one-third of the time, if we would have just
rolled our sleeves up and pieced this back together. It’s a frustrating thing
– our dependence on outside funding. I get it . . . nobody likes paying
taxes. But, sometimes we aren't quantifying the opportunity cost of what
the cost of waiting really is, and it’s kind of unfortunate.
Seymour, a state employee appointed to assist with disaster recovery, noted, “The  
riverbanks are a mess, the neighborhoods are a mess, and I realize that you can't do things
without money, but with the city, the attitude was, we will only do it if someone pays us
for  it.” In addition to these issues, over 350 damaged homes remain untouched in the
valley. These homes,  penned  as  “zombie  homes”  by  residents, have created another issue
for valley dwellers.
Zombie homes have created a blight in the valley, and have proven to be a point
of frustration for residents who have fixed up their homes. Cindy, a stay at home mother,
commented, “We still have a zombie house in our neighborhood. We used to look out
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and  see  a  beautiful  yard,  but  now  all  we  see  is  a  zombie  house.”    Milton,  a  local  mental  
health professional, expressed concern that these damaged homes do little to build morale
in flood ravaged areas, stating, “I  think  the  community response, is even more important,
and that is what I see failing in the city government. Allowing these things to persist. . . .
I know that property rights are important, but these houses are goners.”    The  zombie  
home issue continues to this day.
Planning for System-Wide River Management
At the time of this report, city, state, and government officials continued to work
on an enhanced flood protection plan utilizing a system wide approach. This plan
included consideration of farmers and ranchers throughout the Souris River Basin. Many
residents have expressed frustration over the management system for the river in use at
the time of this study. Nick, a local media specialist, noted the current management
model has appeared to consider constant flows in the river system, rather than the
mitigation of potential flooding and planning for unusual weather events, such as heavy
rains. Nick had faith that a new international agreement would be  reached,  stating,  “The
ball is slow in rolling, but it is rolling.”    The  city  has continued to debate the possibility
of an enhanced flood protection project, and has continued to work with state and federal
officials to access funding.
Summation of Findings of Theme #6
Damage caused by the Souris River Flood of 2011 was extensive. Many residents
have expressed concerns that the city of Minot may have been negligent in their response
to the disaster. Others commented that Minot’s  city  council  has  expressed little desire to
invest local funds in the recovery process. Other residents are angered by the delayed
93

development of an enhanced flood protection plan, and fear it will flood again, while
others debate whether or not to invest in the repair of property that may eventually be
bought out as part of the flood protection project. Some homes have been sold, and are
now rental properties, which have changed the ambience of neighborhoods that existed
before the flood. While many residents worked diligently to repair their homes, many
houses have remained untouched. These flood damaged unrepaired homes have become
known as zombie homes, and have caused a great deal of concern throughout the valley.
Theme #7
Effective communication has been lacking during all phases of crisis and recovery, and
has created a layer of confusion and mistrust throughout the Souris River Valley.
Effective and accurate communication is crucial when dealing with any type of
disaster. Milton, a mental health professional, stated that when dealing with
communication during a crisis, “Consistency  is  the  key  – you  don’t  want  rumors  to  start  
or  for  people  to  hear  different  things.”    Milton  added,  “You can’t  control  how  people  hear  
it or interpret it, but you want people to hear a consistent message, that is delivered in a
process that people  can  understand.”
During the pre-flood and evacuation period, the city of Minot held regular press
conferences to notify people of evacuation zones and to provide updates on anticipated
water levels. The press conferences were detailed and informative, but were offered at a
specific time of the day, and were broadcast through a limited venue. At the time of this
report, Minot citizens lived in a digital world and communicated in a much different
manner than was being used to disseminate information. Many participants noted that
communication efforts during the pre-flood, evacuation, flood, and post-flood periods
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were often muddled and incomplete, leaving citizens with a desire to seek information
from other sources, including social media.
Communication During Pre-Flood and Evacuation Periods
Before the flood and during evacuation, the city of Minot had daily press
conferences at 2:00 PM. The purpose of these press conferences was to deliver specific
and timely information to citizens in regard to evacuation and flooding. According to
Nick, a local broadcast journalist, these press conferences were aired live on local
television and radio stations. The Minot Daily News also provided print copies in their
daily addition, and provided updates via the Minot Daily News website.
In general, participants felt that Mayor Zimbleman was an excellent spokesperson
for their city. The relationship that Mayor Zimbleman and city personnel had fostered
with citizens over the years made a difference, and their communication caused valley
residents to take heed. Milton, a mental health professional, commented:
When Alan Walter, the City Public Works Director, came on, and when he
said, “We are going to try to save the city,”  it  hit  me  about  as  much  as  the  
sirens. I said, “Oh, s***!” . . . I know Alan, and he is as nuts and bolts as
they  come,  and  I’ve  always  relied  on  him  being  very  frank  with  us.
Ryan, a local physical therapist, had a similar view of General Sprynczynatyk of the
North Dakota National guard. Ryan said, “I  knew  that  what  he  said  was  the  truth,  and  he  
was  going  to  help  us  as  best  he  could,  and  for  lack  of  any  better  words,  he  wasn’t  going  
to  take  no  s***  from  anybody.”    The  communication  in  the  early  stages  of  the  flood  crisis
was considered by most participants to be thorough and reassuring.
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Communication and River Management
Many participants had a very different view of communication in regard to river
management. The researcher noted a lot of confusion about the role of Canadian dams in
regard to flood protection, as well as confusion in regard to international reporting of
water levels and rainfall in the Souris River Basin. This confusion often manifested
through social media outlets, and in some cases, inflamed rumor and innuendo
throughout the Souris River Valley.
Nick, a local news reporter, became concerned about rising water levels in
Canadian reservoirs, and decided to take a trip to Canada to assess the situation. He was
very concerned at the amount of water that was held behind the reservoirs. While visiting
with a contact in Canada, he was informed that the Saskatchewan Watershed Authority
had planned on releasing additional water from the Alameda and Rafferty dams that day.
Nick remembers calling Kelly Hogan, who was in charge of the Lake Darling dam to say,
“I  heard  that  the  levels  and  releases  were  increasing  to  7500  cfs,  and  he  was  at  5,000  cfs.    
He  couldn’t  believe  it. I  found  out  about  it  before  he  did.”    Meanwhile,  the  Army  Corps  
of Engineers continued to say they were “comfortable”  with  water being released at dams
up and down the river including Canadian dams.
Duncan, a local engineer, also expressed concern over river management and
believed part of the problem rested with a lack of communication among key players
along the river system. He stated, “Subject matter experts were too slow in getting their
stuff together, and part of it is related to this bureaucratic web that we have to travel
through when we are dealing with one state, two provinces, and two different countries.”    
Duncan added:
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The  chain  of  command  within  our  system  isn’t  that  responsive.    So,  when  
we start talking about revised flows, and whether or not the Army Corps
of Engineers are going to open the gates, there is kind of a custody of the
information and how that information travels from one agency to the next,
and eventually passes down to the operators on the ground. By the time
that chain of events happens, the people on the ground already know what
is  happening,  and  it’s  because  of  social  media, cell phones, and the
internet – all this real time data is out there. So, that chain of custody
among all those agencies needs to be significantly shortened.
After the initial shock of the flood wore off, Minot citizens became dismayed with
communication coming from city hall.
Seymour, a state employee assigned to assist with flood control, expressed
concern  about  the  city’s  lack  of effort in communicating facts with its residents. He
explained,  “We  [the  State  of  North  Dakota],  almost  on  Day 1, urged the city to have a
communications  director,  and  the  city  didn’t  want  to  do  that.”    Seymour  added,  “We  
wanted somebody on staff to coordinate communication, and  it  didn’t  happen.    So,  we  
had press conferences, but we wanted a website and all these things that provided
immediate  information,  but  there  was  a  reluctance  to  do  that.”    Without  real-time
reporting of flood conditions, individuals were left to their own devices to glean needed
information from unofficial sources.
Many residents turned to the local CBS affiliate for 24 hour press coverage during
the immediate crisis. Jim Olson, the local CBS news director, was hailed by many as a
hero and savior. Leon, a retired bricklayer, commented, “He told us what was going on
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with those Canadian dams, and we didn’t  hear  a  lot  of  information  from  anybody  else.”    
The 24 hour coverage served as a beacon for many residents who hoped to catch a
glimpse of their home, business, or school. Tiffany, a special needs instructor, reported
that  she  “had  the  television  on  for 24 hours a day, and I never thought I would know so
much  about  water  levels.”    Milton,  a  local  health  provider,  indicated  that  Jim’s  coverage  
and personal interest stories during recovery were helpful to those affected by the flood.
However, not everyone was appreciative of 24 hour news coverage of the flood.
Hunter, a Red Cross employee, indicated that emergency shelter residents would often
become distraught when they watched the news. Holly, a former city employee, said,
“My  husband  was  the  opposite. . . . He was at the house every day, and would say, ‘Turn
it off; I  can’t  watch  it.’”
Another popular venue for following flood news was Facebook. Many
participants reported that Facebook and other forms of social media were excellent
methods of gleaning information in regard to the flood. Ryan, a physical therapist,
reported  that  Facebook,  “not  only  shared  information,  but  kind  of  connected  everyone.”    
Liz,  a  speech  pathologist,  admitted,  “I  wasn’t  a  big  Facebook  user  [before  the  flood],  but  
everyone started sharing stories and pictures about our neighborhood.”    Others expressed
concern that Facebook and other social media outlets often created panic and promoted
rumors and innuendo.
Bonnie, a day care provider, noted, “On the negative side of social media, rumors
spread  way  quicker,  and  they  still  do  .  .  .  and  that’s  where  the  Spring  anxiety  starts  .  .  .  we  
start hearing that Canada got record amounts of snowfall, and we are going to flood
again.”    Pastor  Pat  found  that  when  people  are  anxious,  they  seek information, regardless
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of the source. He cited an example of people on Facebook describing extreme
overcharging for bottled water at Superpumper on North Hill of Minot, stating that
Facebook patrons had reported, “They [Farstad Oil] were charging double for a case of
water,  and  they  couldn’t  combat  it.”    Nick,  a  local  reporter  followed  up  on  the  story,  and  
found that the price charged by Farstad Oil was no higher than before the flood, and
reported, “It was  a  convenience  store,  and  that’s  just  the  way  it  is.”
Other rumors were more pointed, and aimed at placing specific blame on
individuals, organizations, and governmental agencies. Leon, a retired brick layer,
angrily  remarked,  “Those  Canadian  dams  were  built  as  flood  control  dams, and they are
now used  for  recreation,  and  those  people  have  big,  fancy  cabins  there  as  well.”    Ken,  a  
retired  railroad  worker  agreed,  “It’s  all  about  recreation  and  money.”
Alton, a former city employee, remembered differently. He recalled that the
United States government purchased storage behind the dams in Canada. Nick, a local
news reporter, agreed with this assessment. However, the city did not have anyone in
place to dispel these rumors, or to present factual information. This created a quagmire
within the city, and promoted the belief that somehow, the city was hiding information
from its residents.
Summation of Findings of Theme #7
Communication problems existed well before water left the riverbanks on June
22, 2011. While many residents respected and held Mayor Zimbleman and the city
leaders in high esteem before the flood, they became frustrated by a lack of real time
communication coming from the city after floodwaters arrived. This lack of
communication resulted in residents seeking other sources of information, such as 24
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hour news coverage, and social media outlets. North Dakota state officials encouraged
the city to appoint a communications director, but this did not occur. As residents
continued to monitor flood activity through social media, rumors began to spread. With
no official voice at the city level to respond to these rumors, many residents became
disenchanted with city government and developed a sense of distrust in city leadership.
Theme #8
The Souris River Flood of 2011 negatively affected survivors; negative effects have
included social, emotional, and financial hardships.
Minot’s flood fight began months before water left the banks of the Souris River.
During this time, residents braced for the worst and hoped for the best. Residents were
forced to evacuate their homes on May 30, 2011, and were allowed to move back in on
June 6. At this point, many felt the city of Minot was past the point of danger. A heavy
rain at the headwaters of the Souris River on June 18 changed the outlook back to one of
flooding, and altered the lives of many Minot residents forever.
The Souris River Flood of 2011 and subsequent years of recovery have created a
stressful situation that has impacted the social, emotional, and economic well being of
residents throughout the Souris River Valley.
Emotional Effects of Flooding
Emotional effects were noted in participants throughout focus groups and
interviews conducted in this study. In general, participants noted that smaller children
appeared to handle the stress of evacuation and rebuilding better than older children.
Pamela, a Head Start teacher, noted that children appeared to do a lot of role playing to
cope.
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I had a little boy that kept stacking up piles of paper, and I would ask what
he was doing. He said he was sheet rocking his house. Then, he would
tear it down and say, “Now,  I’m  gutting  my  house.”
Marion, a pre-school teacher who worked with 3- and 4-year-olds,  commented,  “Coming
back to school that fall, there was a lot of emotional stuff. . . . They knew something was
wrong,  yet  they  didn’t.”
Elementary school children appeared to accept the stress of flooding fairly well.
Ken, an elementary school principal, commented that his own children were fine during
the evacuation period, primarily because the family continued with baseball and other
regular summer activities. Jake, an elementary physical education teacher, noted,  “There
were no big blow ups at school. There was too much other stuff going on in other
places.”
Many parents were very complimentary of school recovery efforts, stating they
appreciated the normalcy school provided for children once the school year started.
Bobbi, an elementary school teacher, noted a unique experience at Christmas in 2011.
She reported:
Most of our families were in FEMA trailers or with relatives or friends . . .
and, I remember that on the last day of school before Christmas vacation,
we were lined up to go, and I had seven students who were just sobbing. I
thought, “It’s Christmas vacation. What's wrong?” But, then it hit me. . . .
School was their normal – their routine. . . . They didn't want to go on
vacation; they wanted to be at school. It made me think . . . they are so
comfortable here. Even if they are in portables, they are comfortable here.
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Liz, a speech therapist, agreed. “We had familiar faces; we gave them a different
environment . . . the teacher, the secretary, the cooks, the custodian . . . everyone was the
same, the principal, too. It was a different environment, but I think they handled that
pretty  well.”
Many teachers often noticed that school aged children were often privy to adult
conversations. Patricia, an elementary school teacher, recalled many conversations that
her students would share.
They knew everything that was going on. They knew when the FEMA
trailers were coming in, and they would ask . . . “Did you get your trailer
yet?” And they knew all about that. . . . They knew about staying in
hotels . . . “Did you get vouchers to stay?” “Did you have to stay in your
camper?”   . . . fourth graders, and they knew all this stuff. . . . I just
thought . . . I thought it was sad . . . and my own kids, they knew way
more than I thought they needed to.
Many parents noted that stress at home was more evident, and was manifested in the
behavior of their children.
Ellen,  a  stay  at  home  mother  and  minister’s  wife,  noted  a  definite  change  in  her  
school-aged daughter’s  behavior  and  general demeanor. Ellen stated:
She was a very cheerful little girl, and she would just come home and play
with her dollies. We finally found her dollies and brought them back, and
I set them up in the basement. She said, “Mother,  I  don’t  have  my  
imagination anymore,” and  she  couldn’t  play with them anymore.
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Alyssa, a stay at home military wife, commented that her daughter was angry after a play
date  with  a  friend  and  told  her  mother,  “She has such a pretty room, and I want mine
back.”    Alyssa  said  that  it  was  hard  to  watch  her  daughter  go through that, because before
the  flood,  “She was  a  happy  little  girl.”
Of all age groups, teenagers appeared to have the most difficulty dealing with the
adversity and loss resulting from the flood. Sally, an appliance salesperson, stated that
her daughter struggled during the transitional living period. She did not have a driver’s
license,  and  was  often  separated  from  her  friends.    Sally  stated,  “She got to the point that
she  didn’t  even  want  to  be  in  there  [school],  but  she  wanted  to  graduate.    We  talked to the
counselor,  and  went  over  it,  and  we  decided  she  would  go  to  the  alternative  school.”    
Sally  added,  “She is still there, and she will graduate next year from Souris [River
Campus].”    Betty  Jean,  a  swim  coach,  recalled  a  day  when  one  of  her  female athletes
asked  to  leave  early.    The  girl  was  crying,  and  when  asked  what  was  wrong,  she  said,  “I  
just  don’t  have  [a] place.”    Betty  Jean  noted,  “That  was  the  day  that  I  realized  that  she  
didn’t  have  a  place,  and  many  didn’t.”
Pastor Pat noted, “There was a resiliency among younger children that was not
displayed  in  older  children.”    Pastor  Pat  also  noted  that  teens  tend  to  be  in  a  life  stage  
where  it’s  “all  about  me,”  and  therefore,  they  tend  to  struggle  with  the  stress  of  such  a  
disaster.
Adults were certainly not exempt from emotional issues during the flood. These
issues were often exemplified through anger and tears. In some cases, adults found
humor in the midst of crisis. Megan, a para-professional, joked in her focus group that
she was responsible for the flood.
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As the school year was winding down, I had my bible out, and I usually
make a few goals. On my list was to clean the house really well . . . and I
put it too close to my prayer list. I should have been more specific on how
God should answer that prayer.
Richard, a retired park board member, recalled an afternoon when the garbage crews
were coming around to gather damaged items off the curb. Richard explained how one
worker came up to him and said:
“You know, this flood is democracy in action – this  is  the  true  equalizer.”    
I  asked  him  what  he  meant,  and  he  said,  “Look  at  this  .  .  .  you  have  a  pile  
of s*** outside your door, and your neighbor has a pile of s***.”    I  
thought about that. There were my $10,000 cabinets that we were so
proud of, and my neighbor down the street, he might have had $800
cabinets  he  bought  at  Menards.    But  at  the  end  of  the  day,  it  didn’t  matter,  
because they were all s*** and all hauled to the street. I laughed about it,
but I guess it did make a lot of sense.
Some residents affected by the flood admitted to self-medication as a method of
coping with stress. Liz, a speech therapist, admitted,  “I  was  pretty  much  self-medicated
with  alcohol  and  Lorazepam.    I  didn’t  have  to  drive,  thank  goodness.”    Tiffany,  a  special
needs teacher, and Carol, a retired teacher, admitted they both drank a lot during that
time. Milton, a mental health provider, indicated that self-medication, while not
recommended, is a fairly common, short-term reaction to crisis.
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Mental Health Interventions
Very few research participants volunteered information that would indicate they
accessed mental health services as the result of the flood. Milton, a local health care
provider, indicated that many mental health providers were either flooded at their place of
business, or flooded at their home. Milton adopted a unique style of therapy as a result of
the flood.
For me, it was almost paradoxical, and I went away from my usual
therapeutic thing and aimed more towards what I could do to help the
person get up in the morning and that seemed to work in individual and
group settings. That is what they were primed for more.
In short, Milton believed the best therapy was getting people to start moving, to grab a
hammer and pull nails, or to clean up damaged sheetrock. In a sense, Milton proclaimed
the most important step in recovery is regaining a sense of individual control.
Pastor  Pat  had  a  different  view  of  an  individual’s  desire  to  gain  self-control.
We worked with some people, who, the more they worked, and the more
nails they pulled, the more they struggled. We worked with that segment
of folks who were largely alone and under-resourced. We visited with one
man in a wheel chair. His wife was in the hospital undergoing cancer
treatments, and he would put a piece of sheetrock on his wheelchair, and
he would roll in and try to put it up on the wall. Now, there is a guy who,
there is a benefit to be at work, because it develops the notion that “I am
not going to let this beat me”;; but at the same time, he was dealing with
such overwhelming belief that he will never get this done. He hears
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people say, take one step at a time, but he takes a step, and there is another
seven more. So, he is obviously at risk.
The emotional stress of the flood and subsequent recovery period was very difficult for
residents affected by the flood to cope with, especially for adults who were vulnerable,
and who had access to limited resources.
Social Effects of Flooding
Flooded residents also struggled with social issues following the Souris River
Flood of 2011. Many residents in the midst of recovery were forced to succumb to a
changed lifestyle, and in many instances, experienced a loss of identity, not only in
person, but within the community.
Personal Loss
Personal loss is not easy to define. Focus group participants spoke in detail about
their greatest personal losses. This loss was not financial in nature; it was the loss of
personal items that held a specific meaning or significance in each home. Mike, a
Salvation Army employee, discussed this sense of loss. “We  see  people  at  one  of  the  
worst moments in their lives. Maybe they lost family heirlooms, pictures, or personal
items. I have not seen many people crying over the loss  their  television.”    For  the  
residents of the Souris River Valley, personal loss came in a variety of forms.
Jackie, a para-professional, recalled a trip to Menards just as staff were putting
Christmas ornaments out:
I am not a crier, but I cried when I saw those ornaments. It made me flash
back to looking at the curb full of stuff, and seeing my ornaments smashed
and broke . . . the ones my kids made . . . just crumbled, and the lady at
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Menards looked at me, and asked if I was going to be okay, and I said, as I
cried . . . “I’ll  be  fine.”
Jackie remarked that the most beautiful ornaments could not replace the memories she
recalled when hanging those hand-made ornaments.
Clarice, a social worker, commented on the loss of generations of family
heirlooms.
Half our house was crawl space, and both our parents are deceased, and
we had a lot of the memorabilia stored down there, including family
pictures that dated back to the 1800s. We forgot all about that area. The
first night we were back in the house, they started hauling that stuff up . . .
and the smell . . . and somebody said to freeze them, so we did. We froze
them for as long as we could, but that smell. All of our pictures were
ruined, including our baby books.
Clarice struggled as she recalled these pictures were left in her care, and now were
destroyed.
Burt, an electrical inspector, reflected on his long time home in the valley.
I lived in my home in the valley for 34 years, so my kids grew up in that
house and went to school across the street at Lincoln. We lost all of that.
My daughter, she planted a big evergreen . . . well, it was a little evergreen
she got one Arbor Day, and we planted it alongside the house, and it was a
huge blue spruce. It was just beautiful, and I told my wife,  “This year,
we’re  going  to  decorate  that  tree,”  but it never came to be.
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Burt explained that the tree died as result of the flood, and his home was on the buyout
list. These were all items that sparked a memory, and now are gone.
A Disconnect Between Valley Dwellers and Hill Dwellers
The immediate reaction of Minot residents to those who were flooded was
positive. Friends and families of those who were directly affected by the flood spent
many hours assisting in evacuation, and in many instances, offered their homes to
families during the immediate crisis. This assistance carried into the early phases of
recovery, where volunteers came to assist residents in mucking out and sanitizing
damaged homes. As time went on, many participants noted a disconnect between
residents who were directly affected by the flood, and those who were not. Jody, a retail
manager noted:
Not long after the flood, and I work at the mall, and I heard people say,
“Aren't you glad the flood is over?” . . . its like . . . it’s not over, for us the
flood is just starting . . . the water is gone, and that's how I felt . . . was a
lot of community involvement, and then people had the belief . . . I'm just
glad it’s over.
Others noted the stark difference in the city of Minot following the flood. Richard, a
retired park district member, commented:
You would be out of the valley and things were green and lush. When you
drove down in the valley after the water left . . . it was a s***hole. . . . It
smelled. The grass was dead. The trees were dead . . . it was just a
s***hole.
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Duncan, a local engineer, agreed:
“I  think  that  this  group  – the two-thirds or three-fourths of Minot citizens
who were not affected includes some of our elected officials, and it’s not
on the forefront. They are more concerned about zoning regulations, or a
Walmart that is being proposed on North Hill.
Much of this frustration was not necessarily aimed at residents of Minot, but
rather political leaders within the city. Ken, a retired railroad worker, commented:
I think the city of Minot has kind of dropped the ball. They have
completely forgotten about all of us -- all they are worried about is the oil,
the influx of people, the infrastructure. . . . They just kind of forgot about
all of us.
Ingrid, an elderly housewife agreed and stated,  “They are more interested in getting new
people  in.”
Residents affected by the flood agreed they were in it for the long haul and
contended the road to recovery is not an easy one. Micah, a small equipment operator,
summed up the general consensus of flood victims. “I  tell  my  wife,  you  play  the  hand  
you’re dealt.    I’m  not  happy  about  it,  but  what  do  you  do?”
Financial Effects of the Flood
Valley residents suffered extreme financial loss as a result of the Souris River
Flood of 2011. The effects were significant for all populations studied, but especially
difficult for vulnerable populations, including the elderly, the poor, and single mothers.
The effects of the flood were exacerbated by a variety of other factors, including rapid
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growth within the community – growth that has created a housing shortage and increased
property values throughout the city.
Homeowners in the valley of Minot, like homeowners throughout the nation,
consider their home to be an investment – their nest egg for the future. The damage
caused by the flood, and the debt load that was incurred to repair these properties
changed retirement plans for many citizens. Micah, a small equipment operator,
commented:
We were debt free, and we just bought a new vehicle and paid cash for it .
. . unfortunately. Seventeen months  and  $140,000  later,  I’m  back  in  my  
house,  but  I’m  57  years  old  .  .  .  my  retirement  went  in  the  river  to  Canada.
Suzanne, a city employee, could not repair her house, and went looking for another home.
She stated,  “There was like 25 houses on the market to buy at the time, and living with
your in-laws only lasts so long, and I worry, that by the time we catch up, we will be
elderly, too.”
Residents had varied options of funding in recovery. The grant money provided
by FEMA provided a basic level of assistance. The remaining funds were low interest
loans that were provided by the Small Business Administration and the Bank of North
Dakota. Many residents ended up with a second or third mortgage on their homes. Nick,
a local media reporter, commented, “I  would  have  had  my  house  paid  for  when  I  was  
about  60,  but  now,  when  I  am  85.”    Seth,  a  railroad  worker, remarked that he was
fortunate to possess the skills to do most of the work himself, but stated, “We are still at
about $80,000 in just materials.”
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The uncertainty of financial assistance weighed heavily on residents of the valley
in the days and weeks following the disaster, especially for the poor and the elderly, who
were barely able to make their existing mortgage payment. Mike, a Salvation Army
worker, provided assistance to many residents during the early stages of recovery, and
noted that many residents had little or no ability to work toward a recovery solution. He
explained:
If we knew of a group that might be able to help or network, we made the
connection. But, between you and I, if I use myself as an example, the last
thing I need is a loan when I have lost everything. We so often see people
at one of the worst moments of their lives.
The financial effects of loss and recovery, coupled with stress created as a result
of disaster, caused many issues within families. Marjorie, a high school math teacher,
commented:
Financially, they [children] knew what was going on at home, and they
knew  what  could  be  done,  and  what  couldn’t  be  done. I would hear the
kids  say  that  .  .  .  “Mom  couldn’t  afford  that,”  or  “We can’t  do  that  
anymore.”    Moms  and  Dads  have  jobs,  and  kids  are  wondering  what  is  
going to happen, and they are caught in this financial crisis.
In order to provide some assistance to struggling families, Minot Public Schools provided
free meals to all students whose families were affected by the flood. Rose, an elementary
school teacher, stated,  “I  had  a  senior and an eighth grader, and they ate for free at
school. . . . We just had to write FLOOD across the top of the form. We never filled that
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out  before,  and  it  was  a  blessing.” The appreciation of free student lunches was a
common theme through focus group sessions.
The financial effects of the flood were far-reaching, and affected the lives of
many residents. Clarice, a social worker, summed up the general consensus of
participants who were interviewed.
I  think  it  changed  everyone’s  life  forever.    We  would  have  never  moved;
we would have never changed anything. But then, all the sudden, it was
all about money – what difference did it make, because we were already
so  far  into  debt.”
Summation of Findings of Theme #8
The Souris River Flood of 2011 had a definite effect on the social, emotional, and
financial well-being of citizens of the Souris River Valley. Residents of the valley
appreciated the generosity and volunteer labor provided by non-flooded victims
immediately following the flood, but felt a disconnect with those who lived outside the
inundation zone, and especially with city government, who they felt were spending more
energy and resources on population growth than flood recovery. While residents affected
by the flood experienced a variety of emotions during flooding and subsequent recovery,
many did not seek counseling or assistance.
Conclusion
The next chapter will provide a comparison between data derived in the study and
the literature review. The chapter will also describe the coding process used to evaluate
focus group and interview data, and will address the primary theory that was discovered
through research.
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CHAPTER V
EMERGENT THEORY AND
DETERMINATION OF A CENTRAL PHENOMENON
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to determine what constitutes full
recovery of a school community from a natural disaster. This qualitative study examined
the perceptions of flooded residents of the Souris River Flood of 2011. This study has
the potential to assist school communities who are suffering the effects of a natural
disaster, and can also support and enhance response plans of governmental agencies and
non-profit organizations that typically respond to disasters.
The research module consisted of nine focus groups and ten interviews. Each
session was recorded and transcribed verbatim. In total, over 700 pages of transcribed
data were reviewed and codes were developed through a process of open coding. During
the open coding process, data were coded twice to ensure a thorough examination.
During evaluation of open codes, a series of eight common themes were developed.
Themes were presented in Chapter IV as follows:
1.

The pre-flood and evacuation period was a traumatic experience and was the
first crisis faced by Minot residents directly affected by the flood.
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2.

The assessment and recovery period was a traumatic experience and was the
second crisis faced by Minot residents who were directly affected by the
flood.

3.

The FEMA Individual Assistance program, while expeditious in nature,
received mixed reviews by Minot residents who were directly affected by
the flood.

4.

The FEMA Public Assistance program was a contentious process subject to
intervention by political leaders before consensus could be reached and
recovery could begin.

5.

Crisis management is a collaborative process involving federal, state, and
local government, as well as volunteer services from charitable
organizations.

6.

The long-term effects of a natural disaster span far beyond the physical
recovery of homes, businesses, and school buildings. The Minot Public
School District community was drastically changed as a result of the Souris
River Flood of 2011.

7.

Effective communication has been lacking during all phases of crisis and
recovery, and has created a layer of confusion and mistrust throughout the
Souris River Valley.

8.

The Souris River Flood of 2011 negatively affected survivors; negative
effects have included social, emotional, and financial hardships.
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Emergent Theory
All codes were further evaluated through axial coding. A thorough review of
thematic findings yielded one common, central phenomenon: Success in recovery was
dependent  on  a  resident’s  social,  emotional,  and  financial  well  being  before  the  flood,  and  
the ability of a resident to gain access to agencies and organizations offering assistance to
flood victims. In general, residents affected by flooding who had a strong friend and
family base, who were able to deal with stress effectively, and who were financially
solvent before the flood were able to respond more rapidly to the disaster, and appeared
to be more successful in their recovery efforts than residents who did not have a strong
support base.
A grounded theory diagram was developed to illustrate interrelationships of
causal conditions to contextual and intervening conditions, as well as outcomes derived
from implementation of various flood recovery strategies (see Figure 1). This diagram
depicts how important it is to identify vulnerable residents in a timely fashion during
flood recovery; and also, how important it is to apply appropriate interventions to assist
residents in recovery.
While social, emotional, and/or financial stability were not sole indicators of
success in the process of rebuilding, they were noted as key elements. Vulnerable
individuals were dependent on assistance from charitable organizations and faith-based
groups to assist in their rebuilding processes.
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Figure 1. Grounded Theory Diagram.

The key to successful recovery of vulnerable populations rested in the ability of
individuals to advocate for themselves, or seek assistance from charitable and faith-based
organizations. Federal involvement through the FEMA Individual Assistance program
provided every flooded resident with a damage assessment and a grant award, not to
exceed $30,200.00. The balance of funds to cover recovery costs came from low interest
loans from the Small Business Administration and the Bank of North Dakota, or through
donations and grants from charitable organizations.
The key to success in working with vulnerable populations was timely
identification of individuals in need of assistance, and securing social, emotional, and
financial capital necessary to assist in recovery before individuals gave up and left. Some
vulnerable residents refused to take any action, and did not wait to receive assistance
from charitable organizations and faith-based volunteer groups. Many of these residents
left the city, and did not attempt to rebuild their homes in Minot.
Grounded Theory
Selective Coding
Eight themes were gleaned from data analysis and interpretation. A common
thread throughout these themes centered on the ability of vulnerable populations to
succeed in recovery efforts. All data were subject to selective coding, a recursive process
that allowed the researcher to compare interrelationships between categories. A central
phenomenon was developed through this process: Success in recovery was dependent on
a  resident’s  social,  emotional,  and  financial  well  being  before  the  flood,  and  the  ability  of  
a resident to gain access to agencies and organizations offering assistance to flood
victims. The ability of charitable and faith-based organizations to provide assistance to
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citizens most in need of help was easier said than done. Many issues were noted during
the flood and subsequent recovery period, including the inability of charitable
organizations to work collaboratively, as well as difficulty in managing faith-based
volunteers who were willing to offer time and services.
Causal Conditions
A causal condition is something that contributes to the occurrence of a central
phenomenon. While reviewing the data, there was little doubt the root cause of the
central phenomenon was the Souris River Flood of 2011. A grounded theory research
model requires that a researcher go beyond the obvious and break data down into the
smallest detail (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In reality, the flood was an event that brought
many other issues to light. The research identified five causal conditions that had a
negative effect on many valley dwellers, and in some instances, hampered the recovery
process.
Forced evacuation during the flood.
Over 14,000 valley residents were forced to evacuate before the flood. The stress
of forced evacuation and transitional living created a hardship for many Minot residents.
Citizens who were well connected in the community were able to evacuate the majority
of their belongings. Many individuals, such as the poor and elderly were unable to garner
assistance during the evacuation period. Jackie, a para-professional, recalled the
struggles  faced  by  her  elderly  neighbors,  who  “just packed an overnight bag and  left.”
Hunter,  a  Red  Cross  employee,  worked  with  residents  of  Minot’s  mobile  home  parks,  
who  “lost  a good percentage of their stuff” as a result of the flood.
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Extensive damage caused by the flood.
Many other residents misjudged the anticipated water levels, or simply denied the
flood would happen. Charles, a retired school administrator, believed the flood forecast
was an over-exaggeration, but was shocked when he returned. He stated, “All the stuff
that was standing in the kitchen was gone; and now, when we are missing something, I
just say,  ‘It went down the river.’”
The forced evacuation of the Souris River Valley created a stressful situation for
many, especially those vulnerable residents who had little or no ability to self advocate or
arrange for assistance. The amount of damage caused by the flood was more than most
residents could envision. Deb, a city employee, stated:
I didn't expect that much damage up high. I thought [it] would be wet to
here [motioning with hands to a 3 foot height], and perfect up high. It was
a mess, and the ceiling was wavy . . . and they had a hardwood floor under
the carpet, and it was all over the place . . . and I said,  “Oh, my gosh.”
Tiffany, a special needs teacher, was shocked by the damage. She said,  “Pictures don't
do it justice. You have to go in there, and so . . . that's my son's room . . . floors just
collapsed.”
Lack of federal funding in comparison to previous disasters.
In most instances, financial costs associated with flood damage far exceeded the
grant money provided by FEMA. Flooded residents were left to deal with the shock of
damages as they scurried to access funding through low-interest loan programs. This
concern was exacerbated in homes where residents had limited financial resources.
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Many participants discussed a lack of equity in the FEMA Individual Assistance
program. The amount of financial assistance paid to residents affected by floods in New
Orleans and Grand Forks was a common topic during focus group sessions. Deb, a city
employee, commented, “If Katrina could get that much, why couldn't those of us in the
middle [of the United States]? We spend money in the community. We volunteer our
time. We are law-abiding citizens. Why can't we get treated the same?”
Confusion regarding federal involvement, and specifically, confusion around
federal loan and grant programs, also caused a great deal of turmoil. Hunter, a Red Cross
employee, stated:
So, the low income person who can't afford to rebuild or doesn't have the
know-how or ability to do it themselves, they have to hire it out, and they
need a loan to do so, because they can't afford it . . . so now, there is grant
money, but they can't get it because they already borrowed money and got
a benefit . . . but, that [is] not a benefit; it’s a loan. And sometimes, you
think, “Where is the reasoning?”    The thought process . . . to get the
money to where it is needed? So, you have a mortgage and a Small
Business Administration loan, but you can't accept a grant because you
took out a loan? You got the second loan because you needed the second
loan.
The confusion surrounding funding options was a common theme throughout focus group
sessions.
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Limited resources for homeowners with a current mortgage.
Many citizens had limited resources. In general, many elderly residents counted
on their property as an investment. Alton, a retired city employee, talked about elderly
residents who just packed a bag and left.
There are a lot of elderly people who lived down in that area, and they
were living on their social security. They had a little home that was paid
for, and  they  lost  it,  and  there  was  no  way  for  them  to  recover.”
Financial well-being was a major concern discussed during focus groups and
interviews. Sally, an appliance saleswoman, stated, “I  am  lucky. I have to start my life
over, but I'm young  enough  to  do  it.”    She  expressed  concern  that  her  mother, a recent
retiree, was not as fortunate. Liz, a speech pathologist, commented,  “I  hadn't  paid  for  my  
house the first time, and I, now  I  have  to  pay  for  it  again.”
A common resource discussed during focus groups was the ability to self-perform
many of the tasks necessary for recovery. Jordan, an elementary teacher, stated,
“Everyone  we  talked  to  who  had  been  in  a  flood  before said do this, do this, do this, so
we  just  started  doing.”    Megan, a para-professional, agreed stating that early on, her
husband “determined  that  he  would  do  as  much  as  he  could  on  his  own.”
Many citizens did not have the money, skills, and ability to begin recovery on
their own. While many charitable organizations and faith-based groups were stationed in
Minot, the city lacked the organization necessary to get volunteers where they were most
needed.
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Limited critical incident command structure.
Confusion was prevalent during the early stages of recovery. Without a fully
functional centralized Critical Incident Command Center, residents who needed
assistance were left in the lurch. Turf wars between charitable organizations were also
evident during this time. Many residents struggled with locating and securing volunteer
services. Sam, a retired laborer, was in need of assistance, but was frustrated with the
process. He explained, “I went down to the armory, and put my name on the list, and
they couldn't get to us. They told me there were people ahead of us, which I didn't
understand, because as soon as it was available, I put my name down. . . . How did I get
so far back?”
Communication was also a concern, exemplified through focus groups and
interviews. Many felt the city had not clearly communicated with residents affected by
the flood; especially, communication in regard to future flood protection. Many residents
were delayed in flood recovery while they waited for months to learn of a final plan for
enhanced flood protection in the city. Raymond, a retired firefighter, commented that he
noticed, “A  lot  of  discussion  about  recovery  and  flood  diversion  projects,  but  not  a  lot  
happening . . . and we still have a lot of people sitting in the valley without a lot of
direction.”
The causal conditions noted by flooded residents were handled in a variety of
ways. Some residents who were well connected in the community were able to access
social, emotional, and financial capital to quickly rebuild their homes. The same was not
noted among vulnerable populations, who were dependent on assistance from outside
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agencies, and who were often uncertain as to whether or not they might access those
services.
Contextual Conditions
Contextual conditions relate to the context in which a participant experiences a
central phenomenon. Corbin and Strauss (2008) found  that  “context  doesn’t  determine  
experience or set the course of action, but it does identify the sets of conditions in which
problems and/or situations arise and to which persons respond through some form of
action/interaction  and  emotion”  (p.  88).   Every natural disaster occurs within unique
surroundings and is characterized by unique components. No two communities are the
same, and no two natural disasters are the same. Therefore, we can only assume that no
two recovery periods will be the same, either. However, natural disasters contain
common threads running through them such as the emotional, social, and economic
factors arising in populations affected by a natural disaster. This was evident in the
Souris River Valley, where residents were evacuated from their homes, and were required
to live in makeshift, temporary facilities. These contextual conditions had little effect on
courses of actions residents had to take to recover, but did make up the environment, the
context, that surrounded recovery efforts of valley dwellers.
Shock associated with evacuation and damage.
Many participants expressed utter shock in regard to their assessment of damage
after the flood. One resident commented that in her mind, she anticipated the water
would come up and go down, and the house would be wet when she re-entered the valley.
This was not the case. Chantel, an accountant, shared her experience in opening her
sister’s  house  for  the  first  time.
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My sister had over 13 1/2 feet of water, and I didn't know a house could
hold so much water – just blew my mind . . . and when I walked in there, I
was just staring, and she asked why . . . because I never saw anything like
this and never thought I would.
Chantel’s experience was not unique. Charles, a retired school administrator, shared his
experience when he re-entered his home.
I didn't even say this to my wife, but I will say it to you. . . . I walked in
the kitchen door, and I saw a rat run across the kitchen floor, and that . . . I
still get goose bumps thinking about that. I thought,  “Wow, this place is
really a disaster.”
In some instances, the damage was so extensive that repair was not an option. In
most situations, repair was possible. The context of damage did not necessarily have a
major impact on any action associated with recovery, but it did present a factual basis for
residents to consider when developing a course of action toward recovery.
Transitional living.
For many residents, the transitional living period proved to be a very stressful
time. Many participants expressed frustration with the lack of privacy during this period.
Milton,  a  mental  health  provider,  commented,  “It  isn't  something  that  you  expect  in  
middle age; it’s  something  you  expect when you are in college,  or  just  starting  out.”
Many residents living in transitional accommodations commented that it was
difficult to have private conversations, and in turn, was difficult to plan for a very
uncertain future. Jody, a retail manager, expressed her frustration during the transitional
living period.
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We were living with my parents . . . an hour north of here . . . and my dad
was – even before it actually flooded – he just kept pushing us . . . What
are you going to do? That was the hardest part . . . I think . . . everyone
was telling us what to do, and Mike and I just wanted to sit back and
decide what was best for us, and that's why it took us longer, and in the
long run, I'm glad, because we took our time to make decisions. We got
our FEMA trailer, and it was home . . . and we just sat back and decided
what to do . . . and for us, that was good . . . because some people jumped
in, and then later said . . . “Gosh, wish I wouldn't have done that!”
The transitional living period created stress for many residents. Eventually, most
residents with flood damaged homes were able to access a FEMA trailer.
Flood protection enhancement projects.
Many residents have been frustrated with the city in regard to the  city’s  
indecisiveness over future flood protection plans. In some instances, these plans could
have a direct effect on residents of the Souris River Valley and the decisions residents
might make regarding their personal recovery. Even after 3 years, many residents
continue to wait for a final decision on an enhanced flood control project before they
decide to rebuild. Others have been told by the city they may be forced to sell their
property for flood protection, but have yet to receive a settlement offer. Leila, a delivery
truck driver, commented that a “lot  of  people  are  waiting  because  their  homes  are  in  the  
potential diversion area, and maybe a potential buyout area, and many of those people
have seen nothing on their homes . . . and they won't for a long time.”
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In many instances, decisions of whether or not to repair flood damaged homes has
been taken out of the hands of residents. Some residents have gone ahead and repaired
their homes, and now are uncertain of their future in the valley.
Initial damage assessment.
In the days following return of residents into the Souris River Valley, FEMA
officials worked with local residents to create an initial damage assessment of each
property damaged in the flood. These assessments were very important for a variety of
reasons. First, an official assessment provided a citizen with a basis for the amount of
FEMA grant each homeowner in the valley was eligible for. Second, it provided a basis
for determining eligibility of citizens for low interest loans through the Small Business
Administration and the Bank of North Dakota.
The dollar amount of damage assigned to a property was based on objective
criteria, and was not open to negotiation. A FEMA worker entered a home and evaluated
the damaged elements of the home. From that visit, a damage assessment or report was
completed, and made available to federal and state agencies. Many participants stated
their initial visit from a FEMA worker was generally positive. Dealing with FEMA and
Small Business Administration officials after an assessment was completed was what
often proved difficult. Hunter, a Red Cross employee, expressed his frustration by
stating:
You have to deal with that; and after the fact, you are dealing with
somebody who is somewhere else from where the disaster is – from
whatever call center they are at – and certainly, they don't understand what
we are going through or how we feel. I think that part of it was a
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challenge, and I know it was for everyone who dealt with FEMA and
Small Business Administration over the phone.
A damage assessment was required of all flooded homes, and in nearly all situations, the
damage surpassed the grant money provided by FEMA. This same assessment developed
by FEMA for FEMA was provided to financial institutions that provided low interest
loans to affected residents. An initial damage assessment was crucial, and had a direct
impact on other funding options offered to homeowners later.
Lack of qualified contractors to assist in rebuilding.
The extensive damage affecting the Souris River Valley created a shortage of
qualified contractors to assist in rebuilding. Early in the recovery phase, contractors from
around the United States came to Minot, North Dakota. Many participants reported that
many of these workers were reputable, and provided excellent services for residents
affected by the flood. Others provided shoddy workmanship resulting in claims of
fraudulent behavior. Lucy, an elementary teacher, noted,  “I  had  a  plumber  come  in  to fix
something that was broken, and he said,  ‘Really,  did  he  [the contractor hired to repair the
home post-flood] use like forty-five  different  pieces  of  pipe?’ I didn't have a very
pleasant  experience  with  that.”    Lucy  added,  “If I could, I would sell it and move
somewhere  else.”
Some participants also shared claims of fraudulent practices and over-billing.
Wayne, a school district employee, expressed concern with a cleaning company that was
hired to mitigate damages in flooded school buildings. He stated:
We did not have a good experience with the cleaning company that we
hired. We got  bills  that  we  should  have  never  been  billed  for…costs  that  
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FEMA deemed ineligible, and it’s still hanging out there. We could end
up in a lawsuit from that cleaning company. They billed us for nearly 10
million dollars, and we have been paid about 7 million, and FEMA says
the  rest  is  not  eligible.”
Options were limited for flooded residents; and in some instances, decisions were made
to ensure a rapid return to the home, without adequate attention to cost.
Housing shortage.
The city of Minot has experienced incredible growth since 2008. This growth
slowed slightly as a result of the flood, but has rebounded in recent years. This growth
received mixed reviews from participants in this study. Duncan, a local engineer, stated:
One thing that has helped us out, is that we have a very robust economy
coming into the flood, and that demand for housing and services, it led to a
speedy recovery in the valley, relatively speaking. So, the people within
the valley, that decided to move on with their lives – either moving on to
the hill or leaving Minot completely – those houses that were in the valley
didn't stay flooded or vacant for long.
Other residents expressed concern over this rapid growth and subsequent housing
shortage. Nick, a local reporter, stated:
It’s such an odd situation, because we had this terrible flood, but we also
had this huge boom thing going on with all the oil. So, there was this
pressure for places to live, which kept prices high – which meant that if I
lost everything in the flood, I really couldn't afford to go out and buy –
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and that's why I rebuilt where I was because I couldn't go and buy land
anywhere. Those factors combined to push a lot of people out.
The housing shortage created an additional layer of stress for residents who struggled
with recovery efforts, and who desired to consider housing options outside the valley.
Intervening Conditions
Several intervening conditions were evident during the review of data. These
intervening conditions were outside forces that helped to shape and promote recovery
from the disaster. Through these interventions, a list of strategies emerged. These
strategies will be discussed later in this chapter.
The mere presence of intervening conditions did not guarantee all residents had
access to similar interventions. Many vulnerable residents did not know how to access
assistance, and in the early stages of recovery, formalized structures were not in place to
identify and advocate for the most vulnerable residents.
Volunteer assistance.
Many residents depended on volunteer assistance to help with cleaning and
rebuilding. Volunteer assistance was broken down into two separate categories: (a)
volunteers who had a kinship with residents affected by the flood, and who assisted
friends and relatives in cleaning and repairing homes, and (b) volunteers who were
associated with charitable and faith-based organizations, and who were assigned to help
residents affected by the flood. Roger, a school district administrator, who was well
connected in the community, commented, “We had friends, family . . . you name it –
people that we didn't know – that  came  to  help  on  different  occasions.”    John,  a  retired  
Methodist pastor, with limited resources, commented:
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We got a call from . . . I think . . . Helping Hands . . . and they asked if we
needed help? They said they would send some people over. It was a
husband, wife, and son, and I found out that her mother goes to the same
church as my wife and I. He happened to be a contractor, and he asked
what we needed. I asked him to do the basement, and he said it wasn't a
problem.    He  said,  “You take care of the upstairs with your friends, and
we  will  take  the  downstairs.”    He asked if he could open the basement
windows, and I said sure, so he went to the truck and got his saw and he
handed everything out through those windows. I had a 2-ton pool table
down there, and he just cut it up and hauled it out.
The ability of vulnerable residents to access volunteer services often depended on
interventions by individuals or organizations in the community who identified a resident
as someone who needed assistance, and who was willing to make the appropriate referral.
Interventions by political leaders.
Many participants noted varied levels of frustration in dealing with flood recovery
issues. In many instances, flooded residents depended on interventions by political
leaders. These interventions came through a variety of sources, including: (a) advocacy
through local congressional offices, (b) advocacy through state government, including the
office of Governor Jack Dalrymple, and (c) in the public sector, direct advocacy of the
congressional delegation with FEMA management.
Roger, a school administrator, who was accused of accepting money from FEMA
in a fraudulent manner, reached out for assistance. He said,  “I  even  contacted [Senator]
Hoeven's  rep  in  town,  Jackie  Velk,  and  followed  up  on  it.”    Ellen,  a  minister’s  wife, was
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upset when a FEMA worker told her a FEMA trailer could not fit on their lot. She
explained:
Everyone else on our street had the same kind of house, and it worked
there. So, we were told that if we went  to  the  Senator’s  office,  we  could  
get a FEMA trailer, so we went and lit some fires.
Many participants commented that interventions with local congressional offices were
helpful in planning for recovery.
The  state  of  North  Dakota,  through  the  Governor’s  office, also served as an
advocacy support for many Minot residents, especially in the public sector. Wayne, a
school district employee, commented:
The people from the state of North Dakota . . . when we got to that point,
they were helpful. Our senators were involved as well. It was kind of sad
that we had to get other government officials involved to get to the point
where  we  were,  but  it’s  what  we  had  to  do.
Interventions by political leaders were often required to cut through bureaucratic red tape,
and to get local and federal agencies on the same page.
Federal interventions.
The federal government provided financial interventions during the recovery
period. These interventions included grants and housing through the FEMA Individual
Assistance program and loans through the Small Business Administration. These
interventions were part of a recovery package offered by the federal government.
The federal government offered grants to flooded residents in the Souris River
Valley, up to $30,200.00 per homeowner. The FEMA Public Assistance program
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provided assistance to publicly funded agencies, such as the city government, schools,
and parks.
The Small Business Administration also provided residents an opportunity to
apply for low-interest loans. These loans had varied requirements, depending on an
applicant’s  credit  rating  and  debt  load.    Penny,  a  school  district  employee,  became  
quickly disenchanted with the Small Business Administration. She stated, “I  remember  
going to the auditorium for an Small Business Administration loan, and it was a big runaround, and we never did get an Small Business Administration loan.” Burt, an electrical
inspector,  took  advantage  of  the  loan,  but  expressed  his  frustration,  “It was a lot of
paperwork with Small Business Administration and a fair amount of frustration.” Jordan,
an elementary teacher, commented, “Our  Small Business Administration thing was good,
but it was a lot. I can go down to the credit union and borrow twice the amount of
money, and it is so easy, but  you  had  to  sit  there  and  fill  this  out.”
The FEMA Individual Assistance program also provided housing options for
residents affected by the flood. These two-bedroom and three-bedroom models were
placed  on  the  homeowner’s  property  when  possible,  and  were  tied  in  to  the  owner’s  
existing water and sewer system.
Some  flooded  residents  expressed  dismay  in  regard  to  FEMA’s  slow  response  to
housing issues following the flood. Hunter, a Red Cross employee, described both angst
and understanding in dealing with FEMA.
I think that FEMA was actually overwhelmed at that point – that's my
opinion on that – but they had so many trailers they had to put together,
and they came from all over, from different spots in the United States, and
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even to get them here was a huge task, so I definitely understand their side
of it, but on our side of it, we had to help them until temporary housing
was available to them.
State interventions.
The North Dakota State Legislature offered two programs to assist residents
recovering from flooding. The first intervention was the formation of the Flood
Recovery Loan Program. This program allowed residents to apply for up to $10,000.00
at a 1% interest rate. Carol, a retired teacher, was impressed with the ease of the Bank of
North Dakota loan. “It  was  pretty  simple.” Nick,  a  local  news  reporter,  agreed,  “That
was  very  easy.”
The legislature also offered a sales tax rebate of up to $2,500.00 for any resident
whose property was flooded. Applicants were required to submit copies of receipts from
the purchase of supplies to repair flooded properties. The sales tax rebate proved to be
less than easy. Lucy, a special needs instructor, expressed her frustration with the
program.
I didn't do that. . . . It was a joke! If you were able to do that, great, but to
be able to sit down and take all my receipts. . . . I mean, I have all my
receipts, but I wasn't willing to sit down and try to go through all of it and
then determine what's the tax on this, and on that . . . but, I didn't do it . . .
you know. . . . I thought we were flooded, and if you can't just give us a
measly $2,500.00, then just keep it.
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School as an institution of normalcy.
The Minot Public School District set a goal to get every student into a desk by the
beginning of the school year. Governor Jack Dalrymple allowed the district to begin the
school year 6 days late. When school opened on September 6, 2011, every student had a
desk and a classroom, albeit temporary. The district also provided other types of
assistance to flooded families, such as free meals during the 2011-2012 school year.
Many people were very complimentary of the school recovery efforts following
the flood. Jackie, a para-professional, commented, “It  was  so  nice  of  Minot  Public  
Schools to offer assistance [free meals] that  fall.” Tiffany, a special needs teacher,
commented that school presented a regular routine  for  students,  saying,  “School was their
normal . . . their routine.” In the midst of chaos, a regular school schedule provided a
sense of normalcy for many students in the Souris River Valley.
Strategies
A variety of strategies were implemented to assist residents of the Souris River
Valley. These strategies were often as unique as the residents who were assisted, and
services were provided based on individual need. Table 1 indicates a variety of strategies
implemented during the recovery process.
The lack of a functional Critical Incident Command Structure presented many
difficulties. Much confusion was noted by charitable organizations and faith-based
volunteer groups in the early days of recovery. Therefore, early attempts to implement
strategies were somewhat ineffective. As recovery continued, agencies began to
collaborate and provided more detailed interventions for vulnerable residents.
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Table 1. Strategies for Recovery.
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Consequences
The causal conditions (forced evacuation, extensive damage, lack of adequate
funding, limited resources, and limited command structure) noted by residents, and
discussed in this chapter, were profound and unavoidable. Many residents were well
connected in the community, and had a strong support structure to assist in evacuation
and recovery (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Recovery for Well Connected Residents.
Other residents did not have the same level of support. Charitable organizations
and faith-based volunteer groups came to Minot and offered assistance, but the lack of a
functional Critical Incident Command Center, coupled with confusion of roles and
responsibilities, meant that many vulnerable residents were unable to get the assistance
they needed to rebuild.
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The Hope Village concept served as an umbrella organization for nine faith-based
volunteer groups. A Hope Village team also provided a framework of case management
to ensure the most vulnerable citizens received assistance. Hope Village did not open
until April, 2012. Vulnerable residents who were able to self-advocate and develop a
recovery plan shortly after the flood had more success in the recovery process than those
that did not. Some residents were able to hold on through the winter, and then received
full benefit of the Hope Village case management model. Those who were unable to selfadvocate, or those who did not receive early assistance and hold on through the winter
were more likely to abandon their homes and move away from the city (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Recovery for Vulnerable Residents.
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Conclusion
Chapter VI includes a conclusion and a summary of findings, as well as
recommendations for further study and action.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions and Summary of Findings
The findings presented in this small-scale qualitative study of the Minot Public
Schools community recovery from the Souris River Flood of 2011 suggested the
following:
1.

The ability to recover from a natural disaster is directly proportionate to an
individual’s  pre-disaster social, emotional, and financial wellbeing.

2.

The definition of the term recovery is as unique as each individual resident
affected by a disaster: There is no sole definition of what recovery looks
like.

3.

The perception of FEMA in regard to recovery was strongly affected by the
relationships that FEMA workers and case managers forged with residents
affected by the flood.

4.

The FEMA Public Assistance program, while crucial in the recovery of the
public sector, was perceived to be confrontational and minimally effective
from the start.

5.

The lack of a Critical Incident Command Center in the city of Minot created
an environment of chaos and stifled the ability of charitable organizations
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and faith-based volunteer groups to assist vulnerable citizens in a timely
fashion.
6.

The citizens of Minot judged the success of recovery in the public sector by
the speed in which the recovery took place.

7.

The expeditious recovery of the Minot Public School District was seen as a
stabilizing force in the community that brought a sense of normalcy to the
flood damaged valley.

8.

The delay in decision making by city government had a direct effect on
many homeowners, and slowed the recovery process for many residents in
the valley.

The following research questions, developed from the purpose statement found in
Chapter I and addressed in research and data analysis, included:
1.

What social, emotional, and economic processes are associated with school
community recovery from a natural disaster?

2.

What  demonstrates  that  a  school  community’s  recovery  is complete?

3.

Who are key players in the recovery process of a school community?

Findings are summarized in narrative form according to each research question.
Research Question 1
What social, emotional, and economic processes are associated with school
community recovery from a natural disaster?
Recovery was found to be about social, emotional, and economic capital. Lindell
and Prater (2003) found that recovery rates varied by individual, family, business, and
community. The strength of a community, albeit social, emotional, or economic, can
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play a major role in the recovery process. Economic factors often take front stage in the
midst of a natural disaster. Olshansky and Chang (2009) noted that residents with the
fewest assets struggled most during a recovery.
Federal interventions, primarily through the FEMA Individual Assistance
program, provided a quick economic intervention for many residents. However, amount
of damage often far exceeded grants provided by FEMA. Unfortunately, federal
intervention in the immediate period following a disaster is usually based on economic
assistance and political restoration, not on emotional or social well-being. This fact was
also noted by Madrid and Grant (2008), who found that federal relief policies tend to
ignore social and emotional issues. Meanwhile, vulnerable populations are left to
struggle.
This struggle was evident in the city of Minot. Residents who were connected in
the community, and who had a strong friend and family base, were more successful in
evacuating their homes and businesses. Shelby, an elementary school teacher, had a large
group of volunteers come in and assist. She stated, “We had our entire house moved out
in about an hour and a half – we had about 40 people at our house. It was crazy to see
how  fast  everything  got  moved  out.”    Chantel,  an  accountant,  provided a contrasting
experience when she checked on  the  residents  in  her  sister’s  rental  property. She stated,
“Everybody  else  was  moving,  and  they  were  not,  so  I  went  over  there. . . . They didn't
take  anything  out.”
This same contrast in support continued into the recovery period. Whaley (2009)
noted that many residents who experience a natural disaster are traumatized. This was
noted in vulnerable populations that failed to evacuate personal items from their homes,
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or the subsequent recovery period when they waited for outside assistance to guide and
provide assistance. The lack of an active Critical Incident Command Structure in the city
prevented charitable and faith-based organizations from working collaboratively to
provide assistance to those residents who were most in need. Conversely, well-connected
valley residents got to work and began cleaning their homes almost immediately, often
with volunteer assistance from family and friends.
Many residents also showed signs of depression and anxiety during the flood and
subsequent recovery period. Many researchers (Jones et al., 2008; Madrid & Schacher,
2006) found that availability of mental health providers is often compromised after a
natural disaster. This was noticed in Minot. Milton, a local mental health provider,
commented:
The flood had a huge impact on mental health providers. Trinity
Riverside was flooded, and they relocated. Two providers had their
practices flooded out, and one, if not both, had their homes destroyed . . .
so they were essentially removed from the list of providers.
Mental health interventions were discussed by several participants during focus group
sessions and interviews. Many participants expressed a belief that the best therapy was
getting to work to repair their homes. Milton agreed with this belief.
The most productive part wasn't talking or feeling, or crying; it was doing.
It was tearing out the rotten sheetrock, or figuring out where your kids
were going to stay. It was getting one room set so you could live out of it
while you worked on the rest of the house.
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Many participants expressed the importance of promoting a sense of normalcy
during the evacuation and recovery period. Madrid and Grant (2008) also found that
victims of Hurricane Katrina found solace in returning to normal. The Minot Public
School District adopted a similar mission. The district set a goal of starting school on
time and ensuring that all students had a desk to sit in. The goal was to deliver a normal
school experience for all Minot Public School students. Bobbi, an elementary school
teacher in a flooded building, summed up the district initiative. “We  needed to stay
together for them, because they needed us.”
Recovery is achieved when the emotional, social, and financial needs of a
disaster-stricken community are met. In order to recover, a community must be able to
work collaboratively to ensure that every resident, even the most vulnerable, has the
assistance they need to examine their current situation, develop a recovery plan, and
begin the road to recovery.
Research Question 2
What  demonstrates  that  a  school  community’s  recovery  is  complete?
Recovery is difficult to define. Various researchers have differing views of what
recovery looks like, and when a community can establish that recovery is complete.
Anderson (2008) indicated that recovery is dependent on the view of the evaluator,
stating that for many, recovery means the community has returned to its pre-disaster
condition. Baird (2010) commented that many researchers believe that recovery is
complete when a community has returned to a condition that is as good as, or better, than
previous conditions.
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By January 2, 2014, all but one flooded school building in the Minot Public
School District had been repaired or replaced. Still, at the time of this report, many
flooded homes were sitting untouched in the valley, the city had yet to finalize plans for
an enhanced flood control plan, and many citizens continued to express fear in regard to
future flooding. Data gleaned through focus groups and interviews indicated that many
residents continued to struggle with social and emotional effects from the flood. As of
July 3, 2014, the Minot school community had not fully recovered from the Souris River
Flood of 2011 (3 years earlier).
The city of Minot was in a precarious spot during the summer of 2011. Oil
activity in the western part of North Dakota had increased community population, and
had already stressed the housing market by 2008. The Souris River Flood of 2011
exacerbated this shortage in housing. Hunter, a Red Cross employee, noted this situation:
If you look back at the flood and look back at the environment that Minot
was at that time – we had very little housing for two reasons. First,
because of the flood, and secondly, because of the economy and how
things were going at that time. Minot had not caught up with the
population that was moving here, so we had the perfect storm for the
situation that we were facing . . . no place to put anybody.
The shortage of pre-flood housing was exacerbated by the loss or damage of over 4,000
homes in the valley.
Nearly 3 years have passed since the Souris River Flood of 2011. The city of
Minot has continued to work toward recovery. Many participants expressed concern that
the city was not doing enough and not moving quickly enough towards recovery. Waugh
144

(2000) noted that recovery is divided into two separate categories: Short-term recovery
involves an emergency period immediately following a disaster, which includes the repair
of critical infrastructure, health and safety treatment, and the clearance of debris. Longterm recovery involves a long-range plan for repair of the community, and the
development of a plan to mitigate future disasters.
Baird (2010) noted that recovery is also based on a community’s  belief  that  
hazard mitigation and risk reduction is in place. Duncan, a local engineer, acknowledged
the  city’s  slow response to flood recovery, and plans for enhanced flood protection
created a stalemate. He stated:
I wish the city of Minot would have done some more things locally, rather
than relying on the federal government for assistance, and for the federal
government to drive some of these processes. That kind of held us up. I
understand the limitation of funding, and I know that [was] what was
holding everything up. But now, we are acquiring some properties in the
city, and some are, right now, getting their first offer for purchase of their
home, and we are 3 years removed from this, and 2 years removed from
when the plan was delivered, when the information was there to make
acquisition.
Other participants expressed concern about the many homes in the valley that remained
untouched after the flood. These Zombie Homes, as they have been coined, have
continued to be an eye-sore in areas where many residents have repaired their homes.
Milton, a mental health provider, agreed the city has been negligent in regard to the
procurement and destruction of Zombie Homes. He explained:
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I think the community response is even more important, and that is what I
see failing in the city government. Allowing these things to persist. . . . I
know that property rights are important, but these houses are goners. If I
were running the city, I would rather take the chance of being sued, and
destroying them, rather than just let them sit.
The appearance of the city was specifically noted in focus groups and interviews.
Many participants expressed  anger  over  the  city’s  slow  response  to  cleaning  up  flood  
debris.    Seymour,  a  state  employee  appointed  to  the  Minot  disaster,  commented,  “The  
riverbanks are a mess, and the neighborhoods are a mess. I realize that you can't do
things without money, but with the city . . . the attitude was, ‘We will only do it if
someone pays us for it.’”    Ken,  a  retired  railroad  employee,  also  expressed  his  frustration  
with the city response. He said,  “I think the city of Minot has kind of dropped the ball.
They have completely forgotten about all of us . . . all they are worried about is the oil,
the  influx  of  people.”
Not all public sector flood response was deemed negative. The Minot Public
School District received many positive comments from participants in regard to the
expeditious nature of recovery, including a rapid response in setting up portable
classrooms. Wayne, a school district employee, acknowledged that recovery, coupled
with a sense of normalcy in a struggling community, was a process of collaboration and
teamwork at various levels. He said:
Because of the emergency, he [Governor Dalrymple] waived procurement
laws, and our local board waived our local rules, so we didn't have to
advertise for X amount of days, so that we could get multiple quotes and
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get moving, and we had to. . . . We had less than 40 days to get over 64
portable classrooms set up.
Wayne also expressed a need to respond quickly to the disaster, whether or not FEMA
had provided their blessing. He said,  “We  had to [move quickly] . . . to be able to do the
things  we  needed  to  get  done  in  the  short  timeframe  that  we  had.”    Seymour,  a  state  
employee,  reiterated  this  assumption,  “You  had  a  deadline  to  meet.”    In  general,  the  
school district did not have the luxury of waiting to ensure federal funding for temporary
school district facilities.
The placement of portable classrooms, coupled with repair and reconstruction of
flooded school buildings, also moved quickly. Milton, a mental health provider,
commented:
I think that many don't want to celebrate our recovery, but now we have a
much better junior high. I wouldn't want to wish a flood on anyone, but
this is a better place, and in some way, we need to feel some pleasure and
realize  that  it’s okay. We don't need to feel guilty about it.
Many participants commented on the quick response provided by the school district, and
appreciated  the  district’s  desire  to  return  to  a  normal  schedule as quickly as possible.
Lindell and Prater (2003) acknowledged that recovery is difficult to define, and
therefore, is subject to interpretation. Kates and Pijawka (1977) noted that typical
recovery can take between 2 and 8 years. While the Minot community has continued to
move forward in the recovery process, the general theme of focus groups and interviews
in regard to the Souris River Flood of 2011 indicated, at the time of this report, the
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community still had many unmet social, emotional, and financial needs; and therefore,
recovery, at the time of this study, was not complete.
Research Question 3
Who are key players in a recovery process of a school community?
The list of key players in Minot’s recovery process is nearly as diverse of the
residents who were directly affected by the flood. In order to better understand the role
of leadership in response to a natural disaster, the definition of disaster must be revisited.
The definition of disaster is also diverse, and subject to interpretation. KrollSmith and Gunter (1998) noted that disaster is best defined by those who have
experienced it. Others (Britton, 1986; Buckle, 2005; Shaluf, Ahmadum, & Mustapha,
2003) have believed that disaster is best left to federal agencies that are mandated to
respond to disasters. The United States Government, through the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (2007), refers to a disaster as either an
emergency or a major disaster. According to the Stafford Act, a major disaster is:
Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high
water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of
cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which
in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity
and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to
supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local
governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage,
loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. (FEMA, 2007b, p. 2)
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The researcher found that focus group participants and interviewees had a very
different view of disaster than the clinical definition provided by the Stafford Act. An
individual’s  interpretation of what constitutes recovery also shaped their view of which
key  players  had  a  direct  effect  on  Minot’s  recovery. The data gathered in this study
indicated that key players were those individuals or organizations that promoted action
and provided a sense of security.
Governor Jack Dalrymple was very engaged in the flood recovery process and
appointed a team to work with the city of Minot during the recovery phase. Seymour, a
state  employee,  commented,  “The  Governor  welcomed  me  into  his  staff. I could call him
at any time, give him any recommendation, and he was totally  engaged  in  the  process.”    
Seymour added:
In October, by the third or fourth month, I had recommended to the
Governor, in a long email, what I thought should be done to jumpstart the
recovery effort, because by then, the water had gone down, and we had
gotten an assessment of all of the difficulty.
This email was the basis for the recovery plan that was submitted to the North Dakota
State Legislature in a November, 2011, special session.
Mayor Curt Zimbleman and Public Works Director Alan Walter both received
many accolades during the flood period and early phase of recovery. Wayne, a school
district employee said:
The city, specifically the Mayor, was extremely helpful in finding a place
for our Ramstad students. We had over 500 students that need a home,
and we didn't have a place for them; they worked closely with us and
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allowed us to use the city auditorium to house those students for over 2
years. They were great to work with . . . the Mayor was great to work
with . . . the people at the city auditorium were great to work with.
Nick,  a  local  news  reporter,  commented  that  Alan  Walter’s  candor  was  appreciated  
during the press conferences. He said:
I remember Alan Walter holding up the chart he would get from the
NWS/Corp, the report they would get a couple of times a day that would
predict what we might get in the near future. He said, “They keep taking
this and moving  it  on  us.”
Milton, a mental health provider, commented that Alan Walter was:
A trustworthy guy, and about as "salt of the earth" as you can imagine.
And when he says that the city is at risk, and he didn't say, “Oh, we are
going to be great.”    He said,  “We are going to try to save the city.”   That
startled me. He is not a dramatic fellow, so when he is saying that, there is
a risk to the survival of the city, I grasped that, because I know Alan, and I
know he doesn't cry wolf. When he says something like that, he means it.
The sincere nature in which information was communicated during the evacuation period
was appreciated by valley dwellers, and assisted residents in taking the evacuation order
seriously.
Jim Olson, KXMC News Director was also listed as a key player in the flood and
recovery process. Jim made many trips to Canada during the pre-flood period, and
provided 24 hour coverage of the flood. George, a laborer, discussed his frustration with
the short final evacuation notice, but added that, “We  had  some  time,  thanks  to  Jim  Olson  
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. . . if he hadn't  gotten  up  there,  no  telling  when  we  would  have  found  out.”    Milton,  a  
mental  health  provider,  also  commented  that  he  [Olson]  “helped  people  to  empathize  – he
went through an incredible tragedy himself, and he accepted the reality, and he became a
role model  for  people.”    The  personal  touch  provided  by  Jim  Olson  and  the  KX  network  
proved to be reassuring to many flooded residents.
Many organizations were also considered to be key players during the flood and
subsequent recovery period. The Red Cross provided shelter for residents, and assisted
residents in dealing with crucial needs during that period. Hunter, a Red Cross employee,
commented,  “Our  goal  was  to  get  them  shelter  and  a  safe  place,  and  along  the  way,  health  
and mental health services. We provided counseling services as they were moving into
their  housing  units.”    The  Salvation  Army  was  a  noted  presence  in  the  community.    The  
most notable services were meals provided to flooded residents, but the work of the
Salvation Army went beyond food service. Mike, an employee of the Salvation Army,
commented:
We have some good active volunteers and officers and laypeople that say,
“You know what I'm here to work . . . your basement is flooded, let's get it
cleaned out. We provide flood kits to help clean up, and we would
provide assistance to those who needed physical assistance. We try to
assist in every aspect, and try not to pigeonhole into specific tasks or
duties.
Flood recovery services provided by the Salvation Army and the Red Cross continued
into the summer of 2012.
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Many faith-based organizations also came to Minot to provide assistance to
residents affected by the flood. The advent of Hope Village brought these faith-based
organizations together under one umbrella, and enhanced recovery efforts for many
residents. According to Pastor Pat, a Hope Village employee, the primary goal of Hope
Village  was  to  provide  a  “one-stop  approach  to  volunteer  disaster  response”  for  the  most  
needy residents. Pastor Pat added this process was not necessarily easy. He said, “What  
we were doing – we  were  building  an  airplane  while  flying  the  darned  thing.”    Hope  
Village proved to be a valuable resource for vulnerable residents who were still in the
area in the spring of 2012.
The Minot Public School District also received positive comments during focus
groups  and  interviews.    The  district’s  goal  of  a  quick  return  to  normalcy  was  appreciated  
by many participants. The district, with the assistance of its construction management
team, was able to secure and set up 64 portable classrooms in less than 40 days. Wayne,
a school district employee, noted,  “The thing with our flood, it came in late June, and
stayed for 30 days . . . so we didn't get into buildings until late July, and we had to start
school in early September . . . there was a narrow time.”
Many parents also appreciated the emotional support provided by school staff.
Ellen,  a  local  minister’s  wife, noted that her daughter struggled with the loss of their
home, and sought support at school. Ellen noted,  “The  Jim  Hill  counselors  were  very  
good  .  .  .  she  did  open  up  to  them.”
It was also interesting to note which individuals and organizations were not
identified as key players. Millions of dollars were expended in the community through
FEMA grants, yet FEMA was not identified as a key player in the recovery process. In
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fact, many participants expressed anger over inequitable treatment by the federal
government, and specifically from FEMA. The Small Business Administration also
provided millions of dollars in low-interest loans to assist in the recovery effort, but were
not mentioned as crucial to the recovery. The North Dakota State Legislature provided
assistance through low-interest loans and tax rebates, but politicians received very few
accolades.
A review of data gathered in focus groups and interviews showed that key players
were individuals who had boots on the ground, made decisions quickly, spoke with
honesty, and showed empathy toward a people in crisis. Federal and state involvement
was deemed a responsibility that was expected by local residents.
Emerging Theory on Recovery From a Natural Disaster
Based on a review of current literature and the  researcher’s  personal experiences
in dealing with the Souris River Flood of 2011, the researcher felt he had a cursory
knowledge of the devastation of the flood and how residents of the Souris River Valley
were coping after the disaster. The researcher drew from this experience to develop
issue-orientated questions. Stake (1995) found that issue-orientated questions “are not
simple and clean, but intricately wired to political, social, historical and especially
personal contexts . . . Issues draw us toward observing and even teasing out the problems
of the case, the conflictual outpourings, the complex backgrounds of human concern” (p.
17).
Questions posed in focus groups and interviews were open-ended, allowing each
participant to expound on his personal feelings, needs, and concerns. Through this
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process, participants had the opportunity to share their own story, and to assess their view
of community recovery.
Each focus group and interview was recorded and transcribed verbatim. Through
a process of open coding, eight themes were developed. A thorough review of thematic
findings yielded one common, central phenomenon: Success in recovery is dependent
upon a resident’s  social,  emotional, and financial well being before a disaster, and the
ability of a resident to access agencies and organizations and receive assistance after a
disaster. In Minot, residents affected by the flood in 2011 who were socially,
emotionally, and financially stable before the flood responded more quickly to the
disaster, and appeared to be more successful in their recovery efforts.
Olshansky and Chang (2009) noted that homeowners and business owners with
the fewest resources struggled the most in the recovery process. Whaley (2009)
reiterated the findings of Olshansky and Chang, stating that many individuals who
experience a natural disaster, and who lack social, emotional, and economic stability are
traumatized in the event of a natural disaster. This finding was a common theme noted in
the review of disaster recovery literature (Bolin, 1993; Kessler, et al., 2008; Madrid &
Grant, 2008). Although the researcher had a hunch that vulnerable populations were
especially subject to difficulty in an evacuation and recovery process, the researcher was
careful not to rush to a judgment or cast assumptions on perceptions of participants. In
short, the researcher wanted the data to tell the story of flood recovery in the Souris River
Valley.
The application of a grounded theory model of qualitative research fit well with
the research topic for a variety of reasons. First, a grounded theory model allowed the
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researcher to develop a theory that emerged through data analysis. This tendency of
qualitative research was  noted  by  May  (1986)  who  stated,  “In  strict  terms,  the  findings  
are the theory itself, i.e., a set of concepts and propositions which link them” (p. 148).
Secondly, a grounded theory model allowed the researcher to compare qualitative data
against a review of current literature without developing preconceived notions. This
model allowed the researcher to gather data from a purposeful sample of participants who
were directly affected by the Souris River Flood of 2011. A comparison of data was used
to demonstrate congruency or conflict with current research.
Validity checks were completed throughout the research period. Two analytical
strategies were used to test internal validity of data. The first test included a triangulation
of personal report data, interview data, and a review of current research. The second test
involved member checking through a review of interview transcripts. A comparison of
data and current research indicated a high level of compatibility: Residents who
struggled socially, emotionally, or economically before the flood had more difficulty
during the evacuation and recovery process than residents who did not.
Limitations of Study
Creswell (2009) found that in qualitative research, the researcher attempts to build
a  “complex,  holistic  picture”  (p.  15)  of  the  topic  being  studied. This study involved a
cross sampling of parents, teachers, and community members who were directly affected
by the flood, and who still lived in Minot, North Dakota, 2½ years after the flood.
Residents who left the city due to impacts of the flood were not part of this study; and
therefore, the researcher relied on second-hand accounts of their stories.
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A limitation of this study involved the size of the participant sample. The 68
participants interviewed in this study represented less than one-half of 1% of all
individuals who were evacuated during the flood crisis. Although the sample size was
relatively small, the researcher believed a point of saturation was reached, with no new
information being brought forth in later interviews. Furthermore, the consistent message
offered by focus group participants and interviewees provided a unique insight into the
social, emotional, and economic effects of a disaster.
The researcher found that focus group participants and interviewees responded
freely during interview sessions. In qualitative research, the potential exists for a
participant to expound on irrelevant or fabricated information, but very few strands of
outlying data were noted during transcription and initial review of data. In order to
ensure that all data were given proper consideration, every transcript was coded twice
during the open coding process. Outlying strands of data, or strands of data with no
relevance to the topic of study, were discounted during axial coding.
Recommendations for Further Study
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the flood recovery process for the Minot
Public School community after the devastating Souris River Flood of 2011, and to
provide a definitive study of a community and school district following a natural disaster.
The researcher identified processes involved with social, emotional, and financial aspects
of recovery, and identified key players in the recovery process. Creswell (2009) noted,
qualitative  research  “takes  the  reader  into  multiple  dimensions of a problem or issue and
displays it in all of its complexity” (p. 15). This study involved multiple facets of disaster
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and recovery. The stories told were real-life experiences of those who were directly
affected by the flood. The recommendations are based on these authentic experiences.
Through analysis of data, six areas were identified that might benefit from further
examination and research: (a) critical incident command structure; (b) clear and concise
communication; (c) identification of vulnerable populations, (d) federal response to
disaster, (e) collaboration, and (f) leadership (see Table 2).
Table 2. Recommendations for Further Action.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Critical Incident
Command Structure

Clear and Concise
Communication

Identification of
Vulnerable Populations

Federal Response
to Disaster

Collaboration

Leadership

MAJOR THEMES
Develop a Plan
Regular Meetings With Key Players
Practice Makes Perfect
A Plan is a Moving Target
Communication in a Modern Age
Open Communication in Crisis
Assess Communication
Early Identification is Key
Identification of Available Services
Development of a Service Plan
Follow-Up and Continued Support
FEMA Individual Assistance Program
FEMA Public Assistance Program
The Chico Effect
Federal Inefficiencies
Working With People in Crisis
Duplication of Services
Coordination of Services
Collaboration With Federal, State, and Local
Government
Elimination of Power Struggles
Pre-Planning and Organization
Short-Term Recovery
Long-Term Recovery
Mitigation of Future Damage
Continued Monitoring
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Recommendation 1: Critical Incident Command Structure
A consistent management structure is crucial in the midst of crisis. Without
structure, chaos is likely to ensue. Residents of Minot learned this lesson first hand. A
critical incident command center is a direct link between governmental agencies,
charitable organizations, faith-based volunteer groups, and citizens directly affected by a
disaster. A critical incident command structure was virtually nonexistent in Minot during
the flood of 2011 and recovery period.
Develop a plan.
Implementation of a critical incident command structure is dependent on the
development of a crisis management plan. This plan must be understandable and easy to
implement. Residents should have a cursory knowledge of the plan, and should know
specific information about where the critical incident command center will be located and
what services will be provided at that location. The plan should also include a hierarchy
of power, indicating which individual(s) are responsible for making decisions.
Regular meetings with key players.
Regular communication is crucial for key players. This is especially important in
charitable organizations that have a high turnover rate in leadership ranks. Regularly
scheduled meetings are an excellent tool for keeping lines of communication open.
Meeting topics should be related to pertinent information in regard to disaster and
emergency response. Disaster response from other areas of the country should be
evaluated and scrutinized, with learned information incorporated into local plans when
feasible.
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Practice makes perfect.
Practicing disaster scenarios can be an important tool in promoting disaster
preparedness. These scenarios should be practiced in schools, businesses, churches,
public organizations, and specifically, within city government. While no two disasters
are alike, many common elements can be noted. The ability to think and act quickly is
crucial during a disaster. Practice can assist city leaders to problem solve in unforeseen
circumstances, and can serve as an excellent reminder of how a critical incident
command structure is organized and implemented.
Collaborative disaster preparedness activities can be beneficial to a community,
and can strengthen bonds between individuals, groups, and organizations. Collaborative
methods to promote disaster preparedness may include, but are not limited to: (a) table
top exercises at city council meetings; (b) joint crisis scenarios involving key
organizations and emergency responders; (c) practice drills in schools, churches, and
community organizations, and (d) public service announcements and notifications to
residents.
A plan is a moving target.
Plans change on a regular basis. Disaster preparedness plans should be reviewed
regularly and adjusted as needed. These plans can become outdated due to changes in
laws and procedures, or due to updated research on disaster preparedness. A plan that is
not subject to regular review can easily become obsolete. Key players are advised to
review plans on a regular basis to ensure current trends in disaster preparedness are
implemented.
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Recommendation 2: Clear and Concise Communication
Clear and concise communication is crucial in the mist of a disaster. When clear
communication is not readily available, residents are left to seek information from
outside sources. This can lead to a plethora of misinformation floating through a
community that is accepted as truth. During the Souris River Flood of 2011, the city of
Minot did not have a communications director. Press conferences were held daily, and
provided excellent information to the residents of Minot. However, alternate forms of
communication, such as email, social media, and twitter, were accessed by residents and
treated as the truth. This created many issues during the evacuation, flood, and
subsequent recovery period.
Communication in a modern age.
The  city’s  model of communication during the flood was the standard, stand and
deliver, press conference model. This communication model provided factual
information for residents. However, advancements in technology have changed the way
we communicate. Social media has become a mainstay in our society. These social
media sites provide users with quick, albeit not necessarily accurate information.
City leaders must recognize the rapid communication that is possible through
technology, as well as a citizen’s  desire  to  have  real-time access to information. City-run
social media pages and websites could serve as an excellent communication tool in the
midst of a crisis, and could stifle rumor and innuendo that may result from inaccurate
information.
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City leaders should appoint an individual to be in charge of communication
during a period of crisis. The practice of providing specific information through one
centralized location can limit confusion among those who are affected by a disaster.
Open communication in crisis.
Truthful and open communication in the midst of a crisis is invaluable. This
theme was evident during focus group sessions and interviews. The people of Minot
were seeking information during the pre-flood fight, evacuation period, and recovery
period. While the truth is not always easy to take, it is generally accepted when presented
in a truthful and honest manner. Lack of open communication creates an aura of mistrust
in a community, and when continued, can weaken relationships between residents and
government officials.
Governmental officials are well advised to take time to communicate. Open
communication can break down barriers, and build positive relationships with those who
are directly affected by a disaster.
Assess communication.
Communication models should be subject to a variety of assessments. During a
crisis, government leaders should assess their communication structure to ensure
effectiveness. After a disaster, a complete assessment should be provided to determine
areas for potential improvement. Suggestions should be openly discussed at public
meetings, and should be addressed by leaders who develop and monitor disaster
preparedness plans.
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Recommendation 3: Identification of Vulnerable Populations
The research in this study showed that many residents of the Souris River Valley
were vulnerable to the effects of the flood. These individuals were not prepared to deal
with evacuation or recovery. In many instances, these residents lacked the emotional,
social, and/or financial capital to advocate for themselves and begin the recovery process.
Many of these vulnerable residents were unable to wait for assistance, and simply left the
city of Minot.
Early identification is key.
Early identification of vulnerable residents is a key component in recovery.
Residents who are unable to plan and advocate for themselves are often left in the lurch.
The federal government, through FEMA, was quick to provide a financial response to
disaster-stricken citizens in Minot in 2011. In most instances, though, FEMA grant
money did not cover the cost of repairs.
Residents who lack social, emotional, and financial capital to move forward after
a disaster are prone to abandon their property and leave a community. Early
identification, coupled with support in developing individual recovery plans, can assist
vulnerable residents in recovery.
Identification of available services.
Residents affected by a natural disaster must know how to access services, and
must know what services are available to them. A critical incident command center can
serve as a centralized location for emergency service contacts.
In the midst of a natural disaster, many charitable organizations and faith-based
volunteer groups arrive to provide assistance. All too often, the most vulnerable citizens
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in a community are not aware of these services. With no centralized operation center,
these organizations are left to falter, their assistance not always effectively used. Early
identification of vulnerable residents, coupled with a plan to address social, emotional,
and economic effects of a disaster, can assist in rapid movement of available services
toward those who need it, aiding residents in timely recovery.
Development of a service plan.
Data in this study showed that well-connected residents were able to recover
quickly in comparison to vulnerable residents. The ability to self-advocate during
recovery was noted as a positive attribute.
Many vulnerable residents did not have the ability to plan for recovery. This was
due, in part, to an uncertainty of what programs were available and who was available to
provide assistance. The appointment of a case manager to assist in planning for
vulnerable residents is a crucial step toward recovery in the early phases of recovery.
Follow-up and continued support.
A case management model is best served if the caseworker or agency assigned to
a resident provides follow-up and consistent support. Research shows that many effects
of a disaster are noted long after a home is rebuilt. These effects can include emotional
and financial issues that are exacerbated by the reality of added expenses and stress
related to rebuilding. Follow-up and support should focus on social, emotional, and
economic aspects of recovery.
Recommendation 4: Federal Response to Disaster
In 2011, the federal government provided rapid financial assistance to Minot
residents through FEMA. For most residents, the amount of grant money from FEMA
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covered only a portion of damages to their homes. Residents were given options for lowinterest loans through the Small Business Administration. Many found the process of
securing funding for recovery to be a messy, bureaucratic quagmire that frustrated
residents in crisis.
FEMA Individual Assistance program.
The FEMA Individual Assistance program provided a quick response to needs of
residents affected by the flood. The participant’s perception regarding FEMA’s  response  
was forged by day-to-day experiences they had with this federal organization. The
FEMA Housing Program was well received by most participants, who appreciated the
temporary housing provided to them as they rebuilt their homes. While financial and
housing assistance was appreciated, many residents evaluated the FEMA Individual
Assistance program based on the performance of FEMA caseworkers (how they treated
residents).
A FEMA caseworker is at the front line within the FEMA response system.
Interactions between FEMA workers and flooded residents were not always positive.
FEMA Individual Assistance program caseworkers should be trained to recognize the
sociological and psychological effects that are manifested in those who are directly
affected by a natural disaster.
FEMA Public Assistance program.
The FEMA Public Assistance program was a struggle from the start. The process
appeared to be based on a mistrust of local public entities. The fact that consultant
services were a reimbursable expense indicated early on that the process would not be
easy.
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A constant shift in case management, coupled with various interpretations of the
Stafford Act, created an environment that delayed decision making and future planning.
Intervention  from  North  Dakota’s  congressional  delegation  was  necessary before
progress could be made. The FEMA Public Assistance program would benefit from
consistent case management throughout a recovery process. FEMA Public Assistance
administrators and employees would also be well advised to learn about the sociological
and psychological effects that are manifest in disaster survivors.
The “Chico Effect.”
Chico was a FEMA worker who was assigned to the Minot area. He did not have
managerial responsibilities, nor did he hold any real power in the FEMA organization.
Yet,  Chico’s  name  was  mentioned  during  many  focus  groups.    Chico  understood  how  to  
work with people in crisis. He readily supplied his cell phone number, and was always
quick to respond in the event of an emergency. Chico strived to make the flood disaster a
little  more  bearable  for  residents  of  the  Souris  River  Valley.    He  didn’t  cite  the  Stafford
Act or give excuses why he could not provide assistance. He just delivered.
FEMA employees could learn  a  little  bit  about  Chico’s  style  of  dealing  with  
people in crisis. He provided a positive aura that promoted a sense of security for valley
residents in crisis. It is imperative that FEMA caseworkers understand the social and
emotional effects of a natural disaster; and furthermore, they need to work to ensure that
their actions promote a sense of trust and security.
Federal inefficiencies.
Several inefficiencies were noted in the federal response to the Souris River Flood
of 2011. Many residents expressed frustration with the interpretation of federal laws that
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appeared to inhibit progress toward recovery. These frustrations were especially noted in
dealing with multiple federal organizations that followed a different set of rules and
procedures.
Federal rules and procedures are undoubtedly complicated. Increasing the ability
of the federal government to provide internal collaboration to ensure equal and
understandable access to a variety of programs would make the federal disaster response
program stronger. In turn, the federal government should collaborate closely with state
agencies to ensure residents have a clear understanding of what programs are available in
order to maximum potential benefits of available programs.
Working with people in crisis.
People in crisis experience a plethora of emotions. The stress related to a natural
disaster can create many challenges for residents who are directly affected. Research
shows this effect can range from irritability to mental illness. FEMA workers who
developed a good rapport with flooded residents were able to recognize the importance of
working with people in crisis. In the eyes of an individual who is suffering as the result
of a natural disaster, the FEMA caseworker is the face of the FEMA organization.
FEMA workers should receive specific training in crisis management, as well as
implementation of strategies designed to assist communication efforts with people in
crisis.
Recommendation 5: Collaboration
In the midst of a natural disaster, charitable organizations and faith-based
volunteer groups that work collaboratively can capitalize assistance within the
community and limit duplication of services. Effective collaboration did not appear
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present in Minot during the early days of recovery. A lesson can be learned from the
unsuccessful early response efforts in Minot.
Duplication of services.
Charitable organizations and faith-based volunteer groups must know their
specific role in recovery. In turn, each organization must be aware of the skills brought
forth by every group. When role confusion is present, organizations might omit crucial
services while providing duplicate services in other areas.
Organizations that collaborate during non-crisis periods operate more efficiently
during a crisis. During a disaster, local charitable organizations should meet on a regular
basis and collaborate with city and county leaders to develop a plan of action that
eliminates duplication of services.
Coordination of services.
Each volunteer group and charitable organization brings a certain skill set to a
disaster. Lack of coordination can create chaos, which might result in turf wars between
agencies. In order to ensure that all resources are maximized, services must be
coordinated.
Individual organizations provide a specific service, but are not uniquely qualified
to spearhead recovery efforts in a collaborative manner. Local governmental
involvement is a crucial component in this process. City and county officials are advised
to provide a coordinator for volunteer and charitable services to avoid conflicts of
interests, services, and turf wars. Multi-agency coordination should be a regular agenda
item when agencies meet to discuss and review disaster preparedness plans.
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Collaboration with federal, state, and local government.
Disaster can create an environment of unruliness. While the intentions of
charitable organizations and faith-based volunteer groups are unquestionably authentic, in
2011, compliance with local, state, and federal laws and procedures in Minot was
sometimes difficult.    Through  FEMA’s  disaster  response,  each  individual  affected  by  the
Souris River Flood of 2011 was identified and a caseworker assigned. Pertinent
information and damage assessments were passed on to other federal organizations, such
as the Small Business Administration. In many instances, vulnerable residents were
either hesitant to or unable to plan and move forward with recovery efforts.
The Hope Village concept provided a link between FEMA casework files and
assistance through charitable organizations and faith-based volunteer groups. The Hope
Village team accessed FEMA records, and worked with vulnerable residents to secure
what was needed to jumpstart the recovery process. This intervention was not limited to
financial assistance. Interventions were also provided to ensure residents were socially
and emotionally able to handle the challenges of recovery. Hope Village was not
operational until April of 2012. For many, this intervention came too late.
The Hope Village model was a successful intervention for vulnerable residents.
Early intervention and collaboration with local, state, and federal partners can provide a
swift response to vulnerable residents, and can ensure that charitable agencies and faithbased volunteer groups are assigned to those who most need assistance.
Elimination of power struggles.
Every charitable organization and faith-based volunteer group that journeyed to
Minot came with a mission. This mission varied from organization to organization.
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When an organized command structure was virtually non-existent, these organizations
were left to flounder. This was evident in the early days of recovery when a power
struggle developed between the Red Cross and the Salvation Army.
The absence of structure promoted disorder and caused role confusion. Power
struggles are best avoided when organizations work collaboratively before a disaster, and
operate under a critical incident command director who facilitates the presentation of
services and defines the role each organization will play. In the most simple of terms: A
disaster is owned by the people who are most affected. The local municipality must take
a leadership role, defining and implementing the scope of service provided by charitable
organizations and faith-based volunteer groups.
Recommendation 6: Leadership
In the midst of a natural disaster, residents look toward local leadership for
support, encouragement, and answers. Mayor Curt Zimbleman, Public Works Director
Alan Walter, and North Dakota National Guard Adjutant Major General David
Sprynczynatyk received high praise from flood-stricken residents during the evacuation
and flood period. As the community shifted from disaster to recovery, many residents
became frustrated with city officials’  response to the disaster, expressing their opinion
that city officials had forgotten about residents affected by the flood.
Pre-planning and organization.
It is difficult to plan for a natural disaster. The unique attributes of various types
of disaster make it unfeasible to plan for every possible event. However, certain common
threads are evident in disaster response, and can be planned for accordingly.
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The city of Minot spent a great deal of effort fighting the Souris River before the
flood. Little emphasis was placed on disaster preparedness and the development of a
response plan. When the final evacuation was ordered, there was little ability for the city
to provide assistance to vulnerable citizens in need. This effect was exacerbated by the
lack of a critical incident command center and absence of a communication director for
the city of Minot. When the state offered the services of a communication director, city
leaders politely rejected the offer.
Pre-planning is a key component in disaster response. The organization of a
critical incident command center is equally important. Failure to plan and centralize
authority can result in chaos. In the midst of a natural disaster, a local municipality must
take the lead in disaster response, and plan for recovery accordingly. Pre-planning,
coupled with effective implementation and organization of available services when a
crisis hits, can promote a stronger response to disaster.
Short-term recovery.
Short-term recovery involves restoration of critical services in the period
immediately following a disaster. Honest and open communication is an important
element of short-term planning. The ability for a city to implement a short-term recovery
plan is hampered when official communication is not readily available from community
leaders. This situation can become even more convoluted when federal interventions are
implemented.
Initial FEMA interaction with residents affected  by  Minot’s  flood  is a prime
example of failed communication. Residents were contacted by a FEMA worker, and
were told to meet the worker in a parking lot somewhere in the city. This random phone
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contact made many residents uneasy, and created a certain amount of trepidation within
the community. An open line of communication provided by city officials could have
forewarned residents of this FEMA interaction, long before the call was received.
A primary goal during short-term recovery is to return a community to some sort
of normal living. The Minot Public School District was determined to provide a normal
educational experience for children early on. Although many families were still
struggling with recovery efforts, the school district worked to provide as normal of an
experience as was possible. This normal school experience was well received throughout
the valley.
People in crisis are desperate for answers. A lack of factual information in the
short-term recovery phase of a disaster can add to the frustration of those affected by the
disaster. A city in the midst of a natural disaster is best advised to assure a short term
recovery plan is in place, and provide accurate, detailed information to citizens in regard
to restoration of critical services, and other pertinent recovery information.
Long-term recovery.
Recovery is difficult to define, and even more difficult to assess. A general
summation of recovery definitions indicate that recovery is complete when the
community is in as good of shape, or better shape, than before the disaster. The recovery
period can last for many years.
Long-term recovery involves extensive planning and implementation of
interventions. The inability to move quickly toward a long-term recovery plan slows the
recovery process, and only adds to frustration of those who have been negatively
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impacted by a disaster. This frustration was noted by Minot residents who were
continuing to recover from the Souris River Flood of 2011 at the time of this report.
Long-term recovery is designed to be a collaborative process with a high level of
community input. Engineers worked diligently to present an enhanced flood protection
plan to the city of Minot. A series of public meetings were held in the fall of 2011. But,
very little discussion has been held since then, leaving residents to wonder about the
future of the valley.
A city planning for long-term recovery must continue to allow open dialogue, and
continue to evaluate plans and procedures. Input should be sought, and concepts should
be vetted for potential implementation. When fiscal restrictions diminish the practicality
of an idea or concept, the public should be informed. Planning for long-term recovery is
a long-term process. Open communication is necessary to develop and implement a
successful plan.
Mitigation of future damage.
Mitigation of future damage is a critical element of recovery. Many residents
were frustrated by Minot  officials’ slow response in developing an enhanced flood
development plan. Some residents delayed rebuilding plans as they waited for a decision.
Others have continued to wait in the valley for a potential buy-out of their property.
The fear of future flooding was a common theme throughout focus group sessions
and interviews. This fear was exacerbated by social, emotional, and economic strain
placed on residents who rebuilt their homes without reassurance of protection from
further flooding. Many also felt city leaders have not appeared concerned about
implementation of an enhanced flood protection plan.
172

Not every natural disaster can be avoided, but civic leaders can continue to work
toward a prudent and responsible mitigation plan. A city in the midst of recovery should
alleviate concerns of future damage while continuing to provide open dialogue in regard
to hazard mitigation plans.
Continued monitoring.
The Souris River Flood of 2011 was a devastating event that affected nearly onefourth  of  the  city’s  existing  population.    Many  flooded  residents  received  assistance  from  
friends and family outside the valley. In many instances, this assistance was in the form
of volunteer labor or a family member or friend providing a place to live during the crisis
period.
Many flooded residents noted that, after a period of time, non-affected residents
went back to life as usual. A similar phenomenon was noted within the city government.
The city of Minot continued to grow after the flood. According to many residents
affected by flooding, the city appeared to be more concerned about expanding
infrastructure to meet the needs of a growing community than flood recovery. Many
participants commented that very little discussion in regard to flood recovery was held
during city council meetings. Therefore, it was perceived that the city of Minot had
forgotten about its flooded affected residents. This assumption exacerbated the notion
that a disconnect had developed between flood affected and non-flood affected residents.
The management of a city is no doubt a difficult task, especially a city that is
dealing with a natural disaster while experiencing rapid growth. A city dealing with
citizens in crisis should continue to address recovery and hazard mitigation on a regular
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basis. Such action can provide an assurance to flooded residents that recovery is the
responsibility of an entire community.
Implications for a School District Recovering From a Natural Disaster
The Souris River Flood of 2011 had a very definite impact on the community of
Minot. This impact was felt by residents, business owners, and public organizations that
are supported by the taxpayers, including the city of Minot, the Minot Park District, and
Minot Public Schools.
The  Minot  Public  School  District’s  goal  of  getting  every  student  into  a  temporary  
facility by the start of the school year proved to be a positive step in recovery of the
school district. Many parents acknowledged their appreciation for free meals during the
2011-2012  school  year,  as  well  as  the  staff’s  willingness  to  empathize  with  their  children  
during a very stressful time. In general, the district worked to ensure each child would
receive as normal of a school experience as was possible.
The school district is only part of an entire community. The researcher, serving as
superintendent of Minot Public Schools, recognized that a normal school experience was
an important component of community recovery, and furthermore, acknowledged the
importance of understanding social, emotional, and financial needs of people in crisis.
Minot Public Schools had many struggles with FEMA during their initial recovery.
These issues were addressed through collaborative discussions with the school district,
FEMA, and the North Dakota Department of Emergency Services, and were not
broadcast throughout the school community. The goal of the school district was to
reassure families in recovery that Minot Public Schools would maintain educational
services and would manage the recovery of the school district in a manner that would not
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impede community recovery or cause stress for flood-stricken families in the Souris
River Valley.
The Minot Public School District’s  responses to the Souris River Flood of 2011
and subsequent recovery efforts were generally well received. However, research and
data gleaned in this study can have direct implications for school districts in crisis. The
study provides specific disaster response recommendations in dealing with:
1.

The importance of developing a critical incident command center;

2.

A need for clear and concise communication;

3.

The expeditious identification of vulnerable populations;

4.

Effectively working with federal agencies responding to a disaster;

5.

The importance of collaboration; and

6.

A need for strong leadership.

Each recommendation should be addressed as a district plans short-term and long-term
recovery goals.
While school district leaders have little ability to prevent or control the direct
effects of a natural disaster, they can be key players in recovery efforts.
Recommendations outlined in this study will assist school leaders in developing a plan
that considers social, emotional, and financial effects that ripple through a school
community as a result of a natural disaster.
Final Thoughts
This research study was designed to better understand social, emotional, and
economic effects of a natural disaster on a community. This qualitative study examined
the thoughts, feelings, and perceptions of several Minot, North Dakota, residents who
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were directly affected by the Souris River Flood of 2011. The participants who took part
in this study expressed little reluctance in sharing their stories. In fact, they appeared to
find solace in speaking with others who had shared their experience.
A natural disaster is a terrible event. Man has tried for centuries to control
geographical systems with limited success. Recent man-made attempts to control the
Souris River have resulted in the worst flooding event in recorded history. The
destruction left in the wake of the Souris River flood of 2011 was devastating.
It is obvious that man cannot control nature and eliminate all fear and risk of
natural disasters from occurring. However, man can control how a society will react to
disaster. The citizens of Minot had an interesting story to tell. Their firsthand accounts
of events surrounding the Souris River Flood of 2011 painted a picture of what disaster
and recovery can be like. The participants in this study presented their views of recovery
without pretense. The story of Minot, North Dakota, reaffirms the importance of timely
identification of vulnerable residents, the application of appropriate interventions, the
crucial role of leaders in disaster preparedness, evacuation, and recovery, and the
importance of communication and collaboration in the midst of a disaster.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A
Flood Crests at Broadway Bridge, Minot, North Dakota
Date River Crested
(Year, Month Day)
1904, April 20

Cubic Feet Per Second
(CFS)

Elevation
(Feet)

12,000

1555.15

1916, May 6

4,260

1923, April 30

3,450

1925, April 18

3,450

1927, April 30

3,700

1948, May 17

2,700

1949, April 6

2,250

1951, May 16

2,280

1969, April 18

6,010

1970, May 12

3,320

1974, April 25

3,530

1975, May 13

5,700

1976, April 17

9,350

1979, May 9

5,960

1996, April 12

2,600

1999, April 19

2,680

2009, April 14

3,370

2011, June 25

26,900

Key:
Action Stage

1548 ft.

Flood Stage

1549 ft.

Moderate Flood Stage

1551 ft.

Major Flood Stage

1555 ft.
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1555.40

1556.08
1544.06

1561.66

Appendix B
Consent to Participate

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH
TITLE:

Down by the Riverside: A Study of the Minot Public
School District Recovery Effort After the Flood of 2011

PROJECT DIRECTOR:

Mark Vollmer

PHONE #

701-857-4422

DEPARTMENT:

Department of Educational Leadership

STATEMENT OF RESEARCH
A person who is to participate in the research must give his or her informed consent to
such participation. This consent must be based on an understanding of the nature and
risks of the research. This document provides information that is important for this
understanding. Research projects include only subjects who choose to take part. Please
take your time in making your decision as to whether to participate. If you have
questions at any time, please ask.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?
You are invited to be in a research study about the recovery of the Minot Public School
District after the Flood of 2011 because you were identified as an individual who was
directly affected by this natural disaster.
While research in regard to natural disaster abounds; very little research in regard to
school district recovery has been completed. The purpose of this research study is to
determine what specifically constitutes recovery of a natural disaster.
HOW MANY PEOPLE WILL PARTICIPATE?
Approximately 65 people will take part in this. Approximately 55 people will be asked to
take part in focus groups that will be held at Longfellow Elementary School, located at
500 16th St. NW in Minot, North Dakota. Approximately 10 individuals will be
interviewed at a location selected by the interviewee.
HOW LONG WILL I BE IN THIS STUDY?
Your participation in the study will last for no longer than 120 minutes.
Date: _________
Subject Initials: _________

179

WHAT WILL HAPPEN DURING THIS STUDY?
Participants will be asked a series of questions related to the Minot Public School District
recovery efforts following the Souris Valley Flood of 2011. Participation is voluntary,
and participants may elect to opt-out at any time.
All focus group participants will be provided a reasonable assurance of anonymity.
Individuals who participate in the formal interview process will be referred to in a
manner that will not unveil their position or identity.
WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF THE STUDY?
The research poses no risk to participants. Participants who are uncomfortable with
questions, comments, or discussion points may opt out at any time.
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY?
You will not benefit personally from being in this study. However, we hope that, in the
future, other people might benefit from this study, as your experiences in the flood
recovery effort may assist others who experience a natural disaster.
ALTERNATIVES TO PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY
No alternatives to participation are available.
WILL IT COST ME ANYTHING TO BE IN THIS STUDY?
You will not have any costs for being in this research study.
WILL I BE PAID FOR PARTICIPATING?
You will not be paid for being in this research study.
WHO IS FUNDING THE STUDY?
The University of North Dakota and the research team are receiving no payments from
other agencies, organizations, or companies to conduct this research study.

180

CONFIDENTIALITY
The records of this study will be kept private to the extent permitted by law. In any
report about this study that might be published, you will not be identified. Your study
record may be reviewed by Government agencies, the UND Research Development and
Compliance office, and the University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board.
Any information that is obtained in this study and that can be identified with you will
remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by
law. [You should know, however, that there are some circumstances in which we may
have to show your information to other people. For example, the law may require us to
show your information to a court or to tell authorities if we believe you have abused a
child, or you pose a danger to yourself or someone else.] Confidentiality will be
maintained by means of providing a secure location for all digital recordings and
transcripts. Participation forms will be kept separate from recordings. No names or other
forms of identification will be used during the transcription of the focus group sessions or
interviews.
If we write a report or article about this study, we will describe the study results in a
summarized manner so that you cannot be identified.
Recordings will be maintained for a period of three years following the completion of
research.
IS THIS STUDY VOLUNTARY?
Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to participate or you may
discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which
you are otherwise entitled. Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect
your current or future relations with the University of North Dakota.
CONTACTS AND QUESTIONS?
The researcher conducting this study is Mark Vollmer. You may ask any questions you
have now. If you later have questions, concerns, or complaints about the research please
contact Mark Vollmer at 701-857-4422 during the day and at 701-500-9833 after hours.
You may also contact Dr. Pauline Stonehouse at 701-777-4163.
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, you may contact the
University of North Dakota Institutional Review Board at (701) 777-4279.
You may also call this number about any problems, complaints, or concerns you
have about this research study.
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You may also call this number if you cannot reach research staff, or you wish to
talk with someone who is independent of the research team.
General information about being a research subject can be found by clicking
“Information  for  Research  Participants”  on  the  web  site:  
http://und.edu/research/resources/human-subjects/research-participants.cfm
I give consent to be audio-taped during this study.
Please initial:

Yes

No

I give consent for my quotes to be used in the research; however I will not be
identified.
Please initial:

Yes

No

Your signature indicates that this research study has been explained to you, that your
questions have been answered, and that you agree to take part in this study. You will
receive a copy of this form.
Subjects Name: ______________________________________________________
__________________________________
Signature of Subject

___________________
Date

I have discussed the above points with the subject or, where appropriate, with the
subject’s  legally  authorized  representative.
__________________________________
Signature of Person Who Obtained Consent
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___________________
Date

Appendix C
General Questions for Focus Groups
Tell me about your personal experience with the Souris River Flood of 2011.
Where is your home located in Minot?
Which school did you reside closest to?
Where is your place of business/employment, and was this location in a flooded
area?
When did you realize the Souris River Valley was going to flood?
Where were you at when the sirens sounded on June 22, 2011?
How did the sound of sirens make you feel?
How did you, your family members, or friends (including children), react to the
reality of flooding in Minot?
How about students in your school?
What were you able to remove from your residence before the flood?
How did you make arrangements to remove, haul and store items from your
residence?
How many of your neighbors and friends were directly affected by the flood?
Many provided and offered assistance during the flood and initial recovery period.
Who  do  you  remember  as  being  “significant  helpers”  during  this  period?
Where did you stay during the flood and initial recovery period?
What emotions did you experience during the evacuation period? Recovery period?
How did you monitor what was going on in the valley during the flood?
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Did you seek counseling during the immediate crisis, or during the recovery period?
What do you think caused the Souris River Flood of 2011?
Tell me a little bit about your experience with FEMA:
How would you rate the response from FEMA?
What type of assistance did you receive from FEMA?
What type of assistance did you receive from the Small Business Administration
(SBA)?
If you lived in a FEMA trailer, please share a little bit about the experience.
What type of assistance did you receive from the city?
What type of assistance did you receive from the state?
What type of financial assistance was the most beneficial to you?
How long did it take for you to rebuild your residence?
How were you treated by workers and contractors who assisted in the clean up and
repair of your property?
How did your employer react to your situation?
Who were the most effective leaders of our community during the crisis and
response?
What made those individuals stand out in your opinion?
In your opinion, what are the chances of another flood happening in the future?
Have you experienced any signs of depression or anxiety during or since the flood?
Did you receive medical attention due to these feelings?
184

Was it easy to seek medical attention?
Do you have friends who experience emotional difficulties since the flood?
Is there any specific sensory item (touch, sound, smell, sight) that reminds you of
the flood?
If so, how does that make you feel?
Have you noticed this with friends or children in the community?
In  your  opinion,  when  will  the  residents  of  the  valley  be  “recovered”?
How could recovery been handled differently to ensure a quicker or more efficient
recovery?
We have certainly covered a lot of topics this evening. Is there anything else you
would like to cover or share?
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Appendix D
Permission to Conduct Study in Minot School District #1

Jim Rostad
Minot Public School Board President
(701) 833-8511
215 2nd St. SE
Minot, North Dakota 58701

July 22, 2012
Mr. Mark Vollmer, Superintendent
Minot Public School District #1
215 2nd St SE
Minot, ND 58701
Mr. Vollmer:
I am writing to give you permission to use data from post-flood surveys and other district
information directly related to the Souris Basin Flood of 1969 and 2011. This includes
all unpublished documentation relating to both flood events.
I look forward to the opportunity to visit with you about the results of your study upon its
completion. There is a real value in ensuring our school district gathers pertinent
information in regard to this devastating natural disaster, as well as providing a history of
flooding in the city of Minot.
It is my hope that you chronicle the events of 2011 and provide a detailed timeline of
events during, and leading up to this horrific flood.
On behalf of the Minot Public School District, I offer our full support of your research
project.
Sincerely,

Jim Rostad, President, Board of Education
Minot Public School District #1
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Appendix E
Poster Soliciting Volunteers for the Study
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Appendix F
Codes and Descriptive Examples
Code

Definition

N

Example of Participant’s  Words

Acceptance

Artifacts that describe
how flooded residents
learn to accept the
damage done to
property.

20

“We  still  have  a  roof  over  our  head.  .  .  .    We  
still have food on our table . . . financially . . .
we are going to get through this, but there are
some  that  struggle  with  that.”

ACE: Army
Corps of
Engineers

Artifacts that describe
the role of the Army
Corps of Engineers in
the flood fight and
subsequent recovery.

3

“They  deal  with  this  kind  of  thing  all  over  the  
country for a number of years, and they come
in  and  start  running  the  show.”

All Affected

Artifacts that describe
how all individuals in
the Minot area were
affected, in some way,
by the flood.

3

“I  think  so,  and  I  feel  like  they  do.    Because  
you think of all the people who had their
garages full of other people's stuff . . . and I
know we had stuff at five different places in
town. I think they would have to be pretty
dense  to  not  understand.”

Assistance:
Emergency
Shelters

Artifacts that describe
the experience of
living in Red Cross
Emergency Shelters
during the flood crisis.

2

“That  was  evident  in  the  fact  that  we  didn't  
need a Red Cross Center. . . . How many
people actually slept at the dome? Hardly
anybody.”

Assistance:
Faith-Based
Groups

Artifacts that describe
assistance from faithbased organizations
during the recovery
process.

19

“I  think  the  ecumenical  community  really  
stepped  it  up.”

Assistance:
Hope Village

Artifacts that describe
the role Hope Village
played in flood
recovery.

13

“For  those  families that came through case
management, we had a common goal . . . not
to  victimize  the  victims  anymore.”

Assistance:
Red Cross

Artifacts that describe
the role of the Red
Cross during the flood
and recovery period.

8

“We  had  donations  come  in  from  everywhere.
I saw donations from California, Florida, and
many states, as well as donations from
around the world – that was pretty neat, to
see the outpouring of support from
everywhere.”
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Appendix F. cont.
Code

Definition

N

Example of Participant’s  Words

Assistance:
Salvation
Army

Artifacts that describe
the role of the
Salvation Army during
the flood and recovery
period.

40

“If  you  want  a  cup  of  hot  coffee  close  to  the  
front, you didn't get it from the Red Cross,
you  got  it  from  the  Salvation  Army.”

Between
Evacuations

Artifacts that describe
activity between
evacuation periods.

3

“We  cleaned  our  entire  house.  .  .  .    We  even  
painted  our  daughter's  bedroom.”

Bureaucratic
Red Tape

Artifacts that describe
issues of bureaucratic
red tape, primarily in
dealing with federal
recovery programs.

42

“We  would  get  a  call,  and  they  would  tell  us  
they needed a piece of paper that didn't really
mean anything, but they wanted it. . . . Those
types  of  things  were  frustrating.”

Business –
Effects on

Artifacts that describe
the effect on business
owners in the Souris
River Valley.

7

"Some were rental houses that are owned by
people, who honestly, are still ticked off at the
city  or  the  government,  and  they  say,  ‘We  are  
going to board them up and leave them until
we  have  to  deal  with  them.’”

Cause of
Flood

Artifacts that describe
the alleged causes of
the Souris River Flood
of 2011.

37

“I  do  think  it  was  human  error  – We had
snow storms in Canada, but this can't be that
much different.”

Change in
Lifestyle:
Flood
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
how victim's lifestyles
changed as a result of
the flood.

17

“Our  home  was  flooded,  our  church  was  
flooded, every one of the kids activities were
flooded – gymnastics, dance, scouts. . . . The
only thing that was not affected was my
husband's  job.”

Changing
Community

Artifacts that describe
how the community
has changed since the
flood.

9

“That's  the  ugly  part  – it changed the
personality  of  our  city  to  a  certain  extent.”

Children:
Significant
Helpers
During
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
how children took an
active role in the
recovery and
rebuilding of homes in
the Souris River
Valley.

2

“And  we  depended  on  our  kids  so  much.  .  .  .    
They learned how to swing a hammer and a
crow bar . . . because they had to, because
they  were  a  part  of  it.”
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Appendix F. cont.
Code

Definition

N

Example of Participant’s  Words

Children: Privy
to Adult
Conversations

Artifacts that describe
how children were
often privy to adult
conversations during
the flood recovery
process.

10

“I  was  mad  for  a  long  time,  but  it  really  
doesn't matter. . . . When I heard my kids
repeat some of my statements, I said,
‘Enough of that.’”

City Recovery:
Negative

Artifacts that describe
negative aspects of the
city's recovery efforts.

48

“A  lot  of  discussion  about  recovery  and  
flood diversion projects . . . but not a lot
happening.”

City Recovery:
Neutral

Artifacts that describe
neutral aspects of the
city's recovery efforts.

2

“It  took  time,  and  it  was  done  on  their  time  
– the city had a lot of work done getting the
specs and plans done on it, and there was a
lot that had to be done, and it took time to
put it all together."

City Recovery:
Positive

Artifacts that describe
positive aspects of the
city's recovery efforts.

10

"I have to say . . . The police, the fire
fighters, my gosh, they were amazing . . .
24/7 . . . their job was endless . . . the kinds
of things they had to monitor."

Communication
Issues: Federal,
State, and Local
Agencies

Artifacts that describe
communication issues
between federal, state
and local
governmental
agencies before,
during, and after the
flood.

8

"What we did at the state – the state
designated a flood recovery coordinator,
and we wanted to have a city/county
recovery coordinator. Zimmerman was
designated, but was basically ignored by
the city. So, we tried to have a more
coordinated effort, and that didn't work."

Communication:
Flood Period

Artifacts that describe
communication to
citizens during the
flood period.

11

"We wanted somebody on staff from Day 1,
to coordinate communications, and it didn't
happen.”

Communication:
Flood Protection

Artifacts that describe
communication to
citizens on flood
protection plans
proposed by state and
local government
agencies.

2

"I think the federal and provincial officials
did the best they could with the information
they had at the time"
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Appendix F. cont.
Code

Definition

Communication:
Recovery Period

Artifacts that describe
communication to
citizens in regard to
flood recovery.

Communication:
River
Management

Artifacts that describe
communication to
citizens in regard to
management of the
river system.

Communication:
Rumor/Innuendo

Artifacts that describe
rumor and innuendo
that spread during the
pre-flood, flood, and
post-flood periods.

Communication:
Social Media

Artifacts that describe
the role of social
media as a
communication tool
by citizens of Minot
during the pre-flood,
flood, and post-flood
period.

Conditions in
Valley: Post
Flood

Artifacts that describe
the effect on the
valley after the
floodwater receded.

Consultants
Used in
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
the role of consultants
used in the recovery
process.

N

Example of Participant’s  Words

5

“I think another cardinal principal of crisis
management is providing accurate and
consistent information in an
understandable fashion, which means in
writing, in oral form and community.
Consistency is the key – you don't want
rumors to start, or people hearing things
differently.”

19

"I agree that communication between
agencies, on both sides of the borders . . .
that communication was stressed, and there
appeared to be a lot of agencies doing a lot
of different things."

31

"Those were built as flood control dams
and because they are there . . . they get
used for recreation. If you use them for
flood control, then empty them."

8

"There were rumors of looting and things
like that going on, and yes, there was some
looting going on . . . and I think that is
where we really took a bad turn with social
media."

4

"I remember recording something, and I
had these big old clod-hopper boots on,
and in the house was a 3 or 4 inch layer of
mud, and there was smoke alarms going off
in the neighborhood, and it was the only
sound . . . It was just dead."

16

“I  would  do  more  research  and  make  sure  
that I found one that had a good
relationship – I’d  weigh  it  out  a  lot  more  
carefully  .  .  .  I’m  not  sure,  I  think  the  state  
relationship, for us, was more important
that  the  consulting  firm.”
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Contractors:
Fraud

Artifacts that describe
fraudulent activity
exemplified by
contractors during the
recovery period.

10

"I know personally, someone in our
neighborhood who lost $20,000.00 . . . . paid
them upfront, and they disappeared . . ."

Contractors:
Positive
Experience

Artifacts that describe
positive experiences
with contractors during
flood recovery

14

"The contractor that fixed up my house ended
up renting it from me, and it worked out fine"

Contractors:
Price
Gouging

Artifacts that describe
examples of price
gouging by
contractors and
suppliers during the
recovery period.

23

"Even our local people jacked their prices on
everything . . . I mean, I couldn't believe like
a hot water heater, they were talking
$1,100.00 or $1,200.00 to install a hot water
heater

Contractors:
Shoddy
Workmanship

Artifacts that describe
examples of shoddy
workmanship
presented by
contractors during the
recovery period.

16

"So, I did find someone out of Minnesota . . .
they were very nice people, and they worked
fast . . . but $100,000.00 later, I have to put
money into it because my pipes freeze . . .
they put the pipes against the wall and they
freeze . . . and now I have to tear out my
kitchen cupboards and replace it"

Contractors:
Corrupt
Practices

Artifacts that describe
examples of corrupt
practices exemplified
by contractors during
the recovery period.

9

"I hired a friend of over 30 years . . . went to
elementary school with him . . . he was
nothing but trouble. He walked away with
about $23,000.00 of unfinished work . . .
haven't talked to him for years."

Contractors:
Excessive
Billing

Artifacts that describe
examples of excessive
billings (including
multiple billings for a
single service) by
contractors during the
recovery period.

5

"The only guy I can complain about is the guy
who did my taping, texturing, and painting
. . . who was excellence, but he screwed us
out of money. . . . He was too expensive . . .
at the time, I wanted it done, and I was at the
point that I wasn't doing any more work."
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Crisis
Management
During Flood

Artifacts that describe
crisis management
efforts during the flood
period.

Crisis
Management
During
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
crisis management
efforts during the
recovery period.

Critical
Incident
Command
Structure:
Negative

Artifacts that describe
negative perceptions of
the critical incident
command structure.

Damage
Assessment:
Critical
Nature of

Artifacts that describe
the critical nature of
damage assessment in
regard to flood
recovery and
qualification for
federal funding
programs.

Death: Stress
Related

Artifacts that describe
the belief that stress
was a factor in the
death of valley
residents following the
flood.

Decision
Making

Artifacts that describe
how citizens of the
valley worked to arrive
at an agreeable
decision in regard to
flood recovery.

N

Example  of  Participant’s  Words

10

"During the press conference, the one I
listened to was Sprynczynatyk . . . because I
knew that what he said was the truth, and he
was going to help us the best he could, and
for lack of any better words, he was going to
take no **** from nobody and tell us exactly
the way it was."

6

"What we were doing – we were building an
airplane while flying the darned thing. But,
leaders stepped up to lead, and that was a
strong, powerful thing."

5

"The critical incident command structure was
not able, for whatever reason, to be carefully
laid out enough to ensure who was in charge
and part of that was that Ward County did not
have a disaster response coordinator; they
had a person in that title, but there was really
nobody there to do it."

6

"It was crucial and it was a mess. They
screwed that up right from the beginning, and
it took a long time to get that cleaned up and
cleared up."

8

"We have some other friends who have died,
and I know it was stress related to the flood.
. . . They lost their house . . . she had just
retired from MPS."

22

"We were getting our house paid for . . . and
we were living with my parents . . . an hour
north of here. My dad was . . . even before it
actually flooded, he just kept pushing us . . .
‘what are you going to do?’ . . . and that was
the hardest part."
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Delayed
Repair

Artifacts that describe
how flooded residents
had to, or chose to,
delay repair on flooded
property.

12

"We waited until November of that year, until
they decided they were not going to do
anything with the Ramstad loop, then we
could fix up our home . . . so we were kind of
behind schedule and then had to make a last
minute decision if we were going to fix up our
house."

Denial: PreFlood &
Evacuation

Artifacts that describe
the denial flood
victims exemplified
during the pre-flood
and evacuation period.

18

"I distinctly remember the dad walking
around, drinking gin and tonics, basically
laughing at us, because we were moving his
stuff . . . and then finally, at about 8:30, it was
starting to get dark, and then it hit him – he
panicked."

Disconnect
with Reality

Artifacts that describe
a disconnect with
reality for victims
during the pre-flood,
flood, and post-flood
periods.

31

"You probably all thought the same thing I
thought . . . that there was no water inside."

Disconnect:
Victims v.
Non-Victims

Artifacts that describe
how flood victims
often felt disconnected
from friends and
family who did not
flood.

32

"I don't even feel like Minot was all in it
together . . . because not long after the flood,
and I work at the mall, and I heard people say
. . . aren't you glad the flood is over? It's like,
it's  not  over,  for  us,  the  flood  is  just  starting.”

Dispute:
Information
Aimed at
Disputing
Rumors

Artifacts that describe
how civic leaders
attempted to end
rumors and false
statements.

3

"It is important that the storage that we
bought and paid for was above and beyond
what the Canadians intended in the first place
. . . so they were never intended to be dry
dams . . . that is a misnomer."

Donor Gifts:
Corporate

Artifacts that describe
corporate donations
during the pre-flood,
flood, and post-flood
periods.

10

"Well, here at Longfellow, this seems like kind
of a silly thing, but people just wanted to help
. . . one of the things that just comes to mind is
that Happy Joe's sent pizza for our students
once a month."

Donor Gifts:
Individuals

Artifacts that describe
individual donations
during the pre-flood,
flood, and post-flood
periods.

2

"I remember crying because I had a gift card
so I could bring chicken out to the house . . .
working and crying in my car over chicken
. . . really?”
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Elderly:
Effects on

Artifacts that describe
how the flood affected
elderly citizens of the
valley.

Emotional
Effect:
Adults

Artifacts that describe
the emotional effects
experienced by adults
during the pre-flood,
flood, and post-flood
periods.

Emotional
Effect:
Preschool

Artifacts that describe
the emotional effects
experienced by preschool children during
the pre-flood, flood,
and post-flood periods.

Emotional
Effect:
School-Age

Artifacts that describe
the emotional effects
experienced by schoolage (elementary)
during the pre-flood,
flood, and post-flood
periods.

Emotional
Effect: Teens

Artifacts that describe
the emotional effects
experienced by
teenagers during the
pre-flood, flood, and
post-flood periods.

Emotional:
Anger

Artifacts that describe
the emotion of anger
resulting from the
flood experience.

Emotional:
Short
Tempers
During
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
how many flood
victims had short
tempers during the preflood, flood, and postflood periods.

N

Example  of  Participant’s  Words

44

"Two houses down were elderly, and we were
going through houses before we left . . . they
made the beds and left everything in the
fridge. They took their meds, a suitcase, and
went to a nursing home in Bismarck . . . and
now have passed away."

60

"I also had those moments where it was tough
to make it. . . . We would get up at 6:30 every
morning, have some breakfast at 7:00 . . . get
my big cup of coffee, and I would go down
and sit on the porch and have my cry . . . a
big  cry.”  

9

"I had a little boy that kept stacking up reams
of paper, and I asked what he was doing. He
said he was sheet rocking his house, .and then
he would tear it down . . . "I'm gutting my
house." . . . So there was a lot of role
playing."

53

When she started swimming, she said, "I
always see our house in the bottom of the
pool, and she would swim kind of reluctantly.
. . . but she always thought that much water
reminded her of the flood."

51

"She took it hard. . . . It was so cramped, and
she just got to the point where she didn't even
want to go to school . . . besides not wanting
to be in school, she was fighting with other
girls . . . not really physically, but bickering."

18

"I'm still very angry . . . very bitter about it.
. . . I'm pissed off at our government. . . . I'm
pissed off at the Canadian government . . . not
really happy with our city council."

3

"There were times, after the flood, and I
would say something, and to me it wasn't that
important, or she would say something, and
snap, not meaning it and apologizing right
after it . . . and that would have never
happened before the flood."
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Equity:
Comparison
to Other
Disasters

Artifacts that describe
the perception that
inequity exists in the
role of the federal
government in the
recovery process.

29

"If Katrina could get that much, why couldn't
those of us in the middle? . . . . Why can't we
get treated the same?"

Fear: Future
Flooding

Artifacts that describe
the fear of flooding in
future years.

37

"We've done nothing in the basement, because
frankly, Minot has done nothing to prevent
this  from  happening  again.”

Federal
Assistance:
Duplication
of Benefits

Artifacts that describe
how federal assistance
programs were
concerned that victims
may receive duplicated
services.

4

"What we ran into – if you got an SBA loan,
you don't get help from anybody else . . .
because you got an SBA loan, which was
supposed to cover everything, but it didn't."

4

"During that time, during the flood, since I
was unemployed, I was able to get disaster
unemployment for a very short period of time
. . . and I got 58.00 per month. It doesn't go
that far.”

Federal
Assistance:
Other Forms

Artifacts that describe
other forms of federal
assistance.

Federal
Involvement:
Inefficiencies

Artifacts that describe
inefficiencies of
federal involvement in
regard to flood
recovery, as perceived
by flood victims.

66

"And that's' what is so frustrating with the
government . . . I could take that $20,000.00
and buy a boat, like maybe people did down
in Louisiana, but I want to give it right back,
and I am told that I can't."

FEMA
Experience:
Negative

Artifacts that describe
negative perceptions of
the FEMA experience
as noted by flood
victims.

20

"Didn't care for that ‘meeting a guy’ thing . . .
so there I am in the Kmart parking lot with
this  gentlemen,  sitting  in  his  vehicle.”

FEMA
Experience:
Neutral

Artifacts that describe
neutral perceptions of
the FEMA experience
as noted by flood
victims.

3

"We just used our FEMA money to get on the
main level. The girls' bedrooms were upstairs
and untouched, so we used the FEMA money
just to get into the house."

FEMA
Experience:
Positive

Artifacts that describe
positive perceptions of
the FEMA experience
as noted by flood
victims.

10

"It was big news when one of those trailers
came rolling to the area."
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17

"We had an inspector come to our house, and
you know . . . everyone was supposed to wear
boots, gloves, and masks. . . . This guy came
in tennis shoes. He asked to see our electric
box, and my wife told him it was back in the
corner of the basement. He could not see it,
and I suggested he go outside and look, but he
wouldn't."

FEMA
Individual
Assistance
Experience:
Negative

Artifacts that describe
negative perceptions of
the FEMA Individual
Assistance program as
noted by flood victims.

FEMA
Individual
Assistance
Experience:
Positive

Artifacts that describe
positive perceptions of
the FEMA Individual
Assistance program as
noted by flood victims.

11

"As far as my work with FEMA on my home,
it was pretty easy. . . . They came in,
evaluated my house, and they figured how
much I was going to get . . . and I got my
$30,000.00."

FEMA
Public
Assistance
Experience:
Negative

Artifacts that describe
negative perceptions of
the FEMA Public
Assistance program as
noted by leaders of
public entities.

60

"We were fighting with people on the ground
while still trying to get the mess cleaned up."

FEMA
Public
Assistance
Experience:
Neutral

Artifacts that describe
neutral perceptions of
the FEMA Public
Assistance program as
noted by leaders of
public entities.

11

"Once we got past which building[s] were
going to be repaired and which would be
replaced, I would actually say that it got
better."

FEMA
Workers:
Negative

Artifacts that describe
negative experiences
with FEMA workers as
perceived by flood
victims.

14

"But when they brought the trailer . . . this
guy . . . ‘Now don't forget, all of this is the
property of the United States Government.’
And I said . . . ‘I'm not going to sell it.’ . . . ‘If
it’s damaged you will be liable for it,’ and I
thought . . . how stupid do these people think
we  are?”

FEMA
Workers:
Positive

Artifacts that describe
positive experiences
with FEMA workers as
perceived by flood
victims.

22

"I have to say . . . the FEMA people that we
met were super."
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FEMA:
Flood
Insurance

Artifacts that describe
the FEMA Flood
Insurance experience.

20

"My friends had enough flood insurance to
cover the basement, so they only got a check
from FEMA for $2,000.00. . . . The
difference. She told me that they will never
pay it off, but she hopes to live long enough to
do it, and piss them off."

FEMA:
Hazard
Mitigation

Artifacts that describe
the FEMA policy of
Hazard Mitigation, in
regard to flood
prevention.

4

"We even had to fight with them to upgrade
electrical to current code. . . . We pushed
that, and they finally agreed and paid."

FEMA:
Housing

Artifacts that describe
the experience of
living in FEMA
housing.

59

"We tried to make the best of it, but we
learned to live closer as a family in the FEMA
trailer, with no cable and one channel on the
TV – two teenagers with no cable and no
internet. . . . I laugh now."

FEMA: Least
Cost
Alternatives

Artifacts that describe
the FEMA policy of
Least Cost Alternative,
and the effect on
public entities
recovering from the
flood.

3

"It was a least cost alternative decision, so
the district made those decisions with a
construction manager who helped to
determine how we would move forward."

FEMA: Like
for Like

Artifacts that describe
the FEMA policy of
Like for Like, and the
effect on public entities
recovering from the
flood.

1

"Like for like meant that is if you lost a
10,000 square foot building, that would be
what you could build. Like for like meant that
whatever you lost, they will replace."

FEMA:
Mitigation of
Damages

Artifacts that describe
the FEMA policy of
Mitigation of
Damages, and the
effect on public entities
recovering from the
flood.

6

"The Ramstad project . . . we were trying to
convince FEMA that since it had flooded
twice in 42 years, that yes, it was in the 100
year flood plain, and they had already, from
what we could gather, made a determination
that they would not relocate it."

Financial
Strain: Flood
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
the financial difficulty
experienced as a result
of the flood and
subsequent recovery.

47

"I hadn't paid for my house the first time, and
now I have to pay for it again."
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Flood
Protection:
Enhanced

Artifacts that describe
the process and
challenges of
developing an
enhanced flood
protection plan for the
city of Minot.

12

"A lot of people . . . they are waiting because
their homes are in the potential diversion
area, and maybe a potential buyout area, and
many of those people have seen nothing on
their homes . . . and they won't for a long
time."

Flood
Protection:
Buy-Outs

Artifacts that describe
the social, emotional,
and financial effects of
property buy-outs for
flood protection.

15

"In January, she got a letter for a buyout . . .
she's in the mandatory buyout . . . so we aren't
done dealing with that yet. . . . It’s
mandatory, so she has to leave the home, so
we are just starting over again with her."

Guilt
Associated
with
Receiving
Assistance
from Others

Artifacts that describe
the guilt flood victims
felt when receiving
assistance from others.

14

"I felt like I had to be the person who did her
housekeeping for her and cook for her . . . any
way to pay her back."

History of
Flooding:
Comparisons

Artifacts that describe
the history of flooding
in the Souris River
Valley, as well as
comparisons to other
floods.

17

"The person next to us . . . we literally had to
go in and talk her into getting out, because
she didn't want to leave . . . because she
evacuated in 1969 and nothing happened."

Housing
Shortage

Artifacts that describe
the housing shortage
that was evident before
the flood, and the
subsequent effects
noticed by victims of
the flood.

20

"Yes, I think the city has grown because of the
oil, but I think we have lost many people who
were here for many years because they had
no choice but to go find some relatives to live
with or find other options."

18

"As the school year was winding down, I had
my bible out and I usually make a few goals,
and on my list was to clean the house really
well . . . and I put it too close to my prayer
list, so I just wanted to say it was my fault. . . .
I should have been more specific on how God
should answer that prayer."

Humor

Artifacts that describe
how humor helped to
lighten the load for
flood survivors.
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Individual
Corrupt
Practices

Artifacts that describe
corrupt practices that
were evident during
the flood and recovery
period.

Individual
Perseverance

Artifacts that describe
the perseverance that
was shown by many
flood victims.

N

Example  of  Participant’s  Words

1

"We had neighbors that rented to some
people in California to make money off their
FEMA trailer while they were fixing up
their house, and they were living in a house
that barely had heat so they could rent out
their FEMA trailer . . . It is frustrating to
see that."

45

"We were just stubborn old German people
. . . that said we are going to do this, and we
are going to get it done . . . and that was
our life for the first 6 months for sure."

Inter-Agency:
Duplication of
Services

Artifacts that describe
experiences with help
agencies that provided
duplicated services.

8

"My son was told that you qualify, but the
money[BND Loan] goes to SBA and Scott
Louser, who was instrumental in getting
that passed through the legislature, was
incensed by that and said it was the goal for
it to be easy money for people to get their
hands on."

Inter-Agency:
Turf Wars

Artifacts that describe
examples of interagency struggles and
battles over their role
in flood assistance and
recovery.

22

"So, we had county and city, and non-profit
organizations all butting heads. It was
difficult to determine who was in charge."

Late Nights
During
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
how victims who did
the majority of
reconstructive work
spent many long hours
in addition to regular
employment.

4

"Every night we would come home from
work and throw something in the crock pot-the rule was that we would work until 9:00,
and then we would go in and eat supper,
and watch the news, and go to bed."

Lessons
Learned:
Communication

Artifacts that describe
perceived "lessons
learned" in regard to
communication.

10

"The first thing to do is to tell the truth.
What they can't handle is when you tell
them something, and then something
different, and then something different
again."

Lessons
Learned:
Evacuation

Artifacts that describe
perceived "lessons
learned" in regard to
evacuation.

28

"It was nickels for dollars. . . . I don't know
how you write a master manual or master
plan of how to evacuate, but I think it is
something we could easily do or offer for
future."
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Lessons Learned:
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
perceived "lessons
learned" in regard to
flood recovery.

31

"Collaboration . . . we need to collaborate
with everyone. . . . It seems like there was
a  lot  of  ‘hurry up and wait.’"

Life During
Evacuation

Artifacts that describe
the experience of
living during the
evacuation period.

4

"We never really moved back in . . . many
of our neighbors around us had tons of
seepage, and we had the elevated
foundation, but we were worried about
sewer failure, so we didn't move back in."

Limited
Removal:
Evacuation

Artifacts that describe
how many residents
removed very little
from their homes prior
to the flood.

14

"I know one couple that, they just like
packed an overnight bag, and they lef . . .
they had flood insurance, and they knew
things were covered, so they just left . . .
that was on odd situation, but they didn't
know people."

Mental Health:
Availability

Artifacts that describe
the availability of
mental health services
during the Souris
River Flood of 2011.

4

"Trinity Riverside was flood[ed], and they
relocated. Two providers had their
practices flood out, and one, if not both,
had their homes destroyed, so they were
essentially removed from the list of
providers."

Mental Health:
Counseling
Experience

Artifacts that describe
varied experiences
with counseling after
the flood and
subsequent recovery
period.

17

"I'm sure she was so depressed. I took her
to see somebody . . . that lasted once, and
she  said,  ‘I don't want to go back,’ and I
didn't make her."

Mental Health:
Re-establish a
Sense of Control

Artifacts that describe
the need for flood
victims to re-establish
a sense of control
following the flood.

18

"The flood stoked people's sense of
unfairness – the arbitrary nature of it.
And one of the things that we do, in fact,
the cardinal rule in working with people
following a disaster, you need to do
everything you can to re-establish a sense
of control."

Mental Health:
Recommendation

Artifacts that describe
various
recommendations
made by mental health
providers in regard to
appropriate dealing
with emotional issues
caused by the flood.

3

"From shock to anger to bargaining, and
that these were linear things, and that
once you go through these stages, you
don't go back, and that is clearly a
fantasy."
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National
Guard
Presence

Artifacts that describe
the National Guard
presence in the valley
during the Souris River
flood of 2011.

8

"When we went in with the boat, we got
caught by the national guard . . . and he
asked what we were doing, and then he said,
. . . I know what you are doing . . . just be
careful."

National
Media
Attention

Artifacts that describe
the presence of
national media in the
city during the flood
and subsequent
recovery period.

3

"We had the third largest deployment of
FEMA housing, and yet that missed all the
press, so I think that part of this issue was by
that time, disaster had gotten kind of old."

Neglect:
Rebuilding

Artifacts that describe
how some victims felt
neglected during the
recovery period.

5

"Wife, new-born child, and the emotion that
he had was a sense of utter abandonment."

Neighborhood
Effect

Artifacts that describe
how neighborhoods
reacted to the flood
and subsequent
recovery.

22

"I used to know my neighbors, but not
anymore, it is all rental property . . . . I don't
know anybody anymore, except for my
neighbors across the street."

Personal Loss

Artifacts that describe
how specific, personal
items caused much
sadness among flood
victims and their
families.

31

"I miss our friends that moved away. . . .
They lost their house, and had no reason . . .
lost that connection."

Pet
Displacement

Artifacts that describe
how pet owners and
pets were displaced
and often separated
during the flood and
subsequent recovery
period.

13

"Our pets couldn't be with us, and they were
sheltered . . . our little dog went with my
mother-in-law in Bismarck for over a year,
and our two big dogs were out at a kennel at
our friend's farm, so every day, we drove out
there."
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Political
Leaders:
Involvement

Artifacts that describe
the involvement in
political leaders during
the flood period and
subsequent recovery
period.

10

"And realizing that we did have alderman that
were flood victims themselves, and asking
them to play dual roles, was probably a bit
much, but for the rest of them . . . I truly
expected more."

Political
Leaders:
Perceived
Effectiveness

Artifacts that describe
the perceived
effectiveness of
political leaders during
the evacuation, flood,
and subsequent
recovery period.

21

"I felt like they were too afraid to make a
decision, even if it was the wrong decision."

Poor:
Effects on

Artifacts that describe
how individuals in
poverty were affected
by the flood of 2011.

11

"And those who didn't have transportation, or
had faulty transportation . . . what then? If
they didn't have the networking that we all
had . . . what then?"

Pre-Flood
Fight

Artifacts that describe
the efforts of the
community in holding
back the Souris River
for three months prior
to the actual flood.

19

"It was interesting as we watched that whole
situation go down . . . not feeling very good
when we saw that 12 foot dike go up around
that building . . . we knew it was going to be
interesting."

Press
Coverage:
Local 24
Hour

Artifacts that describe
the experience of
viewing live, 24-hour
coverage during the
crest of the flood.

45

"The uncertainty of what was going on . . .
and watching the news, and seeing that first
airboat going down the streets it was all real
. . . we were flooded."

Re-Entry:
Before Ban
Lifted

Artifacts that describe
the desire to enter into
restricted areas before
the evacuation ban was
lifted.

13

"I was in my neighborhood two days before
everyone else . . . secretively."

Reality
Check:
Evacuation

Artifacts that describe
the point in which an
individual accepted the
flood forecast and
determined the
urgency and necessity
of evacuation.

11

"That press conference . . . I thought we were
going to fight it, and I thought we were going
to win. . . . I thought we were going to get it,
and that morning, they met with the staff that
morning before the press conference, and you
could  have  heard  a  pin.”
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Regional
Effects of
Flooding

Artifacts that describe
the effects of flooding
throughout the Souris
River Valley.

3

"The new normal for a place like Towner, you
know . . . where it used to just flood those
meadows in the Spring . . . the new normal is
dealing with grasses that were impacted with
poisonous and toxic materials for their
cattle.”

River
Management

Artifacts that describe
the perceptions of river
management in the
Souris River Valley.

32

"They are doing a study, and they are figuring
out which aspects they would like to change.
I think things will happen there, and we will
get better management."

SBA
Experience:
Negative

Artifacts that describe
negative aspects of the
SBA experience, as
noted by flood victims.

22

"As far as qualifying for loans . . . and we
have never dealt with the same person twice
in dealing with SBA, and we battled for month
. . . and that's when we finally kicked them to
the curb . . . because it was chaos."

SBA
Experience:
Neutral

Artifacts that describe
neutral aspects of the
SBA experience, as
noted by flood victims.

4

"As far as SBA, I was told that I did not
qualify."

SBA
Experience:
Positive

Artifacts that describe
positive aspects of the
SBA experience, as
noted by flood victims.

3

"And then we worked with another gentleman
. . . he was a lawyer . . . he ended up coming
back to assist because SBA was so far behind.
Everything went smoothly from there on."

13

"The toughest part of my job for the last 13
years, was the time before the flood, and
being in the circle of our engineers and public
works directors, because I could see and hear
the fear . . . and I would have other friends
and family asking what I was hearing."

8

"I'm special education . . . a speech therapist,
and there was like six of us sharing this space
. . . they had to put a curtain up . . . we made
it work . . . I mean it wasn't wonderful, but I
still think we provided decent services for our
kids."

Shock
Association:
Evacuation

Artifacts that describe
the shock associated
with evacuation.

School
Experience:
Post Flood

Artifacts that describe
the post-flood
experience in the
Minot Public School
District.
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School
Experience:
Evacuation

Artifacts that describe
the evacuation of
school buildings in the
valley.

1

"We were just in a scramble, and it was a
madhouse . . . be honest with you, I wish there
were things I would have done, but we were
in the middle of a mess."

School
Experience:
Temporary
Facilities

Artifacts that describe
the educational
experience in
temporary facilities
following the flood.

23

"Things went pretty well when we moved into
the new Lincoln . . . because we had familiar
faces, we gave them  a  different  environment.”

School
Response

Artifacts that describe
how the school
responded to the flood
and subsequent
recovery, as perceived
by flood victims.

24

"The school was amazing . . . the year she
was in the portables at Longfellow, they were
so good to those kids . . . and they couldn't
have had better teachers.

Self Help:
Rebuilding.

Artifacts that describe
the experience of
completing most of the
recovery work without
seeking contracted or
hired assistance.

27

"We, too, started early, and we determined
. . . well, my husband determined, that he
would do as much as he could on his own."

SelfMedication

Artifacts that describe
how some flood
victims would "self
medicate" in order to
deal with stress during
the flood and
subsequent recovery
period.

7

"I was pretty much self-medicated with
alcohol and Lorazapam. . . . I didn't have to
drive, thank goodness."

Sensory
Issues:
Reminders of
the Flood

Artifacts that describe
various sensory
reminders that
emotionally takes a
victim "back" to the
flood crisis.

47

"When you smell it again, it just stops you in
your tracks. When I walked into Arrowhead
Mall after it opened, and when I opened the
door, that smell was right there.”
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Shock
Association:
Flooding

Artifacts that describe
the shock associated
with the reality of
flooding and
subsequent evacuation
from the valley.

37

"My house . . . I was in an island until one
night on the TV . . . the boat went down
Eastwood Park, and went all the way around
my house. They were on the street and went
around the corner, and I saw everything.
Even standing on the bridge with binoculars,
I thought maybe it's not on the main floor, but
seeing my front door in water . . . that's when
it hit."

Shock
Association:
Damage

Artifacts that describe
the shock associated
with the reality of
damage caused by the
flood.

41

"But nothing was really breathing or living
down there . . . we rebuilt around us."

Shock
Association:
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
the shock associated
with all aspects of
recovery.

7

"It became too much for my sister, so she
walked out on me, and my brother in law did
too."

Shock: First
Time
Assessment
of Damage

Artifacts that describe
the shock associated
with the first
assessment of damage
in the victim's home,
business or school.

25

"My husband had actually bought those face
masks with the filters on them . . . and he was
like . . . trust me . . . you [are] going to need
these. It was the end of July when we finally
went in, and I remember trying to take the
mask off to wipe the tears away, and he
wouldn't let me . . . we stood on top of the
dike, and that was all we saw . . . was water."

Sirens:
Remember
Your
Location

Artifacts that indicate
where an individual
was when the sirens
sounded, to indicate
that water was topping
the city's levy system.

22

"I had just locked up the adult learning center
. . . and had driven away . . . and had gotten
in line by the water treatment plant. I could
see the water coming, and knew we had to get
across that bridge . . . And they were lined up
probably a mile or so behind me."

State
Involvement:
BND

Artifacts that describe
personal experiences
with the Bank of North
Dakota's loan program.

13

"And we got the North Dakota loan . . . that
was simple."
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State
Involvement:
Procurement
Regulations
Lifted

Artifacts that describe
the effects, negative
and positive, of the
state's decision of lift
procurement
restrictions, which
allowed many
contractors to work in
our state without
proper vetting.

State
Involvement:
Sales Tax
Rebate

Artifacts that describe
the perspectives of
flood victims in regard
to the sales tax rebate
legislation.

State
Involvement:
NDDES

Artifacts that describe
the working experience
between the North
Dakota Department of
Emergency Services
and flood affected
public entities.

Stress of
Evacuation

Stress of
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
how flood victims
experienced stress
during the evacuation
period.

Artifacts that describe
how flood victims
experienced stress
during the recovery
period.

N

Example  of  Participant’s  Words

2

"It allowed us to respond in a much quicker
fashion, and allowed us to mitigate potential
losses."

9

"We took the time to do all that, and we sent it
all in, and then we got a letter back a month
later, saying, ‘How about those seven people
who did your plumbing, heating, and roof?’      
. . . Had to go get an affidavit from them."

9

"And the people from NDDES . . . when we
got to that point, they were helpful. Our
senators were involved. . . . It was kind of sad
that we had to get other government officials
involved to get to the point where we are, but
it’s what we had to do."

21

"One of the problems you have in any flood,
and you experienced it too, is that people get
exhausted. When you are working 24/7, week
after week, and you are only one deep, people
start getting exhausted, and then they start
getting cranky, and little things become big
things, and there is no time to take any time
off."

19

"It took two trips to the local bank to get
somebody in Minneapolis to say . . . ‘Your
mortgage is paid, and here is the rest of your
money,’ but after that, maybe it is today's
standards, but when you are in that crisis
mode, you just don't know how much longer
you can wait."

207

Appendix F. cont.
Code

Definition

N

Example  of  Participant’s  Words

Stress on
Family

Artifacts that describe
how flood victims
experienced stress
among family
members during the
evacuation and
recovery process.

34

"Well, living with our daughter was
interesting . . . we were only there for a
couple of weeks, and it was a tough situation,
mainly because our daughter has rules . . .
uhhh, with us and our three dogs, and some of
those rules were not easy to follow. She has a
small apartment, and it was very cramped."

Stress on
Marriage

Artifacts that describe
how flood victims
experienced marital
stress during the
evacuation and
recovery process.

15

"It was terrible to say, but it was a long time
to live with your in-laws . . . like my husband
said . . . it won't be that bad, and I said . . .
they're your parents, and you lived with them
your whole life."

Stress
Related
Illness

Artifacts that describe
how flood victims
experienced illness that
they related to stress.

13

"There has been a lot of illness . . . we hear a
lot about people who have respiratory
problems."

Stress
Relievers
During Crisis
& Recovery

Artifacts that describe
how flood victims
relieved stress during
the crisis and recovery
period.

22

"And another thing that seemed to help was
social systems . . . church night, soccer
practice, and those normal, day-to-day
practices that took their minds off things and
helped hold people together."

Survivor
Guilt

Artifacts that describe
how citizens who were
not affected by the
flood experienced
feelings of guilt.

5

"We had a lot of survivor guilty . . . we ended
up helping a lot of families whose houses
were flooded and those we thought who were
flooded, because a lot of people were gutting
their homes."

The North
Dakota Way

Artifacts that describe
how flood victims
showed a high degree
of tenacity in dealing
with crisis.

9

"We are very lucky . . . we are Midwesterners.
Until recently, we haven't been too transient,
and people have been able to build
relationships, so I guess anything that helps
the community be strong and healthy, instead
of having a huge police force . . . we watch
out for people and each other."
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Transitional
Living
Experience:
Positive

Artifacts that describe
positive aspects of the
transitional living
experience.

29

"People were so generous . . . to this day, we
joke that we need a sleepover. It was a good
experience . . . we have good friends."

82

"We put our daughter in the house - she laid
on a mattress on the living room floor. . . .
My mom slept on the couch, my nephew slept
on the floor, so we slept outside in that little
makeshift camper until September. . . . It got
to the point, on different occasions . . . I woke
up with ants crawling on me."

Transitional
Living
Experience:
Struggles

Artifacts that describe
struggles with the
transitional living
experience.

Transitional
Living: Added
Expense

Artifacts that describe
added expenses
incurred during the
transitional living
period.

5

"My cell phone bill showed it that summer. I
spent hours on the phone, trying to line up
electricians and workers, and then when I
got my bill, I was like . . . Oh, my gosh."

Transitional
Living:
Neutral

Artifacts that describe
the neutral experience
associated with
transitional living.

17

"We lived with my mom off and on for a few
months."

Transportation
During Flood

Artifacts that describe
transportation issues
that were evident
during the flood,
which affected all
citizens of the
community.

25

"Yep - you had to have your tank full of gas
when you got on the bypass . . . you didn't
know how long you were going to be there."

38

". . . got a lot of friends through Scouts and
family that brought a trailer down, and we
were lucky enough to get most of the
important stuff out or at least up to the
second floor . . . so it didn't get affected.
That was . . . and then just the outcropping of
friends and family that helped us out along
the way."

Volunteerism:
Evacuation

Artifacts that describe
volunteerism during
the evacuation period.
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Volunteerism:
Flood Period

Artifacts that describe
volunteerism during
the flood period.

9

"I called . . . the Red Cross wanted people to
answer phones, and I called and said I could
. . . We were flooded, and my husband was
like . . . what are you doing?"

Volunteerism:
Recovery

Artifacts that describe
volunteerism during
the recovery period.

51

"We would have family that would come and
help us on the weekends, and we would use
every bit of that time."

Volunteerism:
Co-Workers

Artifacts that describe
volunteerism provided
by co-workers during
the evacuation and
recovery period.

9

"The first time I met my husband's boss, he
was picking my underwear off of the floor
and throwing it in a bag. . . . "Nice to meet
you . . . so we got everything out but the light
bulbs - we took everything."

Water Level

Artifacts that describe
the water level in each
home - something that
seemed very important
to flood victims.

27

"We lived in our home for about 23 years. . . .
It was right behind Oak Park, and we had it
up to the countertop."

Weird
Findings

Artifacts that describe
the strange things that
were found after the
flood.

17

"I remember walking into my room, and my
piano was over here when I left. . . . When I
went back in, it was over here on its side . . .
and again . . . you just don't pick up a piano."

Women:
Effects on

Artifacts that describe
how women,
especially single
women, dealt with
evacuation and
recovery.

12

"It was just I and the three kids, so we didn't
have  a  vehicle.”

Zombie
Homes

Artifacts that describe
the social, emotional,
and financial effects of
homes in the valley
that are not repaired,
and are thus referred to
as Zombie Homes.

12

"We still have a Zombie House . . . and we
used to look and see a beautiful yard, but
now, all we see is a Zombie House."
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